Implicaciones para la práctica clínica

In addition to the findings and lessons learned, some important themes for consideration bear mentioning.

Private ROW Ownership and Success

Can the NEC and the Keystone Corridor be replicated without ownership of the ROW by a single passenger rail entity?

On both the NEC and the Keystone Corridor ownership of the ROW by Amtrak proved critical. Ownership of the ROW allowed Amtrak the authority to more easily deal with signaling, dispatching, power distribution, and maintenance decisions to implement HSR. It also reduced costs since there was no need to purchase new ROW and, in the case of the KCIP, also allowed the avoidance of certain environmental requirements since most of the improvements occurred in the current ROW and did not reflect a new service in themselves.

In contrast, except for one relatively small segment, the Chicago Hub is not owned by Amtrak, and unlike the NEC on which the other owners were public entities, the Chicago Hub’s spokes are primarily owned by private railroad companies. The result is similar to what is seen on the western portion of the Keystone Corridor—there is no clear authority for implementing HSR, and the costs to do so are much more significant since in many cases separate tracks will be required for passenger trains operating at higher speeds. In fact, the only section of the Chicago Hub that has been upgraded in speed in recent years is the Amtrak-owned segment from just outside of Chicago to Kalamazoo.

The Cost of Keeping Costs Lower

Keeping costs lower helps, but there are costs to “doing it on the cheap.”

Among the key findings on the Keystone Corridor was that because the costs to implement change in the most recent effort were reasonable, they were more easily accepted and

achieved. Similarly, in the Chicago Hub area—the one area where the tracks have been upgraded to 110 mph maximum allowable speed (though speeds remain lower because other upgrades are still not in place)—it was relatively inexpensive and costs could be covered under a broader statewide infrastructure initiative in Illinois. However, as the experience on the NEC demonstrates, trying to reduce costs too much can lead to the situation where the goals are left unmet. In fact, on the NEC, the constant tension between what was needed to realize the goals of the NECIP and the NHRIP, and the funds that were provided often led to increased costs over time as plans were continuously redrawn and revised, and implementation delayed. Worse, making decisions based on the cost of each project individually ignored the possibility of reaping greater savings by combining the projects.

Moving Beyond U.S. Reluctance

Is the United States Ready for New HSR?

The first study in this series suggested that there were opportunities for both incremental and new HSR in the United States, noting a 1997 Federal Railroad Administration study that concluded that high-speed ground transportation (including HSR and Maglev) could develop appreciable ridership.332 A number of experts have suggested in recent months that with concerns rising over fuel prices and the damage cause by greenhouse gases, people may be more willing and likely to turn to rail for travel. However, in the United States to date, the only two cases that even come close to having HSR implemented are the NEC and the Keystone Corridor, and whether they are truly HSR remains debatable. The Keystone Corridor still will only be traveling at speeds of up to 110 mph, and while trains on the NEC can travel at speeds of up to 150 mph on the north-end and 135 mph on the south-end, average speeds fall much below that. However, they are at least implemented, which is more than can be said for many other efforts around the country—Florida, Ohio, Chicago Hub—that have been pursued for decades but have not moved past the planning phases.

Beyond the fact that Amtrak owns the lines for both the Keystone Corridor and the NEC, another factor that stands out is that they are both incremental rail initiatives that build upon what already exists. In contrast, earlier attempts at HSR on the Keystone Corridor that stressed new HSR or Maglev technologies failed as did Florida’s and Texas’ attempts at new HSR. Many other initiatives that focus on new HSR have also failed to progress.

Should the Focus Be on Incremental HSR?

Perhaps the most resounding theme for consideration is that in the United States, incremental HSR may have the best chance for success. This is not to say that all incremental HSR solutions will be successful. The Ohio and Chicago Hubs have been pursued for many years without approaching implementation beyond the upgrades to the tracks on the two small segments noted earlier. Nor is this to say that incremental HSR is the preferred approach. Indeed, while the NEC is successful in some ways, it also clearly demonstrates the difficulties in operating true HSR on a ROW shared with heavy commuter and freight rail traffic.

Nevertheless, this is a point worth serious consideration given the costs of new HSR; current political apathy (and in some cases outright antipathy) surrounding rail more broadly and new HSR more specifically; the perceived risks associated with “unproven” HSR technologies in the United States, and the fact that the few places where success has occurred (even if modest in many respects) have implemented incremental HSR. While incremental rail may be viewed by some as “settling” for the second-best choice, without stronger and consistent financial and political commitment on both the part of the federal government and the states, it may be the only means for having any HSR in the United States for some time.

ENDNOTES