Impulsando los Acuerdos Institucionales de Convivencia (AIC)

This section explores the nature of public/private alliances using three key themes emerging from the literature: the role of the public sector; forging alliances; and

‘boosterism’ and influencing decision-making.

First, Lloyd and Newlands suggested that Molotch’s theory of local government was “poorly developed” and local government was effectively “hijacked by business” (1988, p35). They reminded us that Molotch developed his theory in the mid 1970’s in the US and using this for UK comparisons we needed to be aware of fundamental differences which existed. For example UK local government has had less independence than the US system of federal government. Also UK urban policy was more dominated by political parties giving less credence to Molotch’s growth coalition theory with US business groups influencing city politics. Many UK commentators argued (Shaw 1993; DoE 1994b) that local authorities rather than business interests should have taken the

facilitators or enablers in establishing and maintaining the coalition structures through which longer lasting and more securely based regeneration can come about” (DoE, 1994b, p51).

Second, Molotch (1976) suggested that ‘key players’ were mobilised and shared mutual interest, “otherwise competing land-interest groups collude” (p311). Coalition theory relied on the shared objective of growth, “urban politics is reduced to ‘growth manoeuvring’, with growth presented as an overriding commonality” (Valler, 1995, p36). Clearly though, City Challenge was not concerned solely with growth as it aimed to reach and involve the most deprived sectors of the community. An assumption that competing interests could collude without major conflicts of interest was perceived, by some, as over simplistic. Indeed Valler suggested that growth machines did not operate in an efficiency vacuum and differed in terms of coalescence and unity.

Finally, Molotch suggested that governments influenced private decisions with taxes or labour costs, for instance. He also pointed out that localities offered attractive ‘packages’ like simplified planning regimes to encourage business growth. He argued that one of the key roles of local government was to promote the virtues of a particular locality to potential developers; such ‘boosterism’ was reinforced by bodies such as the Chambers of Commerce. In the Deame Valley the private sector was particularly influential in encouraging local authority employees to be pro-active in terms of developing a marketing strategy for the area, “I don’t believe any marketing would have happened without the private sector” (A Private Sector Representative).

Regime theory focused on the ‘structural’ aspect of public/private alliances. Some observers such as Fainstein and Fainstein contended that urban regimes incorporated a “circle of powerful elected officials and top administrators” (1986, p256) that dominated decision-making within a city. Lindblom (1977) suggested that in a liberal democracy there were two main tiers of authority that were inherently interrelated: the democratically accountable government and the asset-owning private sector. Business decisions, he claimed, could affect public welfare and have considerable consequences for the development of an area. Although the public sector may not have controlled business decisions it offered inducements or what Stone referred to as ‘side payments’ (for example via tax incentives, grant regimes or urban initiatives). This ‘structural’ relationship meant that by creating a favourable business climate, businesses were in effect privileged elites. Kantor and Savitch confirmed that local governments “derive bargaining advantages from their ability to exploit popular control systems as a bargaining resource” (1993, p252). Furthermore, they suggested that ‘bargaining

advantages’ tended to be cumulative, “the more a city holds, the greater its ability to bargain” (p234).

In the Deame Valley it was stressed that the private sector enjoyed strong relations with central government, “some of their ‘in-roads’ to central government are better than our ‘in-roads’ to the current central government” (Local Authority Representative). At board level one third (six out of eighteen) of the members represented the private sector. The private sector in the Deame seemed to have a major role in the decision-making process. One public sector respondent referred to business involvement as the “third force”. The constitutional rules of the DVP gave the private sector equal status with the local state in terms of voting powers: “at least eight members must be present at a board meeting for decisions to be taken, of whom at least three must be from local authorities and at least three from the private sector” (DVP, 1992, pl45).

One private sector respondent referred to the City Challenge decision-making process as a catalyst for the private sector “in bringing an understanding between central and local government who’ve fallen out.... I believe its helped local politicians to actually meet and work closely with the private sector people. I think its helped develop an understanding and a confidence not in our ability, but in our sense of purpose”.

In Sheffield private sector relations with the local authority appeared to have been strengthened with the advent of City Challenge. Indeed “the private sector has had more consultation with the local authority than the local community did” (Private Sector Representative). Cochrane suggested that Sheffield had already begun “to put together an ‘urban regime’ appropriate to the 1990’s” (1994, p21) through organisations like the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee. However, some concern was expressed by some observers at the absence of private sector involvement in the City Challenge team: “they didn’t have any representation on the team. Maybe that was a mistake. Certainly some really hard nosed commercial people at the time would have been some assistance” (City Challenge Team Member).

The private sector did however have representatives at Policy Board level which meant they were able to influence the decision-making process. Nevertheless, some observers claimed that the private sector had only token representation: “we need to have more people who are involved in a company on a day to day basis rather than an umbrella organisation like the Chamber of Commerce who represent a group of companies and, not, perhaps the local interest that we need in the area” (Private Sector Representative).