Implementación del Plan de Trabajo

FACTS: A sold his land to B who began to possess it. Later, C, a stranger, sold the same land to D who in good faith registered the sale. Who should be considered as the owner?

HELD: B should be considered the owner even if he did not register the land because D who registered the sale did not buy the land from A. Art. 1544 does not apply for here, in this case, we have two (not one) sellers.

(NOTE: Had C been the authorized agent of A, Art. 1544

would have applied, for then C would have been representing his principal, A.)

Carpio v. Exevea (C.A.) 38 O.G. 1356

FACTS: A sold his land to B. Later, A sold the same land to C. B in turn sold the same land to D, who took pos- session of the land in good faith. C, a purchaser in good faith, registered the sale of the land in his favor. Issue: Who is now the owner of the land?

HELD: D is the owner. The rule in the Civil Code (Art.

1544) should be applied only when two buyers (or more) (C and D) bought the same property from the same person. In

this case, there were two (2) different sellers (A and B), one of whom (A) had long before disposed of his rights as owner of the land.

Diosdado Sta. Romana v. Carlos Imperio, et al. L-17280, Dec. 29, 1965

FACTS: A principal named Silvio Viola authorized his

brother Jose Viola to act as agent for the sale, on the install- ment plan of certain parcels of land in a proposed subdivision for residential purposes. The agent then sold said parcels to a buyer named Pablo Ignacio. The deed of sale as well as the agent’s power of attorney was duly registered with the Registry of Property. Four months later, however, the principal sold the same parcels to a buyer named Diosdado Sta. Romana, who in turn sold them to Carlos Imperio in whose name title was issued. Who should be preferred as owner over the land? If Ignacio sues for annulment of the sale to him in view of his inability to obtain the parcels of land, will Ignacio get anything?

HELD: Ordinarily, Ignacio should have been preferred in view of Art. 1544 read together with Art. 1916 in agency. However, since in this case, he sued for annulment, the an- nulment ought to be granted, and Ignacio must therefore be refunded the value of the property at the time of eviction. It is elementary that unless a contrary intention appears, the vendor warrants his title to the thing sold, and that, in the event of eviction, the vendee shall be entitled to the return of the value which the thing sold had at the time of the evic- tion, be it greater or less than the price of the sale.

Dagupan Trading Company v. Rustico Macam L-18497, May 31, 1965

FACTS: In 1955, while Sammy Maron’s unregistered land was still pending registration proceedings under the Torrens System, he sold the same to Rustico Macam, who thereafter

took possession thereof, and who then made certain improve- ments thereon. A month later, an original Torrens Certifi cate of Title, covering the land, was issued in Sammy Maron’s name “free from all liens and encumbrances.” A year later, the land was sold judicially in favor of the Manila Trading and Supply Co. to satisfy Sammy’s debt in favor of said Company. The notice of levy and the Certifi cate of Sale were duly registered. The Company then sold its rights to the property to another entity –– the Dagupan Trading Company. This buyer now sues Rustico Macam and prays that it (the Dagupan Trading Company) be declared owner of the property. Issue: Who owns the land?

HELD: Rustico Macam is the owner of the land, for the Company only acquired whatever rights Sammy Maron had over the property at the time of execution sale. Incidentally, this is an exceptional case. If both sales covered unregistered land, Macam would surely be the owner by virtue of his prior purchase and possession. If both sales had been made when the land was already registered under the Torrens System, it is clear that the company would be preferred because the un- registered sale in favor of Macam does not operate to transfer title. This case, however, falls under neither situation –– for here the sale to Macam was made while the land was still unregistered, whereas the sale to the Company was effected at the time when the land was already registered. The Rules of Court should, therefore, govern this situation –– and under the Rules, the purchaser of land sold in an execution sale “shall be substituted to, and acquire, all the rights, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtor to the property –– as of the time of levy.” Since at the time of levy, Sammy no longer owned the land, the Company also acquired nothing, the levy being in a sense void and of no effect. (Buson v. Licauco, 13

Phil. 357-352; Landig v. U.S. Commercial, L-3597, Jul. 31, 1951). Parenthetically, the unregistered sale and consequent

conveyance of the title and ownership to Rustico Macam could

not have been cancelled and rendered of no effect simply

because of the subsequent issuance of the Torrens Title over the land. Moreover, to deprive Macam now of the land and the improvements thereon by sheer force of technicality would be both unjust and inequitable. [Query: Would the answer

be the same if the buyer (after the Torrens Title had been issued) had been an ordinary purchaser for value, instead of a purchaser at an execution sale?]

Felix de Villla v. Anacleto Trinidad, et al. L-24918, Mar. 20, 1968

FACTS: In the year 1920, through error, two separate original certifi cates of title were issued covering the same property (5,724,415 square meters land in Barrio San Agustin, Municipality of Iriga, Camarines Sur). The fi rst was issued on Jan. 30, 1920; the second, on Nov. 25, 1920. (We shall refer to them as the Jan. Original and the Nov. Original, respec- tively). A certain Fabricante (holder of a duplicate Transfer Certifi cate) mortgaged the property to De Villa for a loan contracted during the Japanese occupation. This duplicate certifi cate was naturally in the possession of the creditor De Villa. After liberation (1945), Fabricante in bad faith petitioned the CFI (now RTC) of Camarines Sur for a new duplicate on the alleged ground that the duplicate had been lost (De Villa was never notifi ed). The petition was granted and a new du- plicate (without any annotation of the mortgage) was issued to Fabricante. This duplicate was based on the Nov. Original. Shortly thereafter, Fabricante sold the land to a certain Palma, who then mortgaged the same to the Development Bank of the Philippines. Palma was not able to pay, and eventually a certain Trinidad obtained ownership over the land. In all these transactions, transfer duplicates were naturally issued (all based on the Nov. Original).

In the meantime, De Villa, who had really lost the dupli- cate given him by Fabricante, petitioned for a reconstitution of the title (the original in the Registry having been lost). The title was reconstituted, based on the Jan. original (not the Nov. Original). The debt not having been paid, De Villa foreclosed the mortgage; purchased the property as the highest bidder; and eventually obtained his own duplicate certifi cate of title based on the said Jan. Original. De Villa then sued Trinidad for the declaration of ownership over the land.

HELD: De Villa should be preferred. Both he and Trini- dad are in good faith, but then De Villa’s title is based on the Jan. Original while Trinidad’s title is based on the Nov.

Original. Where two certifi cates of title are issued to different

persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier

in date must prevail as between original parties; and in case

of successive registrations where more than one certifi cate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certifi cate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certifi cate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certifi cate and his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the fi rst certifi cate and his successors, who should be permitted to rest secure in their title. And from the viewpoint of equity, this is also the proper solution, considering the fact that unlike the titles of Palma and the DBP, De Villa’s title was never tainted with fraud.

Teodoro Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan L-22486, Mar. 20, 1968

FACTS: On June 28, 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arsenio Abalo a parcel of land in Esperanza, Agusan, covered by Original Torrens Certifi cate of Title P-1237 in the name of “Arsenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo.” Some- time in May, 1962, Almirol went to the offi ce of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale, and to obtain in his name a transfer certifi cate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:

“1. That Original Certifi cate of Title P-1237 is reg- istered in the name of Arsenio Abalo, married to Nico- lasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;’’

“2. That in the sale of conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the new Civil Code, it is necessary that both spouses sign the document;’’ but

“3. Since, as in this case, the wife had already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. (LRC Consulta 46, dated Jun. 10, 1958).’’

“To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, it is necessary that the property be fi rst liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition, and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document, ratifying this sale executed by their father.”

In view of the Register’s refusal, Almirol went to CFI (RTC) on a petition for mandamus (to compel the registration), but the Register answered that the remedy is to appeal to the Commissioner of Land Registration. Issue: Will the petition for mandamus prosper?

HELD:

(a) Although the reasons relied upon by the Register evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al.,

L-17956, Sept. 30, 1963 and Gurbox Singh Pablo and Co. v. Reyes & Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).

(b) Nonetheless, mandamus cannot be granted for under Sec. 4 of RA 1151 — there is the proper administrative remedy: where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds — the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memoran- dum to be made which shall be conclusive and binding

upon all Registers of Deeds. This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have

Guzman v. CA GR 40935, Dec. 21, 1987

Art. 1544 relating to double sales does not apply to a situation where the earlier transaction is pacto de retro sale of an unregistered land and the subsequent is a donation of the land by the vendor a retro.

Bernales v. IAC