I MPUESTOS DIFERIDOS

2.2.1.1 The Case for a Liberal Focus

What kind of theoretical approach is required to explain the foreign policy activity of Germany, Spain, and the UK towards Latin America? As discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 1.1.4), this study is based on a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), trying to hold constant as many factors of the cases under study as possible (della Porta 2008: 214ff). The factors that are held con- stant here are mostly systemic: all three countries can, within reason, be con- sidered middle powers, all three are influential EU Member States, in particular regarding policy towards Latin America, and finally, they have been EU mem- bers for a relatively long time by now, which should have given them enough time to adjust to EU membership.9_{Those explanatory factors that may explain}

variation in the dependent variable are therefore most likely found in the do- mestic realm of each country. Therefore, an explanation of variation should be

9_{However, see fn 12, p. 30 for the particularities of the Spanish case and why this factor should}

based on a theory that focuses on domestic explanations rather than on the geo- political position of each country under study within the international system or the EU, as for instance Realist theory might. The theoretical framework that best matches this investigation’s requirements is hence a liberal framework, since it “focuses on subsystemic determinants of behaviour” (Rittberger 2001a: 4).

2.2.1.2 Characteristics of a Liberal Focus

Liberal theories of foreign policy concentrate on the importance of domestic preferences in explaining foreign policy activity or behaviour. In Hill’s defini- tion of foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (2003: 3), liberal foreign policy theory dives into the factors that motivate the state to carry out its “sum of official external relations” in a certain way as based on the outcome of a domestic process of preference aggregation (Moravcsik 1998: 20f). The fundamental idea is that the factors conditioning a state’s preferences are to be found within the state. This idea appeals to this study’s framework because if systemic factors are by and large constant, the explanation for differences in foreign policy activity towards Latin America must be found at the level of each individual state under study.

The process of preference aggregation itself – that is, the question of how policy-makers arrive at determining what foreign policy they should pursue and how actively – is exogenous to my framework, since I am concerned with which factors impact upon foreign policy towards Latin America rather than with how these factors are formed. While I am aware that how they are formed – such as through the interaction of interest groups (see especially Moravcsik 1993, 1998) – is intimately linked to the explanation of which factors matter un- der which circumstances, the actual preference aggregation process is mostly outside the scope of this investigation and would require a different method- ological approach that cannot be covered within the limits of this study, al- though I do hope to be able to give some indications.10 _{There are a number}

of different types of preference that may determine foreign policy.11 _{The task}

10_{It might, however, be the subject of future research.}

11_{Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 146f) conceptualises two causal mechanisms for the choice of prefer-}

ence: public pressure (emanating, for instance, from interest groups) or elite choice (that is, policy- makers’ decisions). Which one is at work at a given time may depend for example on the intensity of the general public’s or interest groups’ preferences on a certain foreign policy issue, but this question is not particularly relevant for the purposes of this investigation. In fact, it is likely that, especially in Germany and Britain, elite choice is mostly at work since the general public is not particularly interested in Latin America, while in Spain, where there is a large Latin American population and the region is more in the focus of the general public, public pressure may be more relevant. However, what this study is interested in is which preferences are relevant – that is, what factors motivate policy towards the region –, not how they are chosen.

of this study is to uncover which ones are important in foreign policy towards Latin America on behalf of each country, under which circumstances, and how they may interact.

Different varieties of liberalism see the origin of preferences in different areas. Andrew Moravcsik (1997) differentiates three, which he terms commer- cial, republican, and ideational liberalism. Freund and Rittberger (2001: 71), on the other hand, differentiate between two variants of what they call ‘utilitarian liberalism’: structural and agency-based liberalism. Systematising these dif- ferentiations, they can be said to vary along two dimensions: firstly, the logic of action, and secondly, the type of ‘preference motivator’, i.e. what determ- ines policy-makers’ choice of preference. The logic of action corresponds either to a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen2004; 1989) – that is, whether action is based on rationally trying to real- ise those preferences determined during preference aggregation, or whether it is based on what is considered by policy-makers the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ course of action. Both variants of Freund and Rittberger’s utilitarian liberalism and Moravcsik’s commercial and republican liberalism correspond to a ration- alist, consequentialist logic, while ideational liberalism corresponds to a logic of appropriateness and has therefore also been termed “liberal constructivism” (Wagner 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2004) or “societal constructivism” (Boekle et al. 2001: 105f). Indeed, Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 145, fn 18) explicitly points out that “ideational liberalism” and “liberal constructivism” amount to the same approach.

The ‘preference motivators’ that condition the independent variables are threefold. Freund and Rittberger provide the more general approach in classi- fying structural and agency-based motivating factors, with which Moravcsik’s republican and and commercial liberalism are commensurate. Under struc- tural – or republican – liberalism, preferences depend on the domestic struc- ture, that is, a country’s form of government or the strength of a state vis-à-vis domestic society (Freund and Rittberger 2001: 71f) – as Moravcsik (1997: 530) calls it, the “mode of domestic representation”. Structural, or republican, liber- alism is not relevant to the study at hand, as the form of government does not vary substantially across the three countries in question. All are liberal, and indeed parliamentary, democracies. The fact that Germany is a federal repub- lic while Spain and Britain are parliamentary monarchies should not have any significant impact on their foreign policies towards Latin America.

The second type of preference motivator is agency-based (Freund and Ritt- berger 2001: 72), and Moravcsik’s commercial liberalism can be subsumed un- der this: preferences here depend on domestic interests, whereby domestic groups compete for the realisation of their respective interests (ibid.), and the

Table 2.2: Typology of Liberal Theories Logic of Action Consequences Appropriateness Preference Motivator Form of govern- ment Structural (republican) Liberalism Strongest

interest Agency-based(commercial) Liberalism Domestic

norms ConstructivismLiberal

(Ideational Liberalism)

most important, or strongest, interest is incorporated as a policy goal. Moravc- sik sees commercial liberalism’s preference motivator in “patterns of market incentives” or “distributional conflicts” (1997: 528f) and considers mostly the (economic) well-being of the most powerful interest group as the determinant of preferences and thus of foreign policy. ‘Commercial’ liberalism is, in this sense, a misnomer: well-being may also allude to political or social well-being rather than strictly to economic interests – depending on the policy area under study. Freund and Rittberger’s ‘agency-based liberalism’ terminology is thus more comprehensive. Therefore, foreign policy towards Latin America based on preferences according to agency-based liberalism would be motivated by, for example, economic interests in economic policy, or political interests in political dialogue.

The third preference motivator is not covered by Freund and Rittberger, who only deal with utilitarian liberalism, but is comprised by Moravcsik’s ideational liberalism or constructivist liberalism. While both structural (repub- lican) and agency-based (commercial) liberalism correspond to a consequen- tialist logic of action, ideational liberalism populates the above-mentioned cat- egory based on a logic of appropriateness. Preferences are, here, motivated by “domestic social identities or values” (Moravcsik 1997: 525) or, as Boekle et al. (2001: 105f.) put it, “norms shared within the society” – or, indeed, norms shared among policy-makers, if Koenig Archibugi’s causal mechanism of elite choice for state preferences holds (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 146f). Therefore, what would matter here are considerations over what constitutes the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ foreign policy action in general, and in particular towards Latin America. In Table 2.2, I summarise the typology of liberalisms based on the above discussion.

As I have outlined above, structural liberalism will not be considered in this investigation, leaving utilitarian agency-based liberalism – which I will proceed to call utilitarian liberalism for the sake of simplicity – and liberal con- structivism as potential explanatory theories for the framework of this study.