Impacto de las TIC en la comunicación científica

Recently, Krickel has developed a new solution to the problems related to constitutive relevance. Her starting point is the assumption that constitutive mechanisms entail both entities and activities. She then considers that the use of just one variable to represent the phenomenon is not consistent with the fact that phenomena often consist of changes over time. For this reason, she proposes to distinguish between spatial entity-involving

occurrents and temporal entity-involving occurrents, where both kinds of parts are

themselves acting entities. Temporal entity-involving occurrents and spatial entity- involving are defined as follows:

“An acting entity E1 is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of another acting entity E2 iff:

1) the entity involved in E1 is identical with the entity involved in E2; 2) the activity involved in E1 begins later and ends earlier than the activity involved in E2, or the former begins simultaneously with the latter and ends earlier than the latter, or the former begins later than the latter and ends simultaneously with the latter.” (Krickel, 2018, p. 64)

“An acting entity E1 is a spatial entity-involving occurrent of another acting entity E2 iff:

1) the entity involved in E1 occupies a proper sub-region of the spatiotemporal region occupied by the entity involved in E2;

2) the activity involved in E1 occurs during the activity involved in E2.” (Krickel, 2018, p. 64)

To give an example, Krickel considers the phenomenon consisting of the mouse navigating the Morris water maze: a mouse put in the water maze has to escape from

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water by successfully navigating and thereby locating a hidden platform. If we have to recognise spatial entity-involving occurrents, we can consider the mouse’s muscles moving, or the hippocampus generating spatial maps while the mouse is navigating. They are spatial entity-involving occurrents constituting the acting-entity under study (the mouse navigating the Morris water maze). Furthermore, the mouse being put into the pool in a particular area of the water maze, the mouse swimming for a while in one direction in another area of the water maze, swimming in another direction in another area of the water maze, and finally finding the platform, can be described as temporal entity- involving occurrents of the phenomenon.

Figure 27 illustrates this distinction: one the one hand, a phenomenon is constituted by spatial entity-involving occurrents that occupy sub-regions of the acting entity, like a); on the other hand, a phenomenon is also constituted by temporal entity-involving occurrents that involve the same acting entity of the phenomenon itself, but that occupy limited time intervals, like b).

Figure 27. Spatial entity-involving occurrents and temporal entity- involving occurrents. a) represents a spatial entity-involving occurrent that occupies a sub-region of the acting entity; b) represents a temporal entity-involving occurrent that involves the same acting entity of the phenomenon but that occupies a limited time interval.

The idea proposed by Krickel is that spatial entity-involving occurrents and temporal entity-involving occurrents of the same acting entity, if occurring in different spatio- temporal regions, can causally interact. The justification for their causal interactions is that entity-involving occurrents that occur in different spatio-temporal regions can be wholly distinct events.

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On the basis of this observation, Krickel has developed a new account of constitutive relevance, called causation-based constitutive relevance, based on the notion of ideal* interventions and defined as follows:

“X’s Φ-ing is constitutively relevant for S’s Ψ-ing iff:

1) X’s Φ-ing is a spatial entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing,

2) there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing that is a cause of X’s Φ-ing, and

3) there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing that is an effect of X’s Φ-ing.” (Krickel, 2018, p. 64)

To formulate this causation-based constitutive relevance in terms of interventionism, Krickel needs to represent the different acting entities by variables: she represents X’s Φ- ing by the variable Φi, and the temporal entity-involving occurrents of S’s Ψ-ing by Ψ1 and Ψ2. If Woodward’s interventionist account is then applied to her notion, it follows that condition 2) is satisfied if and only if there is a variable Ψ1=ψ1 for which it is true that there is an ideal or ideal* intervention on Ψ1 with respect to Φi=φi that changes Φi while all other variables not on the causal path between Ψ1 and Φi are kept fixed except for variables that Ψ1 and Φi non-causally depend on. Condition 3) is satisfied if and only if there is a variable Ψ2=ψ2 for which it is true that there is an ideal or ideal* intervention on Φi=φi that changes Ψ2 while all other variables not on the causal path between Φi and Ψ2 are kept fixed except for variables that Ψ2 and Φi non-causally depend on.

Let us consider again the mouse navigating the Morris water maze for a period of time going from t1 to t4. Krickel focuses on the question of whether the hippocampus’s activity

at t3 is constitutively relevant to that phenomenon (2018, p. 65). To answer that question,

it should be verified at first that there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of the mouse’s navigation behaviour for which it is true that, had there been an ideal* intervention on that temporal entity-involving occurrent with respect to the hippocampus’s activity at t3, then the hippocampus’s activity at t3 would have been different. Second, it should be verified the existence of a temporal entity-involving occurrent of the mouse’s navigation behaviour for which it is true that, had there been an ideal* intervention on the hippocampus’s activity with respect to that temporal part, the temporal entity-involving occurrent would have been different.

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According to Krickel, condition 2) might be satisfied if one could imagine that had there been an ideal* intervention on the entering of the mouse into the maze at t1 (e.g. a change

in the location of where the mouse was put into the maze), then the hippocampus’s activity would have been different at t3 (e.g. different neural representations in the

hippocampus would have been active). In addition, condition 3) could be satisfied if there was an ideal* intervention on the hippocampus’s activity at t3 so that the mouse’s finding

the platform at t4 would have been different (e.g. it would have found the platform later).

While Krickel claims that her proposal can save the mutual manipulability approach, in the next pages I will discuss four limitations of her account.

7.3.2.1 Causation between entity-involving occurrents requires parts occupying different temporal regions

Let us consider some possible scenarios based on Krickel’s account. Intuitively, the general case described by Krickel is the situation where we ideally or ideally* intervene on the temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t1, this causes a change in the

spatial entity-involving occurrent X’s Φ-ing at t2, which consequently leads to a change

in the temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t3, like in Figure 28. In this

situation, we would not have problems because spatial entity-involving occurrents and temporal entity-involving occurrents of the same acting entity, if occurring in different spatio-temporal regions, are wholly distinct events and can causally interact.

Figure 28. The general case described by Krickel. A temporal entity- involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t1 is a cause of X’s Φ-ing at t2, and

there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t3 that it is

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There are further scenarios, however, that pose a problem to Krickel’s account. Although in her paper Krickel clarifies in different occasions that, in order to be causally dependent, entity-involving occurrents must occur in different spatio-temporal regions, her definition of causation-based constitutive relevance does not rule out that a temporal region can be occupied by both spatial and temporal entity-involving occurrents. More specifically, the definition of spatial entity-involving occurrents entails that such parts occupy just sub- regions of the spatiotemporal region, while the definition of temporal entity-involving occurrents entails that they occupy the whole spatial region and occur at a sub-region of the temporal region. Consequently, while a spatial entity-involving occurrent and a temporal entity-involving occurrent will never occupy the same spatial region, it might happen that they occupy the same temporal region.

This observation causes a counterexample if applied to the conditions for constitutive relevance. On the one hand, X’s Φ-ing is claimed to be constitutively relevant to S’s Ψ- ing iff: (i) X’s Φ-ing is a spatial entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing, (ii) there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing that is a cause of X’s Φ-ing, and (iii) there is a temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing that is an effect of X’s Φ-ing. On the other hand, the temporal regions of such parts are not specified, with the consequence that it might happen that the same temporal region is shared by the spatial entity-involving occurrent X’s Φ-ing and its putative cause, the temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing (as in Figure 29); or by the spatial entity-involving occurrent X’s Φ-ing and its putative effect, the temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing (as illustrated in Figure 30).

As described above, Krickel uses the notion of ideal or ideal* interventions to establish causation: considering Figure 29, for instance, we can establish that S’s Ψ-ing at t1 is a

cause of X’s Φ-ing at t1 iff there is an ideal or ideal* intervention on S’s Ψ-ing at t1 with

respect to X’s Φ-ing at t1 that changes the value of X’s Φ-ing at t1 given that all other

causes of X’s Φ-ing at t1 that are not on the causal path between I, S’s Ψ-ing at t1, and X’s

Φ-ing at t1 are kept fixed at their actual values (except for variables that I, S’s Ψ-ing at t1,

and X’s Φ-ing at t1 non-causally depend on).

Since, as argued in section 7.2, ideal and ideal* interventions allow for causal relationships between one entity and its constitutive parts, the ideal or ideal* intervention on S’s Ψ-ing at t1 with respect to X’s Φ-ing at t1 would not be problematic in

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interventionist terms. My argument is that such a conclusion, however, would be in contrast with the idea that causation cannot be established if the spatial entity-involving occurrent X’s Φ-ing and the temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing share the same temporal region because in that situation they are not wholly distinct events.

Figure 29. A temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t1 is

the cause of X’s Φ-ing at t1.

Figure 30. A temporal entity-involving occurrent of S’s Ψ-ing at t2 is

the effect of X’s Φ-ing at t2.

7.3.2.2 Do we need temporal entity-involving occurrents?

The observations proposed in section 7.3.2.1 can be used to identify another problem of Krickel’s account. Since a spatial entity-involving occurrent and a temporal entity- involving occurrent can share the same temporal region, it is likely that each temporal entity-involving occurrent (that is characterised by the same entity of the whole mechanism) is constituted by spatial entity-involving occurrents. Figure 31 helps to clarify this situation: the temporal entity-involving occurrents at t1, t2, and t3 are all

174 Figure 31. The temporal entity-involving occurrents at t1, t2, and t3 are

all constituted by spatial entity-involving occurrents sharing the same temporal regions.

If we intervene with an ideal* intervention on the temporal entity-involving occurrent at t1 with respect to the spatial entity-involving occurrent at t2, our intervention will always

change both the temporal entity-involving occurrent at t1 and at least one of its constitutive

spatial entity-involving occurrents at t1. Similarly, if we intervene on the spatial entity-

involving occurrent at t2 with respect to the temporal entity-involving occurrents at t3, our

intervention will always change also one spatial entity-involving occurrent at t3. The

problem is that, with ideal* intervention, it is impossible to establish whether we are intervening on the temporal entity-involving occurrent at t1 with respect to the spatial

entity-involving occurrent at t2, or whether we are intervening on the spatial entity-

involving occurrent at t1 with respect to the spatial entity-involving occurrent at t2. In

other words, due to the fat-handed nature of an ideal* intervention, we do not know where to locate it. It is hence questionable whether Krickel’s account needs temporal entity- involving occurrents, or whether we could spell out her proposal just in terms of spatial entity-involving occurrents in different time regions of the phenomenon-to-be-explained.

7.3.2.3 Multiple realizations and the absence of ideal interventions

As described in section 7.3.1.1, the account proposed by Baumgartner and Casini might cause problems when constitutive mechanisms are characterised by multiple realizations. A similar problem can be found also in Krickel’s account of causation-based constitutive relevance. If we applied Krickel’s proposal, it would follow that those parts characterised by multiple realizations should not be considered as constitutive parts. The reason is that, in order to establish constitutive relevance, it should be verified that there is an ideal or ideal* intervention on X’s Φ-ing at tn that changes S’s Ψ-ing at tn+1 while all other

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variables not on the causal path between X’s Φ-ing at tn and S’s Ψ-ing at tn+1 are kept

fixed except for variables that X’s Φ-ing at tn and S’s Ψ-ing at tn+1 non-causally depend

on. An intervention on X’s Φ-ing at tn that causes another spatial entity-involving

occurrent Y’s Φ-ing to replace X’s Φ-ing, as happens in the case of multiple realizations, would maintain S’s Ψ-ing at tn+1 unchanged, with the consequence that it would not be

considered an ideal or ideal* intervention. The direct consequence would be that a possible causal relationship between X’s Φ-ing at tn and S’s Ψ-ing at tn+1 would be

excluded. Furthermore, it would be established that X’s Φ-ing does not meet the requirement for constitutive relevance.

7.3.2.4 Constitutive mechanisms without activities

In section 7.3.2 I have observed that Krickel’s starting point is the assumption that constitutive mechanisms entail both entities and activities. According to this position, mechanisms merely characterised by a disposition cannot be described as mechanisms. There are different counterexamples, however, that might lead to the conclusion that there are systems characterised only by causal capacities that should be considered mechanisms.

A clear case in point that illustrates a situation in which we have a causal disposition is an unexploded bomb. The bomb is not exhibiting any behaviour, therefore the phenomenon Ψ (that is, the bomb exploding) is just dispositional. Additionally, the bomb’s components are not engaged in any activity. Overall, however, we can claim that the components’ behaviours are potential, and that this is enough to claim that the bomb is a mechanism, given that it has the causal capacity to explode.

A similar example is the case of an unwound watch S. It could be claimed that the watch is a mechanism because it has the dispositional causal capacity Ψ to indicate the right hour, and that its components X1, X2, X3, X4 (for instance the gears and the hands) are

constitutive parts that potentially can exhibit the constitutive behaviours Φ1, Φ2, Φ3 and

Φ4.

Another example from the social sciences is the componential system whereby the central bank can influence the money supply through the potential activities of some financial entities (for instance, certain entities can buy or sell government securities; influence interest rates; or change the reserve requirement). This complex system of entities and

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potential activities can be considered a mechanism even if the central bank is not influencing in any way, in a specific moment, the money supply.

Similarly, we could claim that the orchestra S ready to start playing Ravel’s Boléro is a mechanism because it has the disposition to do Ψ (that is, to play) and that, even though its components (the players and the conductor) are not acting, potentially they can exhibit the activities required to constitute the phenomenon Ψ.

Overall, all these examples suggest that constitutive mechanisms do not necessarily require actualised behaviours to be defined as such. If a constitutive mechanism is not engaged in any activity, however, it is difficult to distinguish between different time regions. Consequently, it might be argued that Krickel’s proposal is not adequate to include constitutive mechanisms characterised by dispositional behaviours.

7.3.3 Baumgartner, Casini and Krickel’s latest proposal: horizontal