also ruled that Sebastian failed to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed order as required by Rule 46, Section 3, and hence, it had no alternative but to dismiss the action.
Sebastian admitted that there was error in the remedy resorted to before the CA. They insist, however, that a perusal of their initiatory pleading in would show that said pleading contained all the features and contents for a petition for review under Rule 43, Section 6. Hence, the court should have treated their special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as a petition for review under Rule 43, since dismissals based on technicalities are frowned upon.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the case and in not treating the petition as a petition for review—NO RATIO: Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. In the instant case, Sebastian failed to show any compelling reason for not resorting to the proper remedy. Instead, we find from our perusal of their pleadings before the CA that they stoutly and persistently insisted that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari was their correct remedy.
Sebastian’s ground for questioning the orders of the DAR Secretary was that it was "issued and promulgated with grave abuse of discretion . . . a mounting to lack of jurisdiction." Note that this is precisely the office of an action for certiorari under Rule 65. Second, after CA dismissed their petition on the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for review, Sebastian continued to insist in their MR that under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), a petition for certiorari is both adequate and proper. It was only as an afterthought that they asked CA to treat their special civil action for certiorari as a petition for review.
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision.
Section 60 of CARP should be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include:
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions…except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-95 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular was incorporated in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 61 of CARP clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary.
By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, "an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed." Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the case.
That a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satisfy the requirements for the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does not necessarily mean that one is the same as the other. Or that one may be treated as the other, for that matter. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer.
In the instant case, Sebastian failed to show any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction on the part of the DAR Secretary. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.
ORBETA v. SENDIONG
FACTS: On March 1925, Simeona Montenegro sold to spouses Orbeta a 4622 sqm. parcel of land in Dumaguete. The land sold EXCLUDED a 884 sqm portion in which the house of Montenegro’s grandmother was built. This was not included in the sale. In 1934, Orbeta, in turn, sold the land to spouses Sendiong.
On December 1956, Sendiong spouses donated the land to Luis Sendiong who thereafter sold the easternmost ½ undivided portion to Pretzylou Sendiong. Luis kept the other undivided half.
In 1968, the Orbeta heirs insisted that Montenegro execute a quitclaim, which she did, acknowledging and ratifying the sale of the land to the spouses Orbeta. On the same day, Orbeta heirs also executed and Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition pertaining to the estate of their mother.
Montenegro eventually lost possession over the 884 sqm portion which was excluded in the 1925 sale, so she filed a complaint against Luis Sendiong for recovery of possession over said portion. The Orbeta heirs, for their part, filed a complaint-in-intervention praying for the recovery of possession of their portion of the land (2311 sqm out of 4622). However, during the pendency of this case, the case records were destroyed by fire in the RTC. Records were not reconstituted and the complaint was never pursued.
On May 1992, heirs of Montenegro and heirs of Orbeta, petitioners in this case, filed before the RTC a new complaint against Pajulas spouses (aka Pretzylou Sendiong and husband—Luis Sendiong sold to her half the undivided portion). The heirs filed for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages. Petitioners assert that when Orbeta (husband) sold the subject property to Sendiong spouses, it was without the consent of his wife, and therefore, he could have conveyed only his conjugal share (2311 of 4622 sqm).
Heirs of Montenegro reiterated claim over 884 sqm portion excluded in the 1925 sale.
Defendant spouses filed their Answer, asserting that the 1925 sale included the whole lot.
Also, they claim that Luis Sendiong and heirs peacefully and openly possessed the land ever since and the fact that Luis Sendiong heirs were not impleaded as party defendants, even though they are indispensible parties, as occupants of the half of the land.
So defendants filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of cause of action, because indispensable parties, heirs of Luis Sendiong were not impleaded. Petitioners opposed the motion alleging that Luis heirs were not indispensable because they were not in possession of the subject land which was the very issue in the case.
RTC denied MTD. MR denied. Then defendant spouses filed a Motion to Include Indispensable Parties, which was denied. After petitioners rested their case, defendants again filed a Motion to Include
Indispensable Parties. Still denied for lack of merit and trial ensued.
In 1998, RTC ruled in favor the Montenegro heirs and Orbeta heirs. Court said the 1925 sale did not include the 884 sqm portion and that what Mr.
Orbeta sold without wife’s consent was only his conjugal share. Defendants sought to appeal by filinf Notice of Appeal, but it was denied by the RTC for a defective non-forum shopping certificate. Disallowance of appeal was challenged in the CA but it was affirmed.
Decision became FINAL.
On Aug 2000, respondent Paul Sediong, filed a Petition for Annulment of the decision with the CA.
Respondent allege that he was not made a party of the case, as heir of Luis and that he came to know of the decision only in 1999. Said the TC refused to implead him despited repeated motions and the decision encroached on his and sister’s hereditary rights, without due process.
Petitioners invoke rule on res judicata, considering the issue on whether respondent is an indispensable party has already been passed upon.
BUT, CA granted the petition for annulment and nullified the decision, saying that respondent was an indispensable party. Any judgment on petitioners’ claims would affect respondent’s interest in the land. In the absence of an indispensable party, case renders ineffectual the proceedings, including judgment. CA said petition for annulment of judgment is not barred by estoppels, laches, res judicata or forum-shopping.
ISSUE: W/N petition for annulment of judgment should be granted.
HELD/RATIO: YES. CA decision affirmed.
Respondent Paul Sendiong and Lourdes were indispensable parties to the case. The petitioners are asserting their right to one half of an UNDIVIDED land.
Luis, inheriting the land from parents occupied half of the land while Pretzylou, the other. Also, petitioners are asserting their right over only one half of the whole land because they base their claim on the fact that their father sold only his half (conjugal share). But this being a conjugal property, it would be undivided still.
So the rights of Luis Sendiong will be affected by any judgment on the petitioners’ claims over the land. He and Lourdes are indispensable parties.
Now, the matter of whether respondent is otherwise barred from seeking the annulment of judgment by estoppel, laches, or procedural infirmities.
Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar.
The petition for annulment alleges that respondent learned of the existence the case only in 1999, or one year after the decision therein had been rendered.
Since he was not impleaded, there is no basis to presume that respondent was aware of the civil case during its pendency before the RTC.
Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment was, at that point, the only viable remedy for respondent to avail of, and it was utilized only one
year after respondent learned of the existence of the case. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier—negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Considering that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, a similar petition based on lack of jurisdiction is generally not barred by laches or estoppel if the petition is filed within one year after petitioner learns of the questioned decision. This moreover holds true, as in this case, since respondent is a foreign resident restrained by time and distance to undertake an immediate and proximate response, such as judicial recourse.
Res judicata does not bar the petition for annulment either because there is no jurisdiction over the party (Luis heirs) and there is no identity of the parties in both cases (Luis heirs not party to the annulled decision).
NERI V. LEYSON