The act of touch starts from the moment we want to touch an object and this urge to touch may start as soon as we think of or notice the object. We touch with our eyes if we have sight and we touch with our thoughts regardless; then the thought touches us back (Derrida 2000 [2005]). Our skin touches emptiness, too and this emptiness that surrounds us is a physical space. These are some of the existential evidences to the fact that touch occurs all the time. However only the physical touch can give the
satisfaction required, if the aim is to feel an affirmation back from the object. Both the inquisitive and instructive type of touch, as identified to be the types of touch dealt in this research relies on this feedback.
The results of the Touching the Bronze Bust of Sophocles showed us that an object
presented inside a glass case can be an obstacle for blind and visually impaired visitors.
The person who can see it gets into a dialogue with it through touch. A dialogue perhaps rather incomplete. The person who is not able to see loses out on this category too, therefore the object becomes unattainable. Because its aim is net met, object becomes a thing and this is a disqualification in many ways. Forming his theory from Heidegger object and thing relationship, Brown (2001) argues:
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution,
consumption and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily. The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a
changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation (p4).
Before embarking deeper on the ideas of others such as Brown’s ‘thing theory’, which is complex in itself, it seems important to point out here that it is not my attempt to deconstruct philosophers such as Heidegger, Lacan and Baurillard all of whom theorised endlessly about the object and the thingness. Instead, I propose to focus some of
Brown’s ideas synthesized from Heidegger’s object/thing dialectics to support some of my conclusions. I will not enter the domain of the ‘self’ and will stay away from analysing some of the metaphors presented in this theory. I will only take what I consider to be purely relevant to my argument, and stay true to the understanding of the thing and object concepts I believe to have developed in this research.
If they were on a stage, being pointed, the selected museum object would be the
‘object’; then the ‘thing’ would be the museum object’s new state after the definition of its unattainably, inaccessibility, untouchableness etc. Perhaps by becoming a thing, the thingness of it gains a new place in the philosophical significance; however it is the loss it encountered is what must be addressed for the sake of this research. I am not
proposing to glorify an object, nor promoting its cultural importance with arguing for the need for ‘meaning’ in this discussion; but instead I am showing my interest in the physicality of it, therefore how it could be accessed by many. At this stage, the
‘interpretation’ enters the subject briefly, but importantly, as this interpretation can chose to fortify or hinder access. However, I say briefly because I do not wish to involve the concept of order of objects within a museum, what Brown (2001) calls a ‘grid’.
If there is a condition for what happens to an object when it loses its access, surely there has to be a condition to lift it up also. By providing a tactile interface to solve the
problem, what the interpretation tries to do is gain back this access. However it must be noted, when looked from this perspective of beings, the interpretation itself can also be considered an object, even though it is formed of a set of artworks. It is the mission attached to what defines this state of being as an object. In other words, an object becomes a bridge to understanding another object. Kaplan (2006) provides a solution from the most unlikely domain and brings it as a theory for this problem-solving. She provides ‘fetishism strategy’ as a key. “The need to transform something unfamiliar and intangible into something familiar and tangible is one of the major principles of the fetishism strategy” argues Kaplan (2006, p. 1). ‘Fetishism strategy’, unlike fetishism does not relate itself to any sexual perversion, instead focuses on objects without glorifying them.
Since it was made clear that I do not aim to glorify the object in any way, perhaps there is no urgency in stating it , but just to clarify, by using the ‘fetishism strategy’ in my thesis I do not encourage worshipping objects either. Neither the museum object nor the object of the interface gain additional roles; they remain on their true selves.
How Kaplan proposes ‘fetishism strategy’ is by first addressing the notion of familiarity.
She takes the object from the fetishist, and brings it to any ordinary person and offers it as the symbol of truth and familiarity, something that person is very comfortable with.
Kaplan refuses fetishism in its ordinary sense because it promotes falseness. However, the difference in ‘fetishism strategy’ she explains that “holding on to something familiar is a good way to approach unfamiliar” (p.2). She uses the metaphor of using a comfort blanket to access the unknown and hold on to it until the confidence grew.
With this, she argues that something tangible, something that can be felt and known brings assurances to people. In so many levels, what Kaplan is offering is an interface to information; and this interface offers access to knowledge that is beyond the interface but needs it to be accessed through it; something bigger than itself. This proves a vital point in theory which practice itself achieved earlier in this thesis, that a tactile exhibition as an interface is a valid formation.
In this brief argument, I defended the object’s importance and the access to it. I used Brown’s thing theory to address the problem and introduced Kaplan’s ‘fetishism
strategy’ into the picture to justify the interface. Now I will talk about the problem with direct replicas before moving on to the conclusion chapter to bring all the chapters of the thesis together.