But for many Americans and other neutrals not directly involved in the business of shipping, such British violations appeared to be matters of technical interna- tional law. The complaints against the British involved obscure rules of blockade and levels of international trade and seemed to have no immediate effects except the confiscation of ships followed by long-drawn-out Admiralty proceedings in British ports. The submarine, however, and its method of employment, had a more immediate and dramatic quality, with all the horrors of narrow escapes in lifeboats, sinking ships, and death by drowning.
Early in 1915, Germany decided to experiment with using the submarine to attack Britain’s commerce on a large scale, in the first so-called unrestricted submarine blockade. Announced in February 1915, Germany declared a war zone around the British Isles, in which any ship might be sunk without warning. Since the Germans sought to avoid sinking neutral ships, Britain made it official policy to urge merchant captains to fly a false flag of a neutral as a ruse de guerre. As a result, Germany warned that from time to time, a neutral ship might fall victim to torpedoing. Although most of the submarine captains continued to warn merchant ships and to evacuate passengers and crew before sinking a ship despite the official “no-warning” order, some captains simply followed the orders and sank obvious British or French ships without warning.
The most disastrous such attack, and one that enraged American opinion, occurred on May 7, 1915, when Captain Walther Schwieger of U-20 ordered the firing of a single torpedo against the huge, four-stack Cunard British flag liner, Lusitania. The ship went down with 1,198 passengers and crew, including many women and children. The death toll included 128 American passengers. Until that sinking, American public opinion, although divided, had been fairly neutral toward the war. To the American public, British interference in trade,
Great excitement always surrounded the arrival and departure of the four-stack Lusitania as well-wishers arrived by auto and carriage. (Library
the stopping of food supplies to Germany, limitations on journalists, and censoring of the mail had all been tallied against Britain. Reports of German atrocities in Belgium seemed horrible, but many believed the Brit- ish had fabricated such tales or cooked up exaggera- tions as part of their propaganda. Lusitania, however, changed the minds of many. The British and pro-Brit- ish publicists in the United States constantly reminded the American public of the tragedy, making it easy to believe that the Germans officially adopted intention- ally inhumane methods of warfare.
German U-boat commander Schwieger reacted with horror when he saw the Lusitania sink so rapidly. Peering through the telescope, he noted, “. . . there was a terrible panic on her decks. Desperate people ran helplessly up and down while men and women jumped into the water and tried to swim to empty overturned lifeboats. The scene was too horrible to watch and I gave orders to dive to 20 metres and away.”1 Schwieger
operated under somewhat vague or open-ended orders that did not clarify exact procedures: “Hostile merchant ships are to be destroyed.” Another standing order indi- cated that the safety of the U-boat had to be a first consideration. Despite the confusion or vagueness in his orders, the British vilified Schwieger as a murderer and Germans hailed him as a hero.
The German government stressed the fact that the Lusitania suffered a sec- ondary explosion, suggesting the explosion as evidence that the ship had been carrying a cargo of munitions. Indeed Lusitania did carry a shipment of small arms and ammunition aboard. However, many experts concluded at the time that a boiler explosion accounted for the secondary blast, and later investigations suggested that it might have been due to a detonation of coal dust in the coal storage compartment.
Although some naval officers and some of the public understood that the U-boat could not follow the traditional method of warning when in fear of being rammed, part of the worldwide shock of the Lusitania sinking derived from the jubilation expressed in Germany. Suffering food shortages from the Brit- ish blockade, the German public saw Schwieger’s act as an appropriate revenge against the British, and even religious ministers called for Germans to take pride in the attack. Postcards showing the ship and Schwieger’s picture became favor- ite collectibles in Germany, as did a newly minted medal commemorating the victory. The British press simply described the sinking as cold-blooded murder and a disgrace.
Only about 760 Lusitania survivors reached land. In Britain, U.S ambassador Walter Hines Page sent President Woodrow Wilson a telegram, asking him to respond to the tragedy with a declaration of war against Germany. Page stated that public opinion in Britain held that unless the United States did so, it would forfeit all respect from the European population and governments. According to legend, Wilson burned the telegram and thereafter tended to ignore any messages
The Lusitania tragedy helped recruit pro-British Irishmen to the Allied effort, as in this poster. (Library of
from Page. Page himself noted the coldness in Wilson’s response to his notes, and began to realize that he had lost the president’s confidence. Wilson did not take kindly to advice from U.S. ambassadors on how to conduct foreign policy; indeed, he often paid little attention to advice from his own secretary of state.
The sinking of the Lusitania and other submarine attacks on freighters, pas- senger liners, and other noncombatant ships would eventually lead to more crises between the United States and Germany. The United States however, continued to strive for a strictly neutral position during the war, and Wilson and many of his advisers continued to hope that the war could be resolved by negotiation. They believed that the United States, as the world’s most powerful and important neutral power in the war, should continue to press for a peace conference.
The British fought back against the submarine attack on their merchant ship lifeline, with one of their most successful efforts consisting of merchant ships and schooners that carried concealed guns, known as Q-ships. After encoun- tering a submarine and appearing to be disabled in the water, with “panic par- ties” scurrying for lifeboats, the Q-ship would hoist the British white battle ensign and drop movable panels to reveal cannons and machine guns. With gunfire, they would sink the attacking U-boat, even if it had stopped to pick up survivors from the attacked merchant ship. U-boat captain Baron von Spiegel survived such a Q-ship attack and left a vivid account of the attack on U-93, and a British officer, Gordon Campbell, wrote an account of the strategies used aboard his own Q-ship to sink U-68.
The British continued to enforce their blockade against Germany with their powerful surface fleet. Germany used its submarines selectively, successfully avoiding the sinking of any American-registered vessels in the period from early 1915 to early 1917. Meanwhile, German U-boat captains continued to seek out isolated British warships, battle against the disguised Q-ships, and destroy as many Allied merchant ships as possible without further angering Wilson or American public opinion.
Meanwhile, the war in Europe, in the Middle East, and on the eastern front with Russia ground on through 1915 and 1916.
CHRONICLE
OF EVENTS
1914
August 9: The British light cruiser HMS Birmingham
rams and sinks the German submarine U-15 in the North Sea.
August 28: The Battle of Heligoland Bight takes
place, in which British cruisers Fearless and Arethusa sink the German destroyer, V 187. In addition, the Germans lose three light cruisers, Mainz, Ariadne, and Köln, and about 1,000 sailors.
September 10–October 24: The German cruiser Emden sinks or captures 23 merchant ships and two
British warships in the Indian Ocean and shells a British oil depot at Madras, India.
September 22: The German submarine U-9 sinks
three British heavy cruisers, Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue.
November 1: In the Battle of Coronel off the west
coast of South America, a German naval squadron headed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sinks the British armored cruiser Good Hope and the light cruiser Mon-
mouth. The British lose 1,000 sailors.
November 9: After an exchange of gunfire with the
Australian cruiser Sydney, the German cruiser Emden is severely damaged, and the captain orders the ship run aground on coral reefs in the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean.
November 14: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are sunk at
the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic by British battle cruisers Inflexible and Invincible; the fleeing German light cruisers Nürnberg and Leipzig are tracked and sunk by British cruisers Kent, Cornwall, and Glasgow. With the loss of this squadron, the Germans lose 1,800 sailors.
December 31: German submarine U-24 sinks British
battleship Formidable.
1915
January 24: The Battle of Dogger Bank is fought, dur-
ing which German admiral Franz von Hipper directs a battle cruiser squadron against a superior British fleet. The Germans lose the battle cruiser Blücher. The British fleet, although outnumbering the German fleet, breaks off the engagement out of concern that German sub- marines might be in the area.
February 4: Germany announces a submarine block-
ade of Britain in response to a prior British blockade of Germany in which Britain adopted the doctrine of “continuous voyage.”
February 10: The U.S. response to the German
announcement is to declare that in the event that Amer- ican ships or the lives of U.S. citizens are destroyed by Germany in international waters, the United States will regard such an act as “an indefensible violation of neutral rights,” and Germany will be held strictly answerable for the violation. German ambassador von Bernstorff urges that the United States explicitly warn Americans against traveling on belligerent ships. His advice is ignored.
February 18: The German submarine blockade goes
into effect. At first German submarine crews employ cruiser rules, stopping merchant ships with a shot across the bows, allowing evacuation by lifeboat (and some- times German crews notify by radio rescue vessels of the state of the crew), then sinking the ship, usually with shell fire or placed charges. However, as merchant ships often outrun or ram submarines, German practice shifts to unannounced torpedo attack.
March 14: The German cruiser Dresden is scuttled
by its crew at Juan Fernández Island in the southeastern Pacific.
March 28: The German submarine U-28 sinks the Falaba, a British liner, in the Irish Sea, with the loss of
Leon Thrasher, the first American killed by submarine attack in World War I.
May 1: Off the Scilly Islands (southwestern Britain),
during an engagement between a British naval patrol and a German submarine, a torpedo damages the Amer- ican oil tanker Gulflight, with two American fatalities. Germany later offers full compensation for the loss.
May 1: The German embassy in Washington issues a
warning that Americans entering the war zone around the British Isles will do so at their own risk. Specific warnings are published in New York City papers regard- ing sailing aboard the Lusitania, a liner operated by the British-owned Cunard line. The Lusitania departs New York harbor.
May 7: U-boat U-20, under command of Walther
Schwieger, sinks the liner Lusitania off the Irish coast en route from New York to Liverpool, with the loss of 1,198 lives, including some 128 Americans. About 760 survivors reach land. The shock in the United States is immense. From Britain, U.S. ambassador Walter Hines Page urges Wilson to respond with a declaration of war.
August 16: The British Q-ship Inverlyon sinks Ger-
man U-boat U-4.
August 19: The German U-boat U-24 sinks without
from Liverpool to New York, and two Americans are among the 44 killed. The number of lives saved is 389. Submarine commander Schneider claimed the steamer’s zigzagging seemed an attempt to ram.
October 5: The German government offers apolo-
gies and indemnity for the loss of American lives in the sinking of the Arabic.
November 21: Germany issues a secret order
authorizing submarine commanders to regard as troop transports all ships crossing the English Channel at night, as Britain uses commercial liners to send troops to the Continent.
1916
February 21: Germany advises the U.S. government that
armed merchantmen are to be treated as cruisers begin- ning March 1. This action is in response to British use of Q ships in large numbers and to open arming of merchant vessels.
March: Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz resigns and is
replaced by Admiral Reinhard Scheer. Scheer is more successful than Tirpitz in advancing a more aggressive policy, involving U-boat construction, raids on British coastal towns, and use of armed merchant ships as com- merce raiders.
March 24: A German U-boat torpedoes the Sussex,
a French cross-channel passenger ship. Several Ameri- cans aboard are injured.
April 24–25: A German naval squadron bombards
the British ports of Yarmouth and Lowestoft.
May 31: In the Battle of Jutland (Skagerrak to the
Germans), the British lose 14 ships, including the Invin-
cible and the Queen Mary, both to spectacular explosions.
The Germans lose 11, but British loss in tonnage is nearly double that of the Germans. Superior German fire-control yields a loss of 117,000 tons of British ships, compared to only 61,000 tons of German ships lost.
June: Deutschland crosses the Atlantic, the first cross-
ing by a submarine; it carries cargo and stops at Balti- more and New London. Its cargoes are insufficient for commercial success.
December: The German commerce raiders Moewe
and Wolf and the sailing vessel Seeadler set forth to attack Allied shipping with numerous successes.
Photographs like this one of some of the bodies of the 1,198 civilians killed aboard the Lusitania shocked public opinion among Allies and neutrals. (Library of Congress)
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off the various entrances and to patrol outside the main entrance: but these measures were no real defences against subma- rines, and the position was such that it was deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour longer than was necessary for fuelling purposes. Accordingly, at 6:30 P.M. on the same day, the Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark by the 4th Flotilla [of destroyers], and the course being then shaped to pass round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to pro- vide some protection against destroyer attack, a request was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the main entrances. This measure was approved. . . .
British admiral John Jellicoe, recalling submarine danger to warships noted by August 7, 1914, as quoted by Thomas Goddard Frothingham, Naval History of the
World War, pp. 72–73. I had been going ahead partly submerged, with about five feet of my periscope showing. Almost immediately I caught sight of the first cruiser and two others. I sub- merged completely and laid my course so as to bring up in the centre of the trio, which held a sort of triangular formation. I could see their grey-black sides riding high over the water. When I first sighted them they were near enough for torpedo work, but I wanted to make my aim sure, so I went down and in on them. I had taken the position of the three ships before submerging, and I suc- ceeded in getting another flash through my periscope before I began action. I soon reached what I regarded as a good shooting point.
Then I loosed one of my torpedoes at the middle ship. I was then about twelve feet under water, and got the shot off in good shape, my men handling the boat as if she had been a skiff. I climbed to the surface to get a sight through my tube of the effect, and discovered that the shot had gone straight and true, striking the ship, which I later learned was the Aboukir, under one of her magazines, which in exploding helped the torpedo’s work of destruction. There were a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire, and part of the cruiser rose
in the air. Then I heard a roar and felt reverberations sent through the water by the detonation. She had been broken apart, and sank in a few minutes. The Aboukir had been stricken in a vital spot and by an unseen force; that made the blow all the greater.
Her crew were brave, and even with death staring them in the face kept to their posts, ready to handle their useless guns, for I submerged at once. But I had stayed on top long enough to see the other cruisers, which I learned were the Cressy and the Hogue, turn and steam full speed to their dying sister, whose plight they could not understand, unless it had been due to an accident. The ships came on a mission of inquiry and rescue, for many of the Aboukir’s crew were now in the water, the order having been given, “Each man for himself.” But soon the other two English cruisers learned what had brought about the destruction so suddenly.
As I reached my torpedo depth I sent a second charge at the nearest of the oncoming vessels, which was the Hogue. The English were playing my game, for I had scarcely to move out of my position, which was a great aid, since it helped to keep me from detection. On board my little boat the spirit of the German Navy was to be seen in its best form. With enthusiasm every man held himself in check and gave attention to the work in hand.
The attack on the Hogue went true. But this time I did not have the advantageous aid of having the torpedo detonate under the magazine, so for twenty minutes the
Hogue lay wounded and helpless on the surface before
she heaved, half turned over and sank. But this time, the third cruiser knew of course that the enemy was upon her and she sought as best she could to defend herself. She loosed her torpedo defence batteries on boats, star- board and port, and stood her ground as if more anxious to help the many sailors who were in the water than to save herself. In common with the method of defend- ing herself against a submarine attack, she steamed in a zigzag course, and this made it necessary for me to hold my torpedoes until I could lay a true course for them, which also made it necessary for me to get nearer to the Cressy.
I had come to the surface for a view and saw how wildly the fire was being sent from the ship. Small won- der that was when they did not know where to shoot, although one shot went unpleasantly near us. When I