One of Donnellan’s most important insights was that when, for example, the object of a singular thought is perceptually accessible to a speaker and audience, and the speaker wishes to communicate a thought about that ob- ject, what matters for successful communication is only that the speaker and audience come to entertain a thought about thesameindividual. Donnellan demonstrated that this is possible even in cases where the vehicle with which the speaker expresses the singular thought, say a de nite description, is strictly speaking inadequate, i.e. not satis ed by the intended referent. at is, if a speaker intends to communicate a singular thought, it effectively makes no difference whether the chosen vehicle of language is adequate as long as the speaker can reasonably assume that using that vehicle of language will enable her audience to entertain the same singular thought.9 us, as regards successful communication, it is oen irrelevant from both the speaker’s and the audience’s point of view whether the intended referent satis es the description.
is observation led Donnellan to conclude that de nite descriptions have referential uses where their semantic referent is simply the intended referent, but this conclusion also leads to the quite counter-intuitive con- sequence that ‘theF isG’ can be true even when there are no individuals who areF. In order to avoid this counter-intuitive consequence, Reimer and Devitt maintain that de nite descriptions are semantically referential only when the intended referent satis es the descriptive content. So, when a speaker entertains a singular thought, intends and succeeds in communicat- ing that singular thought, but misdescribes the intended referent, she fails to referand hence she fails to literally express a singular proposition.
Now, it is important to recognize that the assumption that ‘theFisG’ can be true only if the intended referent isFin fact undermines the motivation that Donnellan originally put forward in favor of his distinction, namely misdescription cases. When this assumption is adopted (which perhaps it should be), misdescription cases can no longer be explained in terms of Don- nellan’s distinction, and instead we must resort to a pragmatic explanation. Reimer and Devitt are thus committed to the view that the explanation of why communication succeeds in normal cases is importantly different from the explanation of why communication succeeds in misdescription cases; the rst is explained simply in terms of the propositionliterallyexpressed
9 Although, if speakers are obeying Grice’s (1989) cooperative principle, it makes sense for them to choose the vehicle which is the least cognitively taxing for the interlocutors, since one might think that this improves the chances of communicative success.
whereas the latter can only be explained by appeal to pragmatics. But since the phenomenology of these cases can be quite similar (which essentially motivated Donnellan’s view), one might be inclined to believe that there should be a general and uniform explanation in both types of cases. And so, if one wants to avoid the consequence that ‘theFisG’ can be true when no invididual isF, it would seem quite reasonable to accept Kripke’s general pragmatic explanation.
A related worry is that Reimer’s and Devitt’s view fails to explain why — when interlocutors fail to grasp what a speaker hasliterallysaid — communi- cation nevertheless appears to proceed smoothly. Now, whether an utterance of ‘theFisG’ succeeds in communicating a singular proposition depends on various factors that a speaker has no control over. Suppose I’m entertaining the singular thought about my sister that she just completed a marathon and suppose further that I want to communicate this thought to my interlocutors. In this context, it would be natural for me to assert (138).
(138) My sister just completed a marathon.
However if my interlocutors have never met my sister and in fact have no idea who my sister is, I can only succeed in communicating a general proposition.10 My assertion will enable my interlocutors to entertain only thegeneralthought that my sister,whoever she is, just completed a marathon. Consequently, if my interlocutors are not acquainted with my sister (in any relevant sense), it is simply not possible for me to successfully communicate the singular thought that she just completed a marathon — even if I so desired. e communication of the singular thought thus depends on both the mental states of the speakerandthe interlocutors.
Given Reimer’s and Devitt’s view, it seems plausible that there are situ- ations where a speakerliterallyexpresses a singular proposition but where the interlocutors are in a position to grasp only a general proposition. For example, given the scenario described with respect to (138), I would effectively have asserted the singular proposition about my sister that she just completed a marathon, but my interlocutors might only be capable of recovering a general proposition. In that case, Reimer’s and Devitt’s view entails that my interlocutors fail to grasp what I have literally said. And even though this might seem prima facie unproblematic, since this could also happen with e.g. proper names (when the names are not antecedently introduced) and deictic uses of pronouns (where the required demonstration
10I.e. suppose that there is no relevant perceptual link between my sister and my interlocutors, as Devitt (2004: 290) argues is required for singular thought.
130 | Evaluating the Argument from Convention
fails), the effect is manifestly clear — communication breaks down. For example, if I assert (139) but fail to demonstrate anything, i.e. suppose I just point into the void, my interlocutors would be forced to bring the conversation to a halt and ask me to elaborate or explain myself.
(139) HEfjust completed a marathon.
[pointing into the void]
In contrast, there is no breakdown in communication when I assert (138) and my interlocutors are not acquainted with my sister. So even though my interlocutors apparently failed to grasp what Iliterallysaid, communication appears to be completely unaffected. e possibility of systematic miscom- munication without any effects on the discourse seems like something that needs to be explained.