IDENTIFICACIÓN DEL PRODUCTO

In Experiment 3, Experiment 1 was extended with two novel age groups of 31- and 41-month-old children. The adequacy of Meltzoff s Failed-Attempt paradigm was examined on the basis of the hypothesis that older children would differentially imitate the target acts as their first acts equally well in both the Full-Demonstration and Failed-Attempt conditions as a consequence of their apparently superior ability to understand the intentional acts of others. Across the four conditions, the 31- and 41-month-olds brought about more target acts than the 19-month-olds, but no significant age x condition interaction indicated that the differences related to age were subject to a specific condition. Thus, no evidence of imitation was found in the Failed-Attempt condition with regard to either 31- or 41-month-old children's performance on target acts at the first act. Whatever scoring strategy was adopted, neither of the two older groups in the Failed-Attempt condition was capable of producing the target acts as frequently as they did in the Full-Demonstration

condition. Although previous research using verbal measures has shown that 3-year- olds are able to distinguish intended acts from unintended acts (Shultz & Wells, 1985; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980; Yuill, 1984), the 41-month-old children in the Failed-Attempt condition did not differentially reproduce the target acts that the demonstrator judged to be the intended subsequent but unfulfilled outcomes. Did the findings suggest that the older children, like the younger ones, also had problems in reading the intentions underlying the demonstrated failed attempts? It appears that the results could not simply be interpreted in terms of an inability to read the

intended subsequent but unfulfilled target acts implied in Meltzoff s Failed-Attempt format. The pattern of findings concerning children’s reproduction of two other types of demonstrated acts—Failed Act and Adult Manipulation—might help clarify the relevant issues.

Overall, the findings of Experiment 3 revealed a developmental lag in children's abilities to imitate demonstrated acts of various types. Despite age differences in the number of target acts produced across the four conditions, the children in the Full-Demonstration condition were most likely to produce the target acts as their first acts. None of 19-, 31-, and 41-month-old children in any of the

other three conditions were found to produce the target acts as their first acts as frequently as they did in the Full-Demonstration condition. No evidence indicated that the 19-month-olds could imitatively copy the demonstrated failed attempts in the Failed-Attempt condition or the non-afforded control acts in the Adult-Manipulation condition. Similar to the 19-month-olds, neither did the 31-month-olds in the Failed- Attempt condition imitatively copy the observed movements. The only evidence for imitation taking place in the Failed-Attempt condition came from the 41-month-old group who reproduced more of the observed movements as their first acts than they did in the other three conditions. In the Adult-Manipulation condition, there was evidence of imitation in both the 31- and 41-month-olds’ reproduction of the non­ afforded control acts. Both the 31- and 41-month-olds in the Adult-Manipulation condition reproduced the observed movements more often than they did in the other three conditions. Overall, the 19-month-old children's performance in imitation of acts on objects was most liable to constraints of types of demonstrated act. Among the three types of demonstrated act—Target Act, Failed Act, and Adult

Manipulation—the only evidence for imitation taking place as the 19-month-olds’ first acts was revealed as their tendency to produce the target acts observed in the Full-Demonstration condition. The 31-month-olds were found to imitatively copy the target acts in the Full-Demonstration condition and the non-afforded control acts in the Adult-Manipulation condition. By contrast, the type of demonstrated acts did not affect the 41-month-olds’ performance in imitation of acts on objects. The 41- month-olds differentially reproduced the observed movements according to how such movements had been actually modelled by the experimenter.

The findings considered above raised several critical questions about the adequacy of M eltzoff s Failed-Attempt paradigm for exploring children’s ascription of intentions to the model in imitation of acts on objects. Why did only the 41- month-olds exhibit the behavioural tendency to copy the observed acts from seeing the failed-attempt model? Counter to the predictions for Experiment 3, the older children in the Failed-Attempt condition did not succeed in producing the intended subsequent but unfulfilled target acts as their first acts as a result of a greater ability to understand unfulfilled intentions. On the contrary, it seems that the observed outcomes of the demonstrated failed attempts could be interpreted as the intended outcomes by the 41-month-old children and consequently they tended to copy such

acts. This interpretation retains the intentional hypothesis that copying the

demonstrated failed attempts was guided by attribution of intention to the model and only the 41-month-olds’ imitative performance in the Failed-Attempt condition gave credence to this hypothesis. In addition, the developmental constraint on children’s ability to copy demonstrated acts of various types as indicated in the present study might relate to such an ability required for intentional understanding in imitation of acts on objects. Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999; also

Tomasello, 1999) maintained that 18-month-olds did not replicate the observed acts literally after seeing the failed-attempt model because they were able to re-enact the intended but unfulfilled target acts that they understood that the model was

attempting to achieve. On the basis of the intentional hypothesis considered above, the evidence of imitation for 41-month-old children's reproduction of the observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition could challenge Meltzoffs and Bellagamba et al.'s view that the observed outcomes of the demonstrated failed attempts were unintended and not likely to influence children's imitative performance. Moreover, except in the Full-Demonstration condition, there was no evidence showing that any of the 19-, 31-, and 41-month-old children in the Failed-Attempt condition

imitatively copied the target acts as their first acts. Thus, an inability to decode the target acts that the demonstrator judged to be the intended subsequent outcomes does not appear sufficient to account for why the 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition differentially copied the demonstrated failed attempts rather than the target acts presumably intended.

Might it be the case that none of the 19-, 31-, and 41-month-old children in Experiment 3 were influenced in their imitative performance by attribution of intention to the model from seeing the failed-attempt model? That is, could the evidence for 41-month-old children's replication of the demonstrated failed attempts suggest that they literally copied what the model did without necessarily interpreting the observed acts as intended? In contrast to the intentional hypothesis, the second hypothesis is that the 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition copied the observed acts more than did the 19- and 31-month-olds because the 41-month-olds were less susceptible to the affordances of the objects and were more able to attend to and copy the modelled sequences of movements. This might also explain why the 19- and 31-month-olds were not as likely to reproduce the demonstrated failed

attempts as the 41-month-olds were. In the following discussion, the adequacy of Meltzoffs Failed-Attempt paradigm for exploring the concept of intention will be examined in relation to the foregoing two hypotheses highlighted by the results of Experiment 3. Did the 41-month-old children in the Failed-Attempt condition reproduce the observed movements as a result of their ability to read the observed outcomes of the demonstrated failed attempts as intended, or did they do so without attribution of intention to the model?

Imitating demonstrated failed attempts

As stated by the intentional hypothesis, a possibility immediately suggesting itself is that the 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition copied the observed acts as a result of their interpretation of the demonstrated failed attempts as the outcomes intended by the model. Methodologically, the goals involved in Meltzoff’s Failed-Attempt format might call for different interpretations other than the target acts that the experimenter judged to be the intended but unfulfilled subsequent outcomes. As suggested in Section 1.5.1, it is possible that the target acts were not the only goals to which the acts demonstrated in the Failed-Attempt condition could be attributed. Several relevant findings in the present study contribute to the above likelihood.

First, the majority of 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition exhibited a proclivity to emulate the target acts whilst also imitatively copying the observed demonstrated acts. Whereas overall the children in the Failed-Attempt condition produced the target acts less often than they did in the Full-Demonstration condition, the 31- and 41-month-old groups brought about the target acts more than did the 19- month-old group across the four conditions. This gives rise to the possibility that the older children, before the demonstration, knew that the objects could be used to produce such acts. However, only the 41-month-olds were found to copy the

observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition, in spite of the substantial influence of observing the failed-attempt model on their tendency to emulate the target acts as compared with that of observing the adult-manipulation model. Further, the analysis of other acts produced at the first act in the Failed-Attempt condition showed that the 41-month-olds brought about fewer of other acts as their first acts than the 19-

month-olds. In contrast to the 19-month-olds, the 41-month-olds appeared less likely to be engaged in a kind of trial-and-error by producing other acts of various types as their first acts. This provides additional support for the 41-month-olds’ tendency to produce both the target acts and observed movements in response to the failed- attempt model. It seems that the 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition readily either produced the target acts in the light of the object affordances or copied the modelled acts that had been observed. These findings suggest that M eltzoffs Failed-Attempt format had potential for offering children an implicit contrast between observed and object-afforded outcomes as alternative interpretations of what the experimenter was intending to achieve subsequently. Although the data do not directly support the hypothesis that the 41-month-olds were reading the

demonstrated failed attempts as intended, their production of target acts and failed attempts in the Failed-Attempt condition at least suggests that they were responding to both the object affordances and observed movements involved in the failed- attempt display.*

Second, from the 41-month-old children’s perspective, the failed-attempt model appeared to involve contradictory information about the observed outcomes of the demonstrated failed acts and the affordances of the objects. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the 41-month-olds in the Failed-Attempt condition had on average 4.3 first acts (out of 5) falling within the categories of Target Act and Failed Act as compared with 1.9 (out of 5) that the 19-month-olds had. By contrast, the 41-month- olds in the Full-Demonstration condition had on average 4.2 first acts (out of 5) exclusively falling within the category of Target Act as compared with 3.0 and 3.9 (out of 5) that the 19- and 31-month-olds produced, respectively. For the 41-month- olds, the inputs given in the full-demonstration model appeared to involve much less contradictory information about the outcomes that the experimenter intended to

'This interpretation differs from the findings of Nagell, Olguin, and Tomasello (1993), who

demonstrated that in a rake-using task the 3-year-olds emulated the target act (flipping the rake then pulling the toy) in both the no-model and partial-model (pulling the toy without flipping the rake) conditions, and did not imitate the inefficient method observed in the partial-model condition. On the contrary, the 2-year-olds in the partial-model condition imitated the inefficient method observed. These researchers suggested that the 3-year-olds did not differentially imitate the demonstrated method, because they were dexterous with this level of skill required for the rake-using task and did not seem to rely on the information given in the demonstration.

achieve than those given in the failed-attempt model. In a sense, the 41-month-olds did not participate in exploratory activities after observing the failed-attempt model as compared with the 19-month-olds, because the 41-month-olds rarely produced acts other than the target acts and failed attempts in such circumstances. That is, it is possible that the 41-month-olds’ performance in the Failed-Attempt condition was guided by ascription of two potential goals inherent in M eltzoffs Failed-Attempt format: the target act that the model judged to be the intended but unfulfilled

subsequent outcome, and the observed outcome of the demonstrated act. As only the 41-month-olds showed the tendency to produce both the target acts and observed movements in the Failed-Attempt condition, the finding might imply a

developmental constraint on children’s possession of abilities for detecting the contradictory information inherent in M eltzoffs Failed-Attempt format.

Third, the 41-month-olds’ adoption of a strategy of reproducing the observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition implies that their performance in imitation of acts on objects was not reliant on cases where the observed outcomes of the demonstrated acts specified both the affordances of objects and the goals of the model. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was suggested that the 19- and 17-month-olds reproduced many fewer of the observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition perhaps because copying the demonstrated failed acts would not elicit the dynamic

affordances of the objects that they found out during observation of the

demonstration. Additionally, the demonstrated failed attempts were similar and relevant to the target acts as compared with the non-afforded control acts and likely to divert children’s attention from the acts that were actually demonstrated to the target acts that specified the object affordances. Under this view, the finding of Experiment 3 that the 19- and 31-month-olds did not adopt a strategy of reproducing the observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition may be interpreted as their

problems in reading the demonstrated failed attempts as “to be copied”. It might be that the 19- and 31-month-olds were not aware that indeed the experimenter meant to perform the unconsummated target acts. Alternatively, it is possible that the 41- month-olds were aware of such an intentional stance of the experimenter and thus read the demonstrated failed attempts as “to be copied”. This might explain why the 41-month-olds used a strategy of reproducing the observed acts in the Failed- Attempt condition. If adopting a strategy of reproducing the observed acts in the

Failed-Attempt condition required a particular form of social understanding,

apparently only the 41-month-olds’ performance could justify the attribution of such a kind of social understanding.

Imitating non-afforded control acts

There is evidence of imitation for both the 31- and 41-month-olds’

reproduction of non-afforded control acts in the Adult-Manipulation condition. Both the two older groups reproduced the observed control acts more often in the Adult- Manipulation condition than in the other three conditions. By contrast, no evidence indicated that the 19-month-old group differentially produced the observed control acts in the Adult-Manipulation condition. On the contrary, the 19-month-old group brought about fewer of such acts than the 31- and 41-month-old groups. Why did the 19-month-olds not imitatively respond to the observed control acts in the Adult- Manipulation condition? Does that suggest that imitating the non-afforded control acts, like imitating the demonstrated failed attempts, also required advanced

cognitive skills, which the 19-month-olds have not acquired? There are two possible explanations for the present findings.

First, it appears that the 19-month-old children's imitation of acts on objects was confined to occasions when the observed outcomes of the demonstrated acts were of certain kinds, for example in the Full-Demonstration condition where the observed outcomes specified the affordances of the object sets. In Experiment 3, while across age groups the children in the Adult-Manipulation condition produced fewer target acts than they did in the other three conditions, both the 31- and 41- month-old groups were found to imitatively copy the non-afforded control acts. Consider the finding, pointed to earlier, that the 41-month-olds adopted a strategy of reproducing the observed acts in the Failed-Attempt condition as contrasted with the 31- and 19-month-olds, who did not differ from each other. It is important to note that reproduction of the observed acts was a strategy that the 31-month-olds adopted in the Adult-Manipulation condition, but not in the Failed-Attempt condition. This suggests that the 31-month-olds tended to use such a strategy in response to the adult-manipulation model when the observed acts were not likely to induce them to emulate the affordances of the objects. Under this explanation, it might be that the

affordances of the objects involved in the failed-attempt model were so explicit as to prevent the 31-month-olds from using a strategy of reproducing the observed acts. Among the three age groups, only the 41-month-olds were found to imitatively copy the observed acts in both the Failed-Attempt and Adult-Manipulation conditions. This might suggest that in contrast to the 31- and 19-month-olds, the 41-month-olds possessed abilities for refraining from the tendency to emulate the affordances they learned from seeing the failed-attempt model. However, in contrast to the 31-month- olds, the 19-month-olds’ production of demonstrated control acts in the Adult- Manipulation condition did not appear to benefit from the diminution of the

affordances involved. Therefore, the 19-month-olds’ ability to imitate acts on objects was restricted in the sense that their performance was highly reliant on cases where the observed outcomes of the demonstrated acts specified what the objects afforded, as in the Full-Demonstration condition.

Second, among the three age groups, the 41-month-old children appeared less likely to be influenced by the types of demonstrated acts in their adoption of a strategy of copying the observed acts. In the Full-Demonstration condition, the demonstrated acts resulted in the observed outcomes that specified both the