Kymlicka (1989) considers at great depth the ability of liberal theory founded on the core individualistic values of equal rights and resources to cope with a culturally pluralistic society and concludes that the two are compatible if liberal theory recognizes that the historically generated disadvantages consistently suffered by Aboriginal peoples in Canada require a system that differentiates rights based on cultural group membership. He argues that giving Aboriginal peoples minority rights to land, language and self-government
doesn’t undermine individual rights, but rather creates a situation in which the individual is able to make better choices for themselves because minority rights bring protection to their cultural attributes. Kymlicka sees these cultural attributes as primary goods just as rights, liberties, income and wealth, and the basis for self-respect are all primary social goods for liberals like Rawls (1971). Kymlicka (1989) sees the need for minority rights to be
enshrined at the highest level possible in the constitution of Canada.
Turner (2006) takes exception to Kymicka’s attempt to frame Aboriginal rights within a definition of minority rights largely from the premise that, ‘most Aboriginal communities claim that their “special” rights flow from their legitimate political sovereignty’ (p.57). These Aboriginal communities reject the idea that they are minority cultures within the Canadian state and instead take the position that they are sovereign nations. So even enshrining minority group rights at the constitutional level is still not sufficient as
ultimately the rights of the minority are still subject to the structures of the majority. While rejecting Kymlicka’s Minority Rights as an ultimate solution, Turner (2006) accepts one of his arguments that underpins all three of the aforementioned liberal approaches to
Aboriginal rights: ‘Kymlicka’s constraint’ (p. 58). This is a practical reality check for Aboriginal groups in Canada which basically says that the rights of minority groups, as bestowed and judged by the state, are subject to the will and good graces of the majority group within that state and thus can’t stray too far from what is acceptable to that majority. Kymlicka (1989) says,
For better or worse, it is predominantly non-aboriginal judges and politicians who have the ultimate power to protect and enforce aboriginal rights, and so it is important to find a justification of them that such people can recognize and understand. Aboriginal people have their own understanding of self-government, drawn from their own experience, and that is important. But it is also important, politically, to know how non-aboriginal Canadians – Supreme Court Justices, for example – will understand aboriginal rights and relate them to their own experiences and traditions. And, as we’ve seen, on the standard interpretation of liberalism, aboriginal rights are viewed as matters of
discrimination and/or privilege, not of equality. They will always, therefore, be viewed with the kind of suspicion that led liberals like Trudeau to advocate for their abolition. Aboriginal rights, at least in their robust form, will only be secure when they are viewed, not as competing with liberalism, but as an essential component of liberal political practice (p. 154).
The final report of the RCAP (1996) calls for a renewed respect for Aboriginal peoples and their cultures, including a respect for Aboriginal self-government which must be reflected
in both legal and political practices. However, even within this extensive study, which strongly advocates for Aboriginal rights, Kymlicka’s constraint is clearly in play, for in the end, the commission states,
The right to self-determination is held by all the Aboriginal peoples of Canada… It gives Aboriginal people the right to opt for a wide variety of governmental
arrangements within Canada, including some that involve a high degree of sovereignty. However, it does not entitle Aboriginal peoples to secede or form independent states, except in the case of grave oppression or a total disintegration of the Canadian state (p. 172).
Turner (2006) argues that just as Kymlicka’s version of liberalism requires Aboriginal peoples to be aware of the perils of competing with liberalism, it is equally important for the Canadian state to be aware that its liberalism, at least as Kymlicka structures it, is not tenable unless it finds a way to recognize Aboriginal understandings of self-government, including control over education. As Kymlicka (1989) points out, for Aboriginal people, the history of colonial assimilation has led to a situation where Aboriginal peoples view inclusion as assimilation and a source of shame rather than equality. The work of Turner (2006) is key to understanding the contemporary social context of Aboriginal and non- Aboriginal relations in Canada along with the discourses which flow from these
relationships and which help to form these relationships. It is the present day discourses, based on historical relationships, which show that currently many Aboriginal peoples in Canada seek political autonomy not inclusion, but as Turner points out, this is not easily achieved. He calls for ‘word warriors’ (2006, p. 71), educated Aboriginal people who can walk in both the policy world of the Canadian government and the cultural world of their traditional communities, with the ability to see with two eyes, as the bridge to a lasting solution to Kymlicka’s constraint. Following Turner’s call for an education system which can produce word warriors, the next section considers three major structural approaches to Aboriginal education advocated in the literature: parallel, integrated and choice, their links to historical and contemporary liberal discourses and the research supports for each.