It was suggested above that there is a link between discourse and social structure, namely that discourse is derived from and so reflects social structure, and in particular power relations.18 The following section explores this link further by providing an explanation of the terms ‘power’ and ‘power relations’ through briefly examining the nature of power, drawing once more, on insights from Foucault’s work.19 This is not
18
In the context of CDA, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough have made the most systematic attempts to define the concept of power in relation to text and discourse (van Dijk 1989, 19-21; van Dijk 1993b; van Dijk 2001; Fairclough 1989).
19
As noted above, critical discourse analysis grew out of an interest in neo-Marxist theories of ideology, in particular the work of Gramsci, Habermas and Althusser and much work in critical discourse analysis has used the concept to great effect (see for example Hodge and Kress 1988, Fairclough 1992 and various others). There are, however, a number of difficulties associated with the use of the concept of ideology in critical discourse analysis, and in particular with the combination of Foucault’s view of discourse with a Marxist or even a liberal conception of ideology. Firstly as Pennycook notes, Foucault’s notion of discourse has much in common with a neutral or liberal conception of ideology as ‘views of the world’ (a conception which Thompson has criticised for lacking critical force and which is the view ostensibly adopted in CDA, see Fowler 1987, 490). Foucault explicitly rejected the Marxist notion of ideology as false consciousness since this view of ideology assumes that there is ‘truth’, and that ideology obscures this truth. For Foucault, there is no ‘real truth’. Rather, the various ‘truths’ of a particular society are ‘constructed’ in discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian view of discourse thus raises considerable difficulty when combined with a critical or Marxist conception of ideology (although Fairclough does not seem to have this difficulty, perhaps because of the two ways he defines discourse) and to represent a conceptual ‘doubling up’ if defined in a more neutral or liberal way.
intended to suggest that social structure can be reduced to issues of power and power relations, but rather that this is the particular concern of this thesis.
In the Weberian sense, the concept of power is broadly defined as the ability of an individual or group to act in a desired way (or not to act), to influence events or to acquire social, political or economic resources despite opposition (Marshall 1998, 519- 20; Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 490). It is also defined as the capacity to manipulate the beliefs and values of others in a way which favors the interests of the power holder, or to otherwise prevent opposition from arising (Marshall 1998, 520; Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 491). This view of power is often referred to as ‘power-over’ (Johnson 2000, 234). Such power is dependent upon access to resources of power such as wealth, expertise, social status, and control of information (Marshall 1998, 520). There is a strong correlation between the unequal distribution of these resources amongst social actors and the differential distribution of power (Marshall 1998, 519). In this view, power is ‘a substance or resource that individuals or social systems can possess’ (Johnson 2000, 234).
Foucault’s view of power differs from this conception in a number of significant ways. First, rather than power representing a resource or an object which can be possessed, Foucault sees it as a set of relationships:
power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault 1979b, 93, cited in Barker 1998, 27). Second, rather than focusing on a sharp distinction between powerful and powerless individuals and institutions and on the negative, repressive exercise of power by the powerful, Foucault suggests instead that power is productive. Power, he argues, operates by directing the behaviour and actions of others in ways which are conducive to the interests of those exercising power (Foucault 1979a; Barker 1998, 25). As Fairclough expresses it:
[p]ower does not work negatively by forcefully dominating those who are subject to it; it incorporates them, and is ‘productive’ in the sense that it shapes and ‘retools’ them to fit in with its needs (Fairclough 1992, 50; see also Philpott 2000, 149).
This view of power is captured in the notion of government, which, according to Foucault, represents one form of power. Government is concerned with the ways in which those in positions of authority (be they the state, parents, teachers or prison wardens) aim to ‘[modify] the actions or conduct of others through maintaining a certain possibility of a choice of actions in them’ (Barker 1998, 38). At the same time, it also aims to influence the ways individuals regulate their own behaviour (Hindess 1996, 97 and 105). This ‘self-policing’ is the ultimate aim of government, and of power. As Barker notes, ‘the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary’ (1998, 60).
The view that the exercise of power is concerned with influencing the choices that social subjects make has important implications since it requires that individuals must have the freedom to make choices. This freedom in turn implies that social subjects have the ability to exercise power themselves (see Hindess 1996, 100-1; Rouse 1994, 105 and 220-1). The aim of government is thus not complete control of society. Rather, effective government is possible only when, and precisely because, it allows citizens the freedom to ‘make the right choices’.
One of the mechanisms through which government operates is discipline. According to Hindess, discipline:
aims to provide [individuals] with particular skills and attributes, to develop their capacity for self-control, to promote their ability to act in concert, to render them amenable to instruction, or to mould their characters in other ways … [D]iscipline is productive power par excellence: it aims not only to constrain those over whom it is exercised, but also to enhance and make use of their capacities (Hindess 1996, 113).
In many modern societies, government and discipline have increasingly replaced coercion as the primary mode of controlling the actions of social subjects (Hindess 1996, 108). As Rouse points out, while coercion can repress or destroy its object, ‘[d]iscipline and training can reconstruct it to produce new gestures, actions, habits and skills, and ultimately new kinds of people’ (Rouse 1994, 94-5). If the strategies of government and discipline have been successful, these ‘new kinds of people’ will possess the capacity to act ‘freely but responsibly’ in accordance with the interests and values of those in authority (see Rouse 1994, 220; Hindess 1996, 131).
Yet an important corollary of the freedom which the exercise of power necessitates is that power is always linked to resistance. As Barker expresses it:
even though power dominates and subjects, because it is a relation and not a substance, by definition it always leaves open opportunities for resistance. Therefore, in its operation whenever power is being exchanged, being circulated, the possibility always exists that it can be reversed, transformed and resisted (Barker 1998, 37).
Foucault’s work on power represented a refutation of the Weberian concept of power and of Marxist theories of ideology. These theories suggest that dominant groups, by virtue of their possession of power, are able to manipulate knowledge and so control others. Foucault suggests that power works in far more subtle ways, through the techniques of government and discipline, rather than coercion, although the aim remains the regulation of others’ behaviour. He also recognises the role of social subjects in the exercise of power: since power is a set of relations, social subjects must be both present and complicit for power to be exercised in a relation of domination and subordination. At the same time, Foucault also clearly identifies the possibility of resistance to the exercise of power: in addition to complying with the exercise of power, social subjects may also choose various levels of resistance to it (see also below).