71 These Jungle Forts were: LEGAP, KEMAR and SELIM in Perak; DIXON, SHEAN,
TELANOH, ISKANDAR and SINDERUT in Pahang; BROOKE and GHABAI in Kelantan; and LANGKAP in Negri Sembilan. Eventually a total of 14 were established. D of 0 Directive No. 37 issued on 1st February 1956.
72 Del Tufo, pp 44-48, Vlieland, pp 42-48, 1957 Census pp 1-11. The Malay urban population increased by 120% between 1947-57, compared to only 7% between 1931-47. However, while the increase in the Malay urban
population was chiefly the result of a drift to the towns, the increase among the Chinese was primarily due to Resettlement.
Relocation in a number of cases disrupted peoples means of livlihood, and many were forced to change their occupations. A sample survey in Salak South New Village in Selangor carried out in 1953, showed that two- thirds of the settlers had been forced to abandon their former agricultural occupations.72 For the New Villages as a whole, the percentage of
agriculturalists dropped from an estimated 60% in 1950 to 27% in 1952, while the proportion of wage earners in the rubber and tin industries rose from 25% to 55%.73
Overall, resettlement had an appreciable effect on the
national economy. In the short term the production of food crops and rice fell, and rubber production also suffered; tin production was adversely
affected and, had not prices of both rubber and tin been inflated as a result of the Korean War, Malaya might have faced immense budgetary problems in 1951-2 when national expense stemming from the programme was at its height. Against this there were advantages in both the short term and the long:
the easier access of the communities to main roads, and the improved security, meant that better market and credit facilities could be made available, while amenities which the rural population had not previously enjoyed were now available in all New Villages.'*■ Moreover, the concentration of previously
dispersed squatters into responsible social entities permitted the growth of political sophistication within the framework determined by the
Government and led ultimately to a massive increase in Federal citizenship. The squatters, in short, were substantially integrated into the new Malaya envisaged by the British and. the non-Cornmunist Malayans, while the new Malaya envisaged by the M.C.P. was deprived, for the forseeable future, of
such social basis as it had.
However, for the purpose of this study, the most important consequence of resettlement was that it provided a means of clearing the battlefield. But while it permitted the essential links between the
insurgents in the jungle, and their supporters among the previously decentral ised squatters and unsupervised labourers to be defined and eventually cut by the Security Forces, its success as a technique did not really become apparent until Briggs himself had left Malaya and its slow progress was inseparable from an array of parallel problems which Briggs experienced as 72 Corry Report, p 12.
Director of Operations
Progress Under the Briggs Plan
Despite the optimism of Briggs' earlier statement of 21st July 1950, the plan quickly encountered difficulties which required its extensive modification.
Operations in Johore rapidly fell behind schedule, and while this was partially due to the slow pace of Resettlement, it was principally a result of the unfortunate choice of Johore as the geographical starting point for the campaign. The general problem of insecurity in Johore was aggravated by certain factors: proximity to the predominantly Chinese city of Singapore from which financial support for the insurgents came; the concentrations of Chinese in the urban areas of the state and on the rubber plantations; the special place of Johore in Malayan history as one of the earliest seats of M.C.P. strength; and, the particular suitability of certain parts of the state for guerrilla warfare i.e. the coexistence of areas of thick jungle or swamp with rubber and palm oil estates. And, although the Government spoke enthusiastically of 'one hundred square miles of bandit territory around Yong Peng in South Johore being "blitzed in combined military, police and civil operations', this optimism proved unfounded, and until 1958, this area held out against overwhelming
concentrations of troops and police.71' Without the Government admitting it publicly, the original Briggs conception of clearing the map from south to north was, from early in 1951, quietly abandoned.
Nevertheless Briggs had placed his greatest confidence in the methodical conception of a 'steady-squeeze' process to interdict the
insurgents' supply lines and he gave this idea his closest attention. First, he reviewed the tactics being employed by the Security Forces, which
showed that the concept of the 'framework' was not being adhered to. Some commanders claimed perversely that the dispersion of troops which this entailed was opposed to the principle of Concentration of Force: hence they abandoned their allotted areas for long periods in order to undertake large operations and 'sweeps' elsewhere. Meanwhile, the security of the areas left unguarded was being jeopardised. To overcome this Briggs issued a tactical directive which stressed the importance of maintaining the
'framework' and of operating in small controlled units:
714 S .T. ; 6th August 1950. Templer, for example, invariably referred to the area as 'bloody Yong Peng'.
"A strong section is a match for any bandit gang especially if it uses 'Sting and disappear' tactics,” stated Briggs, "Seldom do more than the first few men get the chance of fire action. Moreover, such section patrols are more controllable, adaptable, less noisy and hence less vulnerable. They are thus more mobile and capable of surprise. Their task is similar to that of big-game hunters."75 The principles contained in this directive were put into effect on 15th November 1950 and Briggs was later able to quote favourable statistics to support his contention that sticking to the 'framework' was the
fundamentally sound course; but he could not command the troops and police to do so. He could only direct his intentions through the G.O.C., Malaya and the Commissioner of Police, and the executive impotence of this
arrangement retarded the real effectiveness of his office. Second,'to commit the Chinese population to the active support of the Government he conceived a Home Guard scheme. Some Chinese on whom the ferocity of terrorism fell, desired to help in their own defence. On the other hand they were not prepared to volunteer to join the Security Forces and deny themselves the better wages they could earn elsewhere. Briggs felt that many would welcome being ordered to help, especially in a collective form. The Home Guard was introduced, by which each village and resettlement area was to form and train a Home Guard; and once the District Officer felt
convinced of its loyalty, it was to be issued a proportion of shotguns. A * f
headman for each village and Home Guard was to be nominated under the supervision of the District Officer. Each house in the village was to have a Tenant-in-Chief who x-zould be responsible to the Headman for reporting the names and movements of people in his area of the village. In large towns, armed and uniformed Auxiliary Police Companies were to be formed, as well as a Home Guard for registration of the population.70
While the scheme was, in the long term, to be hailed as a considerable success in practice it suffered many changes in a short period of time. For a start, there were insufficient shotguns even for the few advanced Home Guard units and the men were armed with batons instead. With the arrival of a Civil Defence Commissioner in preparation for possible external war, the Home Guard organisation was amalgamated with Civil Defence, 75 Tactical Directive No. 1, p 3.
D of 0, Directive No. 11 issued 11th June 1951. Briggs and his advisers also discerned the distinct psychological possibilities in harnessing the deep-seated Chinese desire to acquire power and authority in a group situation. The hierarchical organisation of the Home Guard would permit this to be put to constructive use. This aspect of the Chinese 'mind' is excellently covered in Pye5 p 277 et.seq.
and Coast-watching was added as a further responsibility. Later again, Kampong Guards which in 1949 had been formed in Malay villages and armed with shotguns were also included in the Civil Defence organisation. Although
the Home Guards operated under the control of the local police, they were trained and administered by a separate organisation. This excision of the Home Guard from complete police control was a major cause of friction between Briggs and the Commissioner of Police, W.N. Gray, whose dissimilar
temperaments and strongly held professional views eventually caused an irreparable breach between the two men.77
Thus, while the Home Guard scheme was imaginatively conceived, it was not until Briggs had left Malaya that it became really effective. Third, while Briggs was emphatic in stressing the need for an overhaul of the intelligence service, the response was slow. Briggs had made his initial representations to Gurney in April, and a study group later known as the Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee was organised in May. In August, a Director of Intelligence was appointed. Yet not until twelve months after
that in later opinion, had an adequate number of officers been engaged for the Special Branch. Nevertheless, the Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee in a report submitted on 24th October 1950, stated that:
"in spite of more than two years of Government effort and increasing military and air support, the Communist potential has increased and
the organisation is now able still further to increase its activities".78 Thus, after two years of continuing effort to combat a
relatively low keyed insurrection and despite the efficacy of several
measures introduced by him, the position in Malaya was clearly deteriorating. On 1st November 1950, Briggs reported to the Officer Administering the
Government in the following terms:
"At the present rate of progress it is my considered opinion that the morale of the population will drop to a level below the danger point and further losses occur before the plan can take effect. Without the adoption of the gravest steps being taken both by His Majesty’s