On 12 November Hopetoun forwarded to Chamberlain a copy of the Bill as it then stood in the Senate. In a long
covering despatch, he drew attention to sub-section (a) of clause 4 as one which
may possibly lead to friction in the immediate future with the Government of nations with whom it is
essential that His Majesty's Government should maintain relations of a cordial character.
The Governor-General pointed out that in deference to
Chamberlain's suggestion, the education test had been amended to comply with that of the Natal Act. He continued:
1. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, secret cable, 19 August 1901. C.O. 418/10/29263, folios 81-86. A copy of the despatch is in CP 78, series 9, folio 69. C.A.O.
2. Chamberlain to Hopetoun, Secret, 9 September 1901. CP 78, series 1, file 65, bundle 2. C.A.O. For draft of the cable see C.O. 418/10/29263, folios 81-86.
I am aware that legislation of the character contained in this Bill, is hardly likely to commend itself to His Majesty's Government, but the feeling in Australia against the unrestricted entry into the Commonwealth of large numbers of Foreigners, and more
especially of large numbers of Asiatics, is so intense that I cannot blame my Government for having introduced a measure of this kind.
He requested special instructions in respect to clause 4, informing the Secretary of State that if the Bill passed in its existing form he would communicate immediately and hoped to receive by telegram the decision of the British Government as to whether the Bill should be reserved or not. ■*"
This despatch was sent by sea and did not reach London until 19 December. In the meantime the Bill had been
swiftly passed by both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. Accordingly Hopetoun cabled on 12 December:
Immigration Restriction bill has passed through both Houses of Parliament. In accordance with your
suggestion word European has been substituted for
English in clause 4 (a) and in view of your despatch ... of 18 October I do not see any reason for withholding royal assent.12
1. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 12 November 1901. C.O. 418/10/ 44750, folios 394-396.
2. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, cable, 12 December 1901. C.O. 418/10/43872, folios 538-539. The despatch of 18
October, referred to by Hopetoun, had been one forwarding correspondence between Chamberlain and the Foreign
Office over complaints by the Japanese Government in respect of Commonwealth Immigration and Postal Bills. In the reply to the Foreign Office, H.B. Cox, Under secretary at the Colonial Office, had written 'Mr Chamberlain does not think either that His Majesty's Government is in a position to suggest a modification of the Australian immigration test, or that there is any prospect that the Commonwealth Government would be able to entertain such a suggestion'. Despatch no. 82
Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 18 October 1901, received 20 November 1901. CP. 78, series 1, item 65. C.A.O.
While the Colonial Office felt that little would be gained by instructing the Governor-General to reserve the Bill,
they failed to reply immediately as Hopetoun had specifically requested in his surface despatch. Instead, a copy of the cable of 12 December was forwarded to the Foreign Office for consideration.
During this correspondence with the Secretary of State, Hopetoun had been carrying on a parallel exchange with his chief Australian adviser over the same issue. In August he had commented that there were no specific classes of legislation upon which he was instructed to reserve the Royal Assent and asked the Prime Minister to consider
'whether there is the shadow of a reason for my reserving the aliens immigration Bill'.^ Barton had not needed any reminder about the provisions of the Governor-General's Instructions. During his stay in Britain in 1900, the
Colonial Office had consulted him about their form and later, copies were sent to him. To Deakin he had expressed
satisfaction that:
they are as wide as we could possibly have wished. Absolutely no stated restriction on the power to
sign the Royal Assent on the spot.2
In the federal parliamentary situation of 1901, the possibility of Labor Party objections to any suggestion that Britian was dictating to Australia on the question, made Barton anxious to avoid Hopetoun's reservation of the
1. Hopetoun to Barton, 8 August 1901. Barton papers, MS 51/419. A.N.L.
2. Barton to Deakin, 5 November 1900. Deakin papers , MS 1540/435. A.N.L.
Royal Assent.'*' Representations on behalf of the Secretary of State pressing for the substitution of a language test
in any European language rather than in the English language were probably decisive in Barton's acceptance of the
amendment, to avoid an excuse for Hopetoun to reserve the Bill. He had, perforce, to keep secret His Excellency's agency in suggesting the alteration, to avoid the accusation of Downing Street control.
Even after the dictation test provision was altered, Hopetoun was careful to retain the option of reserving the Bill. On 11 November he wrote to Barton:
The question as to whether or not this Bill will have to be reserved will have to be considered & I shall be gratified if you will... make known to me your opinions on this point.^
At the same time he informed Barton of his intention of sending a copy of the Bill as it then stood, to the Secretary of
State. A month later he was still cautious not to commit
himself. When the Speaker signified his intention to present both the Pacific Island Labourers Bill and the Immigration Restriction Bill for the Royal Assent, Hopetoun informed Barton that he would receive both Bills but did not propose to assent to them immediately. He wanted an opportunity to consult the Prime Minister about them. In particular he felt
1. See Ronald Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth, 1901-10. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National
University, 1970. In July 1901 a Labor M.H.R., R.A. Crouch, had tabled a question which objected to the Instructions of the Governor-General as 'subversive to responsible government'. C.P.D., 1901-2, III, p. 2807.
2. Hopetoun to Barton, 11 November 1901. Barton papers, MS 51/440. A.N.L.
that the Immigration Restriction Bill 'requires careful & earnest consideration'. He assured Barton that he was 'most anxious to do whatever is right'.^
Rejecting a last minute appeal from the Queensland Premier, calling upon him to reserve the Pacific Island
2
Labourers Bill Hopetoun assented formally to that Bill
on 19 December. However he did not assent to the Immigration Restriction Bill, probably waiting for definite instructions from the Colonial Office. To further complicate the
situation he was due to leave Melbourne for a four weeks tour of Western Australia on 21 December. By the time
he left no reply had been received from the Colonial Office, and the Governor-General had still not signed the Royal
Assent. As the delay could not continue much further
without becoming public, and Barton was obviously concerned that His Excellency deal with the matter himself, Hopetoun eventually agreed. On 23 December in the train at Adelaide en route to Perth the Governor-General assented on behalf
3 of the King to the Immigration Restriction legislation.
Writing to Chamberlain in February 1902 Hopetoun explained that the Bill had given him
much anxiety. But after a great deal of thought I gave my assent to it as in my opinion the least evil course to follow. I felt that if I reserved
1. Hopetoun to Barton, 11 December 1901. Barton papers, MS 51/453. A.N.L.
2. See Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 19 December 1901. C.O. 418/10/3604, folios 583-589.
it there would be a violent agitation against what still remains of Imperial control.1
Ironically while His Excellency was still absent from the seat of government a protest by the Japanese Acting Consul- General reached Melbourne, belatedly drawing attention to a serious conflict between the Immigration Restriction Bill and a Protocol adhered to by the Queensland Government in
2
October 1900. The Governor-General cabled the substance of the Japanese protest to Chamberlain on 18 January 1902 and was surprised to receive in reply an instruction requiring him to defer assent to the Bill until he had received advice
3
from the British Law Officers of the Crown. As it was over a month after assent had been granted, the objection had come too late.
Hopetoun's action in granting Royal Assent to the Immigration Restriction Bill was an important confirmation of the larger independence within the Empire claimed by the Commonwealth after federation. In the absence of specific instructions from Chamberlain he had decided, on his own
discretion, that reservation might encourage a reaction against the powers of the King's Representative. By avoiding a
confrontation on this issue he hoped to retain sufficient influence to be able to present the point of view of the British Government in private with considerable anticipation
1. Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 24 February 1902. Chamberlain papers, JC 14/1/1/32. University of Birmingham Library. 2. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth, pp. 178-179.
3. Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 30 January 1902. CP 78, series 1, item 65. C.A.O.
of success. Although it would take a further six years for this procedure to become regularized, the power of the
Governor-General to reserve legislation for the Royal Assent when his local Ministers did not advise him to do so, was to fade altogether.
Hopetoun's handling of the difficult issue of Australia's Immigration Restriction legislation showed an appreciation of local attitudes and a concern for constitutional propriety fully in keeping with the deserved popularity of the
Governor-General. Yet, despite this popularity and his apparent sympathy with Australian views, he failed to recognize one important aspect of his position, and this failure was to be fatal to his career in the Commonwealth. He failed to appreciate that Australian politicans were
unwilling to allow the office of Representative of the Crown in the Commonwealth to be one of expensive pomp and
ostentation.
Hopetoun's appointment had been made on the assumption that his previous experience in Victoria would be of
assistance in setting up the office of Governor-General in the Commonwealth. However, Australia's relationship with the Empire had undergone a subtle change since the days when as a young and wealthy peer he had dispensed hospitality lavishly at Government House and exercised the office of
colonial Governor with colour and gaiety. Mistaken assumptions born from this period of time were inapplicable to the
Commonwealth of 1902. Despite his enormous popularity, careful constitutional propriety and the cordiality of his
relations with all Australian politicians, Hopetoun's career as Representative of the Crown in the Commonwealth came to an humiliating conclusion in a dispute over money.^
The Constitutional Conventions of the eighteen nineties had eventually settled, though not without dissension, that the salary of the Governor-General should be £10,000 per year. This was extremely generous by ordinary Australian
9
standards,’ and equalled the salary paid to the Governor- 3
General of Canada. But in the latter instance the Representative of the Crown was provided with generous
4
travelling and entertainment allowances. Although it had been generally assumed that some payment would be made by the Commonwealth for His Excellency's expenses of office no provision for this appeared in the Constitution. This
omission was to lead to considerable misunderstanding.
There was a further complicating factor. The rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne over their respective claims to be the seat of the federal Government led to a protracted
1. For accounts of this dispute see A.N. Smith, Thirty Years: the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1931
(Melbourne, 1933) , pp. 76-78 ; h7g . Turner, The First
Decade of the Australian Commonwealth (Melbourne, 1911) , pp. 37-45; and~La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, 1, pp. 301-303. 2. The Chief Justice of New South Wales, in the eighteen-
nineties, earned only £3,500. Later, in 1903, the
Judiciary Act set the salary of the Chief Justice of the High Court at £3,500 per annum.
3. See Statistical Year-Book of Canada for 1901 (Ottawa, 1902) pi 36. New Zealand paid its Governor, £5,000 year plus £2,000 allowance. See New Zealand, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1902, vol. 1, p. B-3, Civil l i s t f o r l 7 0 1 - l $ 0 2 .
4. For the year 1900-1901 Canada spent the equivalent of £17,137 upon the vice-regal establishment, excluding salary. See Dominion of Canada, Sessional Papers, Session 1902, vol. XXXVI, vol. 1, part 1, (pp. I.-2 to I.-4) and Part 2, (pp. V-100 to V-103 and W 52).
dispute over the residence of the Governor-General. The
jealousy of these two great colonial metropolises had impinged upon the question of representation of the Crown in Australia as early as 1852. Upon FitzRoy's appointment as Governor- General a resolution had been introduced into the Victorian Legislative Council objecting to the selection of Sydney as the location for the seat of the central government. It was resolved that an address be presented to the Queen urging that Victoria be constituted the place of residence of the Governor-General.^ As a further rebuff to the claims of the senior province the Victorians voted their Lieutenant-
Governor an annual salary of £10,000, which exceeded that of 2
his nominal superior in Sydney by £2,000.
Nearly fifty years later, when federation had finally become settled, the Colonial Office recognized that the question of the Governor-General's allowances needed to be clarified. In August 1899 a despatch to the federating colonies requested Governors to draw their Ministers' attention to the matter. Chamberlain presumed that the
Governor-General would 'mainly reside at Melbourne' until the establishment of the federal capital. Unless it were intended that the Governor-General should 'hold pro tempore a
Commission as Governor of Victoria' he asked for views of colonial Ministers as to the provision which should be made
1. C.D. Allin, The Early Federation Movement of Australia (Kingston, 1907), p. 243. For resolution see
Victoria: Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, vol. 1, 1852, pp. 185-186.
2. Edward Jenks, A History of the Australasian Colonies (From their Foundation to the Year 1911) (Cambridge,
for his residence.^
The responses of the two rival colonies were predictable. Turner informed Chamberlain that Government House, Melbourne would be made available for the Governor-General. He
undertook to provide another residence for the Governor of Victoria, but considered that a combined appointment would
2
have 'obvious advantages'. In New South Wales, Lyne, only a few weeks in office, was determined that Melbourne should not steal a march upon Sydney in the possession of the principal Representative of the Crown in the Commonwealth. He proposed that His Excellency should stay in Melbourne only during the sessions of the federal Parliament. At other times ample
3
provision would be made for his residence in Sydney. Later, Lyne urged unsuccessfully, that the Governor-General be
4