The conclusion of the NSS comprises of a total of eight sentences. It briefly summarises the broad concepts discussed in the document however it does not link the summary to the purpose of the document presented during the introduction. In its conclusion, the NSS reiterates the change to a more demanding security environment. It states that the greater complexity, fiscal constraint and demand for transparency, should further involve central government in the management of New Zealand’s national security sphere. The NSS asserts that the New Zealand Government retains its long standing foundation whilst recognising the areas in which the management of security issues can be enhanced.52The observations
presented in the conclusion are further supported by an examination of the annexes of the NSS.
Annexes
Annex A of the NSS outlines New Zealand’s security context. Twenty security themes are presented ranging from those risks that affect the individual citizens such as criminal activity and serious traffic accidents, to larger security issues, like interstate conflict and arms proliferation that threaten global society.53 These themes portray New Zealand’s security
49 Ibid. p. 16 50 Ibid. p. 16 51 Ibid. p. 16 52Ibid. p. 17 53
environment as being characterised by the absence of an existential military threat. The significant potential risks to New Zealand’s national security are centred on the vulnerabilities inherent in the nation’s geographic isolation and its volatile natural environment. Other major national security concerns are New Zealand’s heavy reliance on a stable, rules- based
international system and its limited ability to support rapid population growth. Annex B consists primarily of two diagrams and their accompanying text. The first diagram, Figure 2: Risks to Security, has been sourced from the Canadian National Security Policy and adapted to New Zealand’s security situation.54 The citation does not clarify which version of the Canadian
National Security Policy this diagram was taken from, therefore the extent of modification cannot be ascertained.
Figure 2: Risks to Security
Figure 3: Indicative National Risks demonstrates the relative likelihood versus the relative magnitude of consequences for different security risks to New Zealand. The conclusion that interstate conflict and large scale warfare are no longer the central security planning focus for the New Zealand Government is reinforced in the text of Annex B.55 Annex B states that the
concept of relative risk has been incorporated into New Zealand’s legislation and practices of the country’s emergency services and civil defence organisations since the mid-1990s. The New Zealand Government intends the NSS to be used as a guiding framework for the
transformation of strategic planning and operations in the New Zealand security sector along
54Ibid. p. 21 55
similar lines.56
Figure 3: Indicative National Risks
Annex C discusses the ODESC terms of reference. The annex introduces the purpose of the committee which is presented as a bullet point summary of the duties already discussed in the NSS main body text. Membership of the ODESC is not fixed and attendance at its meetings is by invitation of the Chair. Makeup of the committee is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the security matter being attended.57 The convening of ODESC is only initiated
under the authority of its Chair. ODESC can be assembled either on their own initiative, or in direct response to a request from an agency with an appropriate security concern. Usually ODESC meetings are only held when required to a resolve a specific issue. Annex D outlines the lead and supporting agencies which have been designated responsibilities for the security risks identified under New Zealand’s national security objectives. The agencies and responsibilities are assigned so that they are consistent with the identified agency’s specialist sector
expertise.58 It is stated in the supporting text that this list is only indicative until detailed
consultation is completed and that the lead agency may change as a situation progresses. The
56 Ibid. p. 21 57 Ibid. p. 23 58
final annex, Annex E, discusses the groups who are responsible to directly support ODESC functions. These groups are the National Assessments Bureau (NAB), Security and Risk Group (SRG) and Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG). Annex E provides a brief description of the way each group assists ODESC with their national security responsibilities. The NAB’s role is to support the New Zealand Government’s decision- making process through the provision of policy relevant assessments surrounding national interests. The SRG synthesises policy and operations to facilitate New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security issues. The ICG ensures collaboration and governance of the New Zealand Intelligence
community.59While the NSS document main body and annexes discuss New Zealand’s national
security in general terms, it does not explain the challenges of implementing national security policy for the New Zealand Government.
General
For assessing the practicality of the NSS, it is crucial to highlight, not only what is included in the NSS document, but also what is not. I offer that the New Zealand Government has four objectives in publishing the NSS document. The first objective is to demonstrate to the New Zealand people that the government understands their security needs and concerns. The second objective is to demonstrate the government’s commitment to develop structures to address these needs. Thirdly, it provides a conceptual framework for constructing a security community in New Zealand that will enable a whole of government response to national security issues. The final objective of the NSS is to establish clear lines of authority within New Zealand’s national security architecture. I propose that this objective is the greatest driver for the New Zealand Government’s production of the NSS. This conclusion is derived from the observation that authority within New Zealand’s national security system is the only clearly defined concept in the NSS document.
As previously mentioned, the NSS does not have any introduction or foreword that clearly articulates how the need for this document arose. No author or authors are identified to allow further investigations of the thought and theories behind the work. The lack of citation and bibliography would suggest that the document is primarily original, yet this cannot be verified independently. The limited referencing, which consists of four footnotes in total, is used only to expand upon the points to which they pertain in the text. The only citation that indicates the origin of a source used is the reference to the Canadian National Security Policy as the
basis for the Risks to Security diagram in Annex A. Even in this case, the document does not cite which version of the policy was used and what the rationale was for using the Canadian National Security policy to frame New Zealand’s security context, rather than the United Kingdom or Australian models. The absence of these elements raises questions regarding the credibility of the NSS as the guiding framework for the development of doctrine and
procedures within New Zealand’s security community. This is of particular significance that one of the most dominant features of the NSS is the notion of authority. In the next chapter, I explore the concept of authority in the context of New Zealand’s Westphalian Lockean model of government.