Impactos de la consulta previa en el desarrollo de medidas administrativas y

Assumption 2: truth functionality fails when “A” is true and “B” is false (Edgington 1986, p.24).

According to Edgington, assumption 2 is also incompatible with both the positive thesis and with common sense. Adopting assumption 2 entails that each of the rows in the below table represent open possibilities:

A B If A, B

T F T

T F F

Under these conditions, we are certain that A is true and certain that B is false, and we remain uncertain as to whether or not the conditional “if A, B” is true. This, however, conflicts with the standard counterexample to the material conditional; when A is true,

and B is false 39

. It is fairly intuitive that a truth-conditional conditional is false whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Indeed, for the material conditional, these are the only conditions under which a conditional is false. Edgington’s positive thesis makes a similar judgement. If someone knows that A is true and that B is false, then they can be certain that B is false on the assumption that A. As such, they are certain that “if A, B”, is false. The uncertainty of assumption 2 conflicts with both the certainty of the positive thesis, and with intuition. As such, assumption 2 is put in doubt.

Assumption 2 seems to be the intuition behind confounding type problems and other issues that involve the prevention of the manifestation of a disposition in response to the associated stimulus. To express this in terms of dispositions, we may be certain that a stimulus occurs, and certain that the associated manifestation did not follow, and yet we may remain uncertain as to whether or not the SM conditional is true.

Consider some examples. First, consider an example that corresponds to line 2. Suppose there is a bowl upon my desk and that the bowl is of unknown constitution and disposition; I have no particular belief concerning whether it is fragile or otherwise. I strike it and it does not break. Upon this example, I am certain of A and certain that not

B and so I seem disinclined to believe that if A, B. So far, this seems correct.

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Again, I am aware that the SM conditional is a counterfactual conditional and not a material conditional. This discussion concerns the assumptions, or informal reasoning, surrounding these conditionals, and not the logic of these conditionals.

Now consider an example that corresponds to line 1. Suppose that I strike that bowl and that it does not break, but according to line 1, I believe it true that if A, B. Upon this example, I am certain that A and certain that not B and yet I seem inclined to believe that if A, B. This, however, seems wrong. This is the confounding problem.

As I did with the mimicking case, I will now argue that the reason for this is that presupposed by beliefs concerning the obtaining of the SM conditional is a belief concerning the obtaining of D; its antecedent in the CA→ conditional. Our belief in the value of D, that is the belief in whether or not a particular dispositional property is or is not possessed by the object in question, fixes our belief in the value of the SM conditional.

To illustrate this point with respect to assumption 2, consider some modifications of the above examples that correspond to the table below.

S M Belief concerning D If S, M

T F T T

T F F F

Consider an appropriately modified example of line 2. Suppose there is what I take to be a genuinely fragile crystal bowl upon my desk. I strike it and for whatever reason, it does not break. I am certain that A and certain that not B and yet I seem inclined to believe that ‘if A, B’. This is contrary to the result that was reached without any belief concerning the disposition of the bowl. With the extra belief concerning the disposition possessed by

the bowl in play, it now seems wrong to believe the conditional to obtain. That is, I am certain that the bowl was struck, and I am certain that the bowl did not break, yet I seem disinclined to believe that the crystal bowl to which I have attributed fragility, is disposed to break upon being struck. There is a conflict here between my belief that the bowl is fragile, and my disinclination to believe ‘if A, B’. Again, my preparedness to accept ‘if A, B’ is determined by something other than the values of A and of B.

Now consider the more important example that corresponds to line 1. Suppose there is what I take to be a genuinely fragile crystal bowl upon my desk. I strike it and for whatever reason it does not break. Upon this example, I am certain that A and certain that not B. As a result, I am certain that ‘if A, B’ is false with respect to the fragile bowl. But in the case of dispositions this seems wrong to many. Surely if the bowl is genuinely fragile then the SM conditional will be true. This is the very intuition that generates confounding counterexamples, or more specifically the belief that such counterexamples ought to be considered problematic. Again, counterexamples are only problematic if one

wants to save the analysis. Otherwise, a counterexample is just a helpful indication that we are in error.

Recall that a confounder, or fink, is a situation in which a disposition ascription is intuitively true, but the associated SM counterfactual conditional is false. This can only be regarded as a potential counterexample if one takes the view that the value of D determines, or is determined by, the value of the SM conditional.

Again, the point I am trying to make here is that the values of the SM conditional and of D (and hence the CA← and CA→ conditionals) are, for those who find the counterexamples problematic, not independent. This assumption of interdependence between SM and D is what generates assumption 2, and each of the other 3 assumptions discussed by Edgington, and is the source of the apparently problematic nature of the counterexamples. If this assumption of interdependence, and hence the 4 assumptions that follow from it, are not made, then the counterexamples do not constitute genuine problems.