Identificar y cuantificar soluciones

This study is comprised of five parts. In Chapter 1, I have introduced the problem of failed foreign intervention and the importance of local-level causes of conflict. Intervention strategies may fail to reduce conflict violence because they do not address the underlying grievances that motivate civilians to take sides and support militant actors, threatening international security and strategic interests. Therefore, it is necessary to understand exactly how varying packages of intervention tools impact local incentives, and whether addressing the underlying roots of

conflict could improve foreign policy outcomes. In Chapter 2, I introduce a theoretically-based computational model that demonstrates how interactions between militant groups and civilians during civil war impact baseline patterns of violence and militant strength over time. In a system of weak control, armed militants may choose to extort, benefit, or attack local civilian

populations based on their own strategies for survival. In turn, civilians may provide support and form alliances with these groups in pursuit of their own interests. Different communities of civilians may be more likely to ally with certain groups based on their underlying grievances and local-level competition. This can encourage violence between different groups, shift the balance of power, and encourage civilians to arm themselves for their own defense.

In order to demonstrate the dynamics of the model, I vary different model parameters individually and observe the change in outcomes. This reveals some interesting insights into the relationships between civilians and militant groups during civil wars, and I discuss how some of these findings support or conflict with the existing conflict literature. I create a list of some initial observations that hold implications for the effectiveness of foreign intervention. Overall, I

demonstrate how complex networks of local grievances and affiliations between civilians and militants create unpredictable levels of civilian support. Civilians may shift their support of different groups in ways that are unexpected, and this leads to strengthening and fighting between groups that foreign interveners may or may not support.

In Chapter 3, I use the computational model to analyze the impacts of varying intervention tools and strategies on civil conflict, and determine whether efforts to resolve underlying grievances have a greater effect on the reduction of violence. I first set the initial conditions of the model based on a hypothetical conflict environment that includes a weak government struggling to maintain power, a strong rebel group that challenges the government

and holds territory, and a small extremist organization that hides amongst the rebel group members and executes attacks on civilians to intimidate them into providing support. Then, I create five different combinations of diplomatic, economic and military intervention tools and introduce each tool and strategy to the model as an external shock by changing the values of corresponding parameters. For example, if the intervener chooses a strategy that provides

military support to a militant group, I represent this as an exogenous positive increase in militant strength. If the strategy also includes holding negotiations between two local communities in order to resolve their grievances, I represent this as a removal of grievances from the model parameters. The five strategies vary in their use of tools that address underlying grievances and in their degree of force, and they reflect hypothetical approaches that the international

community could take towards a foreign conflict.

I then measure the effects of each tool and strategy using an Interrupted Time Series (ITS) analysis to compare militant strengths, violence levels, and incidents of civilian defending before the intervention to those following the intervention. I also compare the impacts of the five strategies at medium and low levels of efficiency, and their introduction to the model during both a short and indefinite period of time. These analyses indicate whether some strategies become more effective than others if obstacles or inefficiencies are expected, or if the intervener chooses to withdraw its intervention after a short rather than long-term period. I find that resolving grievances alone may result in little to no effect on intervention success. Many of the

intervention tools that address local interactions, while they may alter the strength of militants and the behavior of civilians, lead to shifts in support that are not necessarily advantageous to the intervener. I explain why this might be, and develop an optimal strategy that consists of

intervention tools such as funding and training some militants and conducting direct attacks on others.

In Chapter 4, I perform a case exploration of historical conflicts of great interest and political relevance to current U.S. policymakers: the 1992 intervention in Somalia, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2011 overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya. I examine the relevance of local grievances and disputes to these conflicts, and then explore the effectiveness of foreign interveners in attempting to resolve them. For each conflict, first I provide an overview of the community dynamics that play a role in each country. I describe how internal disputes escalate into local conflict and militarization, and explore the ways in which militant groups benefit from this instability. Next, I provide background into the history and causes of each conflict, and recount the chronology of the foreign intervention. Then I examine any attempts that the

interveners made to address local grievances more specifically, and assess their effectiveness at both the local and broader level. I provide overall assessments for each conflict case, and discuss implications for policymakers.

I find that serious obstacles impeded any attention to grievances by outside actors, and genuine attempts were rarely made during any of the three cases. The few that were, primarily during the later years of the intervention in Afghanistan, yielded few perceptible results and were not implemented on a widespread scale. I note the importance of internal factors such as the strength of the government, the availability of weapons, and the alignment of grievances with broader conflict goals, finding that these factors can help interveners shape their expectations about how local disputes will contribute to conflict outcomes. I conclude that grievances are undoubtedly critical to the trajectory of violence in these three cases, and that perhaps rather than

tackling them directly, foreign interveners could do more to support local traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that have proven to be more effective in conflict resolution.

In Chapter 5, I simulate the same three intervention cases using the computational model in order to explore how the model’s generated outcomes compare to actual historical events. I research a wide variety of data sources and use them to estimate parameters and initial

conditions. I then introduce simulated foreign intervention strategies based on the actual

intervention tools that were used. Although agent-based modeling is a tool intended for exploring the mechanisms underlying collective outcomes, rather than for prediction, I am able make some initial assessments as to whether the tool can be used as an indicator for how a civil war may evolve, based on the influence of local support interactions. Although I find that many of the outcomes generated by the model differ from historical events, many are also consistent with empirical observations. I discuss how these differences help inform the usefulness of this agent- based model for examining real conflicts.

Finally, in Chapter 6 I conclude with a summary of my findings and recommendations for policymakers for improving violence and stability outcomes in civil wars. These

recommendations suggest how foreign interveners could address weaknesses in their intervention policies in a manner that is also mindful of political and bureaucratic constraints. Countless assessments of current and past intervention policies have previously been performed, and many of them also contain nuanced recommendations for strategic and bureaucratic approaches to intervention. I describe how previous work is or is not consistent with my analysis, referencing existing academic and practitioner reports. Ultimately, I advise that quick military operations may be effective for establishing security in the short-term, but indirectly supporting traditional dispute resolution institutions may be required to resolve the underlying grievances which

perpetuate local conflict in the long term. I build upon this assessment by providing additional insight from the perspective of local governments, civilians, and international observers. I conclude with a discussion of the broader ethical implications of foreign intervention, and I suggest that policymakers consider these and other effectiveness arguments when making the choice to intervene in the first place.

CHAPTER 2: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF CIVILIAN