Much of the federal dynamic literature focuses on macroscopic systemic changes:
constitutional change, judicial interpretation, formal intergovernmental agreements, fiscal federalism, delegation of powers from one level to the other, and asymmetry (Simeon 2001, p. 147ff). The methodology that accompanies such analysis typically adopts a historical institutionalist framework (eg see Broschek 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013) that sees federal dynamics characterised by path dependency and periods of equilibrium punctuated by critical junctures brought about by exogenous factors in ‘the economic, cultural, social, and global environment in which federalism is embedded’, embodied in a crisis or external shock where
‘citizens and leaders alike come to perceive that the institutions designed to serve them are failing to do so’ (Simeon 2001, p. 145). As noted in Chapter 2, this raises the question of why some institutions remain stable despite ‘massive’ periods of upheaval, and how gradual change may still take place despite apparent institutional equilibrium (Thelen & Karcher 2013, p. 118).
A second stream in the federal dynamics corpus relates to the endogenous sources of change arising from informal institutional processes and interactions that take place in federal systems, often in response to the formal constraints posed by constitutions, legislation and rules (Colino
working relationships in the course of adopting and implementing policies. Actors develop informal strategies and norms within intergovernmental decision structures through administrative or partisan arenas or through personal contacts’ (2010, p. 22). Accordingly, this stream focuses on change emanating from specific strategic decisions or policies adopted by concrete political actors at certain moments in time (Colino 2010, p. 18; Broschek 2013, p. 96).
Such change is characterised by the incremental development of institutional components of the system.32 The associated methodology consequently adopts the incrementalist aspects of historical institutionalism that emerged in response to critiques of the methodological constraints of path dependency and punctuated equilibrium (Broschek 2013, p. 96).
At this point, however, a shortcoming arises in the capacity of the older forms of neo-institutionalism to deal with personal agency, because they posit institutions as structures external to agents, with rules set exogenously as constraints, whether as rationalist incentives, path-dependent trajectories or cultural norms. A focus on bureaucratic agency, in particular, goes beyond the mechanisms of change posited in the institutionalist tradition for the following reasons.
First, in line with its general adoption of a historical institutionalist lens, federal dynamics research subsumes bureaucratic agency and capacity within the general framework of collective political actors, occluding the bureaucracy’s specific contribution and role. Second, federal dynamics places a priority on understanding how the institutional and ideational layers are related. How this works in Australia, and consequently what implications this might have for the practice of intergovernmental management, requires a methodology that is particularly responsive to the ideational component of federalism. Finally, Thelen and Karcher’s question about the possibility of change despite (or even possibly leveraging) formal institutional stability raises similar questions about the role of ideational factors and their effect on federal institutions and processes in generating such change.
Accordingly, if we are to focus on individual practice and agency, explanation lies in the interaction between ‘the consciousness of agents and the relevant strategic, that is to a large extent discursive, context’ (Marsh 2010, p. 219 - my emphasis; Schmidt 2010, p. 14).
Similarly, Wright considered ‘the human dimension - the activities and attitudes of the persons
32 In the Australian case, Galligan similarly contrasted processes of punctuated equilibrium with those of incremental change, although he was writing about constitutional developments (2008, p. 621).
occupying official positions in the units of government under consideration’ to be a defining feature of this system (1978, p. 9). In so doing he echoed Anderson’s call for a focus on the human dimension of the federal system that I have already noted at Chapter 2.1.33
Ostrom provides a good summary of what institutionalism in general offers to support a focus on agency. She defined institutions as "the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies." (Schlager 1999, p. 308). How these concepts arise in a federal setting, how they relate to the ‘formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity’ (Hall
& Taylor 1996, p. 938) and are then used in policy work, is precisely the problem of interest here.
More broadly, Schmidt’s four elements of discursive institutionalism are particularly apposite for the study of intergovernmental management: in the discursive framework, ideas and discourse ‘are taken seriously’; they are set in an institutional context with one or more of the older forms of institutionalism as background; discourse follows a ‘logic of communication’;
and discursive institutionalism takes ‘a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles’ that the older institutionalisms posit as insurmountable (or at least take as a given set of constraints on agency). 34 As Schmidt argues, ‘institutions are internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures (of thinking and acting) that constrain action and as constructs (of thinking and acting) created and changed by those actors’ (2008, p. 304; 2010, p. 14).
Over the past decade, a burgeoning body of work in discursive institutionalism has illuminated and explained major processes of policy change.35 A number of these studies have looked at these policies in a federal setting, including multi-level governance studies of the Eurozone (Schmidt, 2017a) and EU trade policy (De Ville & Orbie, 2014). However, there has been very
33 In a similar vein, Burgess notes that ‘change and development remain the most difficult aspects to explain and understand in the study of federal political systems’ and suggests that ‘the notion of federalism as political ideology can provide a useful route into this complicated area’ (1993, p.107).
34 I would briefly note here the congruence between the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideas’, with ideational approaches, in Carstensen’s formulation, being ‘less reluctant’ to focus on strategic, actor-oriented change in policy processes (2011, pp.603-604).
35 Including environmental and climate policy (Gillard, 2016; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Leipold, 2014; Lorenzoni
& Benson, 2014; Mert, 2009); domestic and multinational economic policy (De Ville & Orbie, 2014; Hope &
Raudla, 2012; Schmidt, 2017a); transport (Palmer, 2010); housing (Jacobs, Kemeny, & Manzi, 2003); drugs (Lancaster & Ritter, 2014); immigration (Boswell & Hampshire, 2016) and even Brexit and Trump’s election (Schmidt, 2017b).
little application of a discursive lens to federal dynamics in particular, or even of federalism generally (Borriello’s & Crespy’s study (2015) of French and German approaches to EU integration is an interesting exception). I have not identified any discursive institutionalist studies thus far of intergovernmental management.36
In their cross-country study of trends and dynamics in intergovernmental financial relations, Eccleston et al. conclude that ‘an ‘actor-centred’ institutionalism approach will provide rich insights into the path ways to federal reform’, but note that more research is needed to understand how actors exercise their agency in interpreting the political and institutional context and constructing strategies for change (2016, p. 13). In her work on EU public policy, Saurugger argues similarly for an ‘actor-centred constructivism’ to help conceptualise institutional complexity (2013, p. 901).
A discursive methodology is also particularly relevant for examining the subset of issues on institutional resilience introduced in Chapter 2. Institutional stability may be the product of path dependency; however, as we have seen, stability may not deliver institutional resilience.
The interviews illustrated the choice many officials face in intergovernmental management between stasis and a more active form of institutional maintenance, requiring them to take steps to maintain networks and policy productivity where they perceive these are becoming degraded. Such choices are patterned by the ‘rules-in-use’ which, as I have suggested, are the focus of the discursive approach adopted here.
Accordingly, this research aims to contribute both to our insights into federal dynamics, and on the methodological front to the development of discursive institutionalism through its application to, and testing in, a comparatively new field for the framework.