Hospital General Universitario de Guadalajara

One of the main criticisms of the field of emotional intelligence is the many existing definitions and models of emotional intelligence. Kuhn (2012) observes that individual

research paradigms are formed through scientists’ work to systematically deal with data,

directed by deeply held theories. As paradigms develop, specific theories within the paradigm begin to emerge and separate. Emmerling and Goleman (2003) emphasise that this has

occurred since the first recognised emotional intelligence theory was proposed by Salovey and Mayer (1990).

One thing many researchers seem to agree upon is the disagreement over the very term ‘emotional intelligence.’ Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2008) comment that the term ‘is now employed to cover too many different things’ (p.503). Matthews, Zeidner and Roberts (2004) state that ‘examination of the literature suggests there is no clear, consensual definition of EI’ (p.180). Waterhouse (2006) states that writers are not always clear about these differences and meanings when they use the term ‘emotional intelligence.’

This disparity in the meaning of ‘emotional intelligence’ has raised a number of issues. For example, Daus and Ashkanasy (2003) maintain that, ‘to an extent, they (these models) have done much more harm than good regarding establishing emotional intelligence as a

legitimate, empirical construct with incremental validity potential’ (p.69-70).Cherniss

(2010b) highlights the problem of readers assuming different types of EQ are one and the same and, as a consequence, applying results based on the study of one form to situations involving another. Additionally, different readers might draw different conclusions about emotional intelligence depending upon the research each used (Cherniss, 2010b). Matthews et al. (2002) report that different studies identify very diverse skills as part of emotional

intelligence, thanks to the frequent redefinitions of the construct of EQ by researchers. Unsurprisingly, this results in considerable confusion.

Cherniss et al. (2006) acknowledge there are differences between several major models of emotional intelligence and that a great deal of theoretical work has explored these differences.

Despite this, there is substantial overlap between different models.Cherniss et al. (2006)

propose that it is in this overlap that a provisional definition of the concept might arise to guide dialogue. They point out that all of the main models of emotional intelligence recognise the involvement of two parts: awareness and management of one’s own emotions, and

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awareness and management of others’ emotions (Cherniss et al., 2006). Emmerling and Goleman (2003) reinforce this notion of overlap between models with specific reference to three theories that have created most interest in terms of research and application. These theories come from Mayer and Salovey (1997), Bar-On (2006) and Goleman (1998). Emmerling and Goleman (2003) state that ‘theories within the emotional intelligence paradigm seek to understand how individuals perceive, understand, utilise and manage emotions in an effort to predict and foster personal effectiveness’ (p.12). Ciarrochi, Chan and Caputi (2000) agree that definitions within the field of emotional intelligence ‘tend to be complementary rather than contradictory’ (p.540). One further point to note is that all the definitions of emotional intelligence embody a combination of cognitive and emotional abilities (Cherniss, 2001).

A number of researchers have suggested possible solutions to the issues raised by multiple definitions and models of emotional intelligence. Cherniss (2010a) proposes one option, which is to differentiate between definitions and models then implement a single definition. Van Rooy, Whitman and Viswesvaran (2010) agree that a more focused and unitary definition will help. Cherniss (2010a) expands on his point, stating that this shared definition can be used to decide which collections of abilities and traits are true models of emotional

intelligence. This approach accepts that a multiplicity of different models can exist, even with a single definition.

Though there is yet to be any common agreement, Cherniss’ (2010) literature review suggests that most researchers accept a basic definition offered by Mayer et al. (2000). They explain emotional intelligence as ‘the ability to perceive and express emotion, assimilate emotion in thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in the self and others’ (p.396, Mayer et al., 2000).

Cherniss (2010a) offers another related solution: select one of the existing models and establish that it is the best one. However, as he notes, every current model has its limitations, including the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso model. There are certain strengths in different models (Cherniss, 2010a).

An alternative option comes from Caruso (2003), who proposes that the term ‘emotional intelligence’ should be reserved for intelligence or ability-based models. He makes the

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compelling point that in the absence of a common language, there is no chance that

researchers and practitioners can effectively communicate with one another. Caruso (2003) also provides a starting point for a dictionary of EQ terms as shown in Table 2. He links each term to a current approach and notes the current areas of interest to which the term relates.

Table 2 Caruso's (2003) starting point for a dictionary of EQ terms

While some authors (Waterhouse, 2006) point to the number of theoretical viewpoints in emotional intelligence as a weakness, others argue that several versions of emotional intelligence theory is a sign of the robustness of the field (Emmerling and Goleman, 2003; Cherniss et al., 2006), and that multiple theories can clarify aspects of multifaceted

psychological constructs (Emmerling and Goleman, 1993). Cherniss (2010a) proposes an alternative solution to the current controversy surrounding different models: to accept the diversity in views and live with it, at least for the present.

‘Such disagreements are not cause for dismay. Scientific research rarely begins with fully agreed definitions, though it may eventually lead to them’ (p.77, Neisser et al., 1996). 2.5.5 Parallels between research into emotional intelligence and traditional intelligence Cherniss et al. (2006) highlights that as with emotional intelligence, there have been multiple versions of theories relating to traditional intelligence (IQ). He cites the work of Guilford, Cattell, Wechsler, and Sternberg as being notable, among other work. Emmerling and Goleman (2003) stress that the debate about IQ has been going on for close to one hundred

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years and looks set to continue. Despite the length of this debate, researchers have not yet agreed upon what IQ actually is or the best way to measure it (Cherniss et al., 2006). Emmerling and Goleman (2003) point out that multiple theories of traditional intelligence (IQ) have not seriously threatened or discredited the field. In fact, they emphasise that the continued deliberations and research on IQ has considerably increased the existing knowledge and practical applications of intelligence assessments to a range of populations and issues. They recognise emotional intelligence as a field that, while still in its infancy, appears to be following a similar path to that of IQ (Emmerling and Goleman, 2003). Cherniss et al. (2006) raise the point that expecting a consensus for a model or definition of emotional intelligence, particularly given the stage of its development, means holding emotional intelligence to a different standard.