6.1 General
Research in cognitive style has contributed to better understanding of the way style contributes to how one perceives and relates to stimuli. There are some revealing reports of
empirical studies which can add to understanding of cognitive style. This section will offer a review of the confusing number of dimensions of cognitive style. And, it will present
important findings based on empirical studies which inform and expand my work.
6.2 Dimensions of Cognitive Style
Hayes and Allinson (1994) presented a chart containing 22 dimensions of cognitive style and suggested that the field was confusing based on too many people working, “…in cheerful disregard of one another” (p.56). In the interest of identifying this scholarship I will present the table showing the information as shown in Hayes and Allinson (1994:pp.58-59). Hayes and Allinson reviewed the cognitive style scholarship for its application in
management practice.
Messick (1984), along with Hayes and Allinson (1994) describe abilities (cognitive level) as unipolar; i.e., from a little to a lot where the more you have the better. Conversely, cognitive style is viewed as bipolar; i.e., generally non-pejorative where having a stylistic preference related to one pole does not mean one has no ability to function in the other pole of behavior. Messick differentiates level from style and, like Kirton and others, says they are not related. He offered a typology which included four classes: intellective abilities, stylistic abilities, cognitive controls, and cognitive styles. And, he identified eight “pure stylistic dimensions of cognitive style.” These are all contained in Figure IV-3 but he received criticism from Tiedemann (1989) who said it was unclear that these eight dimensions of cognitive style even met his own criteria. However, Hayes and Allinson identified Kirton’s (1976) measure of cognitive style that satisfies all of Messick’s criteria. I want to call attention to the fact that Hayes and Allinson (1994) collaborated to develop their own
Table IV-1. Dimensions of Cognitive Style (Hayes and Allinson 1994)
Dimension Description References
1. Scanning-focusing* Entails identification of relevant versus irrelevant
information in attempting to solve a problem Schlesinger (1954); Bruner et al. (1956) [Personality theory] 2. Constricted-flexible
control* Constricted control shows more susceptibility to distraction; flexible control is characterized by resistance to interference
Klein (1954) [Motivation] 3. Broad-narrow*
(Category width) Preference for broad categories containing many items, rather than narrow categories containing few items. Broad categorizers tolerate errors of inclusion whereas narrow categorizers tolerate errors of exclusion
Pettigrew (1958); Fillenbaum (1959); Bruner and Tajfel (1961); Kogan and Wallach (1964) [Personality] 4. Analytic-nonanalytic
conceptualizing* Analytic style entails differentiating attributes or qualities. Non-analytic style responses may be more relational or thematic
Kagan et al. (1960); Messick and Kogan (1963); Kagan et al. (1963 and 1964) 5. Leveling-
sharpening* Individual variations in assimilation in memory. The leveler tends to assimilate new stimuli into previous categories and to blur memories, while the sharpener tends to differentiate new
information from old, to magnify small differences and to exaggerate changes between present and past
Gardener et al. (1959); Klein (1970)
6. Field dependent-
independent* A global versus analytic way of perceiving. Entails the ability to perceive items without being influenced by the background
Witkin (1976); Goodenough and Oltman (1981); 7. Impulsivity-
reflectiveness* Impulsivity is characterized by quick responses, reflectivity by more deliberate, slower responses. The impulsive person is quicker but makes more errors
Kagan et al. (1964); Kagan (1965)
8. Risk taking-caution* Risking taking is characterized by taking risks even when the odds for success are poor. Caution is characterized by reluctance to take chances except when the probability of success is great.
Kogan and Wallach (1964)
9. Cognitive complexity- simplicity*
Complexity is the tendency to conceptualize the world in a multidimensional way (characterized in terms of differentiation, discrimination and/or integration). Simplicity is the tendency to conceptualize in a unidimensional way
Kelly (1965); Harvey et al. (1961); Bieri et al. (1966); Driver and Mock (1974) ; Streufert and Nogami (1989)
10. Automization-
restructuring Preference for responding to obvious properties of simple repetitive tasks versus preference for restructuring tasks
Braverman et al. (1964); Tiedemann (1989) 11. Converging-
diverging Convergent thinking leads to a single correct solution using narrow, logical and deductive search criteria whereas divergent thinking is broad and open ended, using broad and associational rather than logical search criteria
Wallach and Kogan (1965); Hudson (1966, 1968); Smithers and Child (1974) 12. Tolerance for incongruous or unrealistic experiences*
Individual willingness to accept perceptions which vary from the conventional experience. Tolerance is characterized by a grater adaption to unusual perceptions. Intolerance is revealed by the demand for more data before the unusual is accepted
Klein et al. (1962)
13. Verbalizer-visualizer The extent to which people favor verbal or visual
strategies when processing information Paivio (1971); Richardson (1977) 14. Preceptive-
receptive/systematic- intuitive*
The inclination to assimilate data into concepts, or precepts, previously held (perceptive) versus the tendency to take in data in raw form (receptive). The inclination to develop clear sequential plans (systematic) versus the tendency to develop ideas freely from data and to skip from the part to the whole (intuitive)
Keen (1973); McKenney and Keen (1974)
15. Serialist-holist Serialists progress in linear fashion through learning and problem solving material, taking a step by step approach and increasing
understanding in small increments. Holistics take a more global approach and quickly lose sight of individual components
Pask and Scott (1972); Pask (1976)
16. Sensing-intuition
thinking-feeling Sensing-intuition reflects a predisposition for information gathering (perceiving): Preference for realities of experience (sensing) versus inferred meanings, possibilities and relationships of experience (intuition). Thinking-feeling reflects a predisposition for information evaluation (judging): Preference for logical order (thinking) versus personal values and emotions (feeling)
Myers and Briggs (1976)
17. Splitters-lumpers Splitters deal with reality by splitting it into its component parts. They are analytical and obtain information through a series of clearly defined steps. Lumpers prefer to look for the big picture.
18. Concrete-abstract/
active-reflective The preference for dealing with tangible objects (concrete) versus theoretical concepts (abstract). The preference for direct participation (active) versus detached observation (reflective)
Kolb (1976, 1984)
19. Adaptors-innovators Adaptors turn to conventional procedures when searching for solutions, whereas innovators prefer to restructure problems and approach them from new angles
Kirton (1976, 1977b)
20. Literal-analytic/
poetic-synthetic A style which contrasts preference for literal analogies which involve close similarity between the analogous situation and the situation for which a solution is sought with more loose, deep, metaphoric analogies
Kogan (1982); Kogan (1983)
21. Logical-reference
point reasoning Logical reasoning involves a preference for a systematic approach and an adequate sampling of available data, whereas reference point reasoning involves a preference for reasoning from a specific known case
Rosch (1983)
22. Reasoning-intuitive/
active-contemplative The preference for developing understanding through reasoned argument involving the drawing of conclusions from premises (reasoning) versus immediate insight without reasoning (intuitive). The preference for direct participation (active) versus envisaging in the mind what is likely to be (contemplative)
Hayes and Allinson (1988); Allinson and Hayes (1988)
* Hayes and Allinson (1994) attribute these constructs to Nelson as reproduced by Claxton and Ralston (1978).
measure of cognitive style sometime earlier than this work (see e.g., Allinson and Hayes 1988 and Allinson and Hayes 1990). The fact that they cite Kirton’s work as noteworthy is significant since they too are scholars in the same field. Additional observations contributed by Hayes and Allinson show that cognitive style can be an important factor in interpersonal behavior and communications, as argued earlier by Kirton (1980).
Hayes and Allinson (1994) concur with the remarks attributed to Miller earlier that the numerous dimensions of cognitive style lend themselves to a two class or a split brain typology. They drew from an unpublished dissertation by Wilson (1988) to classify many of the dimensions shown above. Table IV-2 shows Wilson’s typology which was based on split-
brain theory. I would place Kirton’s adaptor under the left brain column and innovator under the right brain column.
Table IV-2 Wilson’s Split-Brain Typology
Left Brain Right Brain
Field Independent Reflective Receptive/systematic Focuser Serialist Converger Splitter Field dependent Impulsive Perceptive/intuitive Scanner Holist Diverger Lumper
Hayes and Allinson (1994) affirm Kirton’s arguments by offering, “Helping people
understand the implication of their own and others’ cognitive styles can provide a basis for team building and individual and group counseling activities designed to foster better working relationships” (p.67). I will conclude this discussion about the dimensions which may be used to describe cognitive style (as shown in Table IV-2) by suggesting that Adaption-Innovation theory is a relatively simple conception, although very theoretically sound, which could prove very useful without requiring the need to be well versed on over 20 different shades of definition and corresponding meaning.
6.3 Requisite Variety of Cognitive Style in Small Group Performance
Small groups are the basic decision unit in governments, organizations, institutions, and families. The fact that some small groups perform better than others is uncontested. For purposes of discussion in this section I will comment on organizational challenges and link empirical research in small group performance with the law of requisite variety.
Organizations exist within an environment of equivocality; consequently small groups which gather to solve problems seek unequivocal solutions to equivocal problems (Weick 1979). Consistent with the ongoing discussion in this research equivocality is viewed differently by people whose cognitive style preferences differ. Weick (1979) offered an admonition concerning decision making in equivocal circumstances, “…but it is crucial to remember that decision-making in the organizing model means selecting some interpretation of the world and some set of extrapolations from that interpretation and then using these summaries as constraints on subsequent acting” (p.175).
Weick (1979) discussed the concept of requisite variety following the work of Conant and Ashby (1970). Quoting Buckley (1968:495) Weick reported that the law of requisite variety, “states that the variety within a system must be at least as great as the environmental variety against which it is attempting to regulate itself. Put more succinctly, only variety can regulate variety.” Weick suggested that it is because of requisite variety that organizations are obliged to have sufficient diversity in order to satisfactorily sense the kinds of diversity at play in the external environment. Equivocal inputs to organizations are, by definition, vague and ambiguous.
Weick argued for equivocality as an acknowledged premise in organizations and, consequently, the concomitant need for requisite variety. Because people have difficulty tolerating equivocal processes the possibility of missing important cues or information that might be helpful can occur. Weick suggested that a common mistake for groups of decision- makers is to shun equivocality which results in interpretations of reality resulting in solving the wrong problem. Weick (1979:189) said it well,
It is their unwillingness to meet equivocality in an equivocal manner that produces failure, nonadoption, autism, isolation from reality, psychological costs, and so on. It is the unwillingness to disrupt order, ironically, that makes it impossible for the
organization to create order. Order consists of data in which equivocality has been suppressed, but equivocality can be suppressed only after processes have first registered that equivocality. Accurate registering requires the matching of processes to the characteristics of their inputs. If people cherish the unequivocal but are unwilling to participate in the equivocal, then their survival becomes more problematic.
The law of requisite variety is assumed as a guiding principle, either explicitly or implicitly, for several scholars doing work in the area of cognitive style and small group performance (Allinson and Hayes 1996; Armstrong 2000; Armstrong and Priola 2001; Bobic et al. 1999; Buffinton et al. 2002; Devine 1999; Jablokow and Booth 2006; Priola et al. 2004; and Schroder 1994). Allinson and Hayes (1996) developed a cognitive style index for
application in professional and managerial groups and accepted the law of requisite variety. They also asserted that Kirton’s A-I theory was based on requisite variety. Armstrong (2000) studied how cognitive differences impact management education at the graduate level and also accepted requisite variety. Bobic et al. (1999) investigated group performance in the public sector of state government. Their work was based on A-I theory and they suggested that A-I theory may be construed as essentially equivalent to requisite variety theory in that both posit the benefit of diversity (variety) over the long term. Buffinton et al. (2002) was also based on A-I theory with specific application into undergraduate education. This report was on the first application of A-I theory into their educational program which was designed to provide students with exposure to a cross-functional educational experience—an implicit adoption of the law of requisite variety. Devine (1999) is a small group scholar and he argued in favor of diversity or variety as a counter move to guard against Groupthink as originally proposed by Janis (1972). Jablokow and Booth (2006) advanced a theory of cognitive gaps into group decision processes in an integrated organization model. Priola et al. (2004), also working in the area of small group research, made the same argument that Devine offered in
support of diversity/variety. And, Schroder (1994) studied managerial competence and style to conclude that managers in organizations must exist in sufficient diversity (variety) on the cognitive style spectrum so as to offer a wide range of views from which to select during problem solving—essentially an argument for requisite variety.
I will present five of the studies listed above for the purpose of demonstrating similar research methods or concepts in the study of small group performance from the perspective of cognitive diversity, or requisite variety. The five studies of interest here include
Armstrong (2000), Armstrong and Priola (2001), Bobic et al. (1999), Buffinton et al. (2002), and Jablokow and Booth (2006). The first two studies are based on Allinson and Hayes (1996) Cognitive Style Index, what I believe to be closely congruent with the Kirton KAI Inventory. The last three studies employ Kirton’s KAI scores as their measure of cognitive style. Also, Jablokow and Booth (2006) posit a problem-solving model that includes both cognitive style and cognitive level. Prior to discussing the studies I will compare Allinson and Hayes’ Cognitive Style Index and Kirton’s KAI score.
I have explicated the Kirton KAI Inventory, its five-point Likert scale, and its general nature above. Kirton (2003) considers it applicable in any context and it has been
successfully used across several cultures and languages, as referenced above. The KAI scale ranges from a low of 32 points to a high of 160 points with 96 the scale mean. Allinson and Hayes (1996) suggested that Kirton’s measure and others were not as simple to use in business environments and, consequently, developed their own instrument called the Cognitive Style Index (CSI). The CSI is a 38-question self-reported questionnaire with answer choices of true, uncertain, or false, which are recorded as two, one, or zero. This means the maximum score is 76, the minimum is zero, and the mean is 38. Allinson and
Hayes felt that the three choices helped overcome the tendency of some people to have difficulty with five-point or more Likert scales; some people tend to answer toward the middle of the options while others tend to answer in extremes.
The important comparison I want to make between these two constructs is that the CSI defines a measure of cognitive style in concert with the split-brain theories which use the descriptive terms analytic and intuitive for the extreme ends of a bipolar continuum. Allinson and Hayes (1996) make clear their bias toward a simplifying theory of cognitive style similar to the work of Agor (1984). The analytic end of the continuum includes word descriptors like deductive, rigorous, constrained, convergent, formal, and critical. On the intuitive end of the continuum descriptive words like the following are used: synthetic, inductive, expansive, unconstrained, divergent, informal, diffuse, and creative (Nickerson et al. 1985:50). Except for the term creative at the end of the Nickerson list of intuitive descriptive words this sounds very much like the high innovator as advanced by Kirton. And, the list of terms used for the analytic is quite congruent with the terms used to describe the high adaptor. These terms may be easily compared by viewing Table I-1 above. I will concur with A-I theory in asserting that all people are problem solvers and, therefore, creative. But for that single term the CSI should be highly congruent with KAI scores. Certainly the two should be sufficiently close in conceptual measurement as to suggest comparable preferable cognitive styles. A complete comparative analysis of the two measures of cognitive style is outside the scope of this investigation.
Armstrong (2000) presented a review of the literature on cognitive style which
showed significant diversity of opinion as to its definition. In particular, he cited considerable work done in the study of left/right brain hemispheric specialization that has been associated
with cognitive style differences (Riding and Sadler-Smith 1993). Armstrong had previously reviewed the literature and found 54 dimensions about which cognitive style has been defined. He suggested that this magnitude of descriptive dimensions may all be subsumed into a superordinate dimension as proposed by Allinson and Hayes (1996) and which use the descriptive terms intuitive-analytic to define the end points on a bipolar continuum.
He defined analytic individuals, in work situations, as compliant, logical and linear thinkers, who prefer structured approaches to decision-making and who like systematic methods of investigation or step-by-step processes—a description that is very much like Kirton’s high adaptor. The intuitive individual, in contrast, “…would tend to be
nonconformist, their thinking relies on impulsive synthesis and lateral reasoning, they prefer rapid, open-ended approaches to decision-making, they rely on random methods of
exploration and work best on problems favoring a holistic approach” (p.325). Again, this description sounds very similar to Kirton’s high innovator.
The question that Armstrong posed involves the relationship between cognitive style and ability (or what Kirton called ‘level’). The literature is not clear as to this relationship. Armstrong asserted that there would be no significant difference between the overall grades of students who are either high intuitive or high analytic. However, he added a hypothesis which posited better performance for high analytic individuals performing assignments (in specific, a research project grade) which demand cognitive style consistent with analytic types. And, he added a similar hypothesis for high intuitive types asserting their better performance on assignments (in specific, for the business policy and strategy unit grade) which lend themselves to high intuitive cognitive styles. He also hypothesized a better grade for high analytics in the marketing planning unit.
The research sample came from a university in northern England and was composed of 412 students in their final year of a business administration degree. There were 203 women and 209 men in the sample. Each of the participants was administered the Cognitive Style Index (CSI) as developed by Allinson and Hayes (1996) and discussed above.
Students’ ability was based on scores from the university. The scoring system provided a range of possible scores from zero to 16 points where zero is the worst and 16 is the best possible achievement. Independent sample t-tests revealed no significant difference between men and women on the test scores, thus the study on cognitive style was deemed to