INDICADORES DE GESTIÓN POR PROCESOS

The consensually integrated, plural and organisational elite models are relevant to a study of how elite configurations and interactions affect the structure and function of the CFUG. These models provide a means to develop a conceptual framework specific to the function of the CFUG. The conceptual model will help to deal with specific problems that pertain to Nepalese social structure and institutions in the context of CF in Nepal. The key elements of the elite models in the CFUG context, caste and wealth, form the basis of the conceptual model shown in Figure 3.1.

Community Caste Structure

One caste Many castes

Wealth Status of EC Members

Rich Only Consensually

integrated elite model

Plural elite model

Rich and Poor Organisational elite model A

Organisational elite model B

Figure 3.1 Conceptual models of elite in CFUGs

The top left represents a situation where the EC is composed of rich people in a community with one caste. In this case, the elite would be expected to behave like the consensually

51 integrated elite model where the elite have similar norms and status, and form separate, fluid, groups that reform into new groups as necessary. Top of the right represents a situation where the EC is composed of rich people in a community with many castes. In this case, the elite would be expected to act like the plural elite model since they will naturally form separate groups due to caste but be required to work together with other wealthy elite from other castes.

The participation of the poor is of the two forms related to the organisational elite model; in both cases the organisation can create the opportunity to be part of the elite or to create an elite group. When the poor are of the same caste as the rich, then the only issue they have to overcome to participate on the executive is their wealth status. This is called organisational elite model A, as in Figure 3.1. When there are many castes or ethnic groups, then the poor have to overcome issues related to their caste as well as their wealth. This is the organisational elite model B, as in Figure 3.1.

The major assumptions of the conceptual model of elite in CFUGs (Figure 3.1) are as follows. First, in a community where the EC is structured like the consensual elite model, one would expect to find only one caste and the rich dominating the EC, and this would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the rich. Second, in a community where the EC is structured like the plural elite model, one would expect to find more than one caste and a mixture of the caste elite and the rich dominating the EC. This would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the caste elite and rich. Third, in a community where the EC is structured like the organisational elite model A, or where the EC has a large proportion of poor, one would expect to find only one caste but the rich would not be dominating the EC, and this would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the poor. Fourth, in a community where the EC is structured like the organisational elite model B, or where the EC has a greater proportion of poor or low caste, one would expect to find greater representation of low caste and the poor on the EC, and this would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the low caste and the poor.

The conceptual model in Figure 3.1 provides an understanding of how caste and the wealth elite characterise themes of decision-making and formulation of rules, regulations and practices. In a community where the EC is structured like the consensually integrated or plural elite models, the domination of the EC by the rich would be reflected in distribution

52 amounts and rules of distribution that favoured the rich. In a community where the EC reflected the organisational A or B situations, it would be expected that the amounts produced and rules of distribution would be more favourable to the poor. The conceptual model provides the basis for examining the three research questions, which deal with the attributes that make leadership selection more likely, the amount distributed with representation of the poor on the EC, and the rules of distribution with poor representation on the EC.

3.7.1 Leadership Attributes

The attributes that determine leadership are an important dimension in the model. One of the hypotheses of this study is that the balance between elite, and poor and disadvantaged households in leadership of CFUGs determines CF management and benefit distribution decisions. Thus, it is important to determine what factors facilitate the representation of the poor and disadvantaged groups on the EC. This hypothesis is in the context of Nepalese society where the elite emerge due to caste and wealth. Wealth related factors include land holding size, livestock holdings, off-farm income and food sufficiency. The elite castes include (Brahmins, Chhetari, Thakuri and Newar) influenced the selection of leadership and benefit distribution from CF. The Dalit (lower caste or so-called untouchable) and the poor would be expected to participate in leadership, as in organisational elite A or B models, only if something other than the assets of the household, income and individual caste influenced the selection of leaders. The hypothesis is that a factor like leadership or organisational skills developed outside of the CFUG, such as with an NGO organisation, is important for being in a leadership position in a CFUG.

3.7.2 Rules, Regulations and Practices of Distribution

Leadership attributes are believed to be reflected in the rules of distribution for CF products. It is assumed that government policy about CF benefit distribution practices are not deliberately against any household. However, the lack of holistic rules and practices for the distribution of benefits and the lack of control over resources by the poor in communities is believed to lead to discrimination against poor households. To alleviate poverty, rules and practices should enable poor and low socioeconomic households to improve their own livelihoods. The hypothesis is that the rules, regulations and practices of distribution determined by the EC affect the level of production and distribution by the CF. The rules and regulations are, in turn, influenced by the type of decision-making, in this case whether the consensually integrated, plural, organisational elite A or organisational elite B models in

53 Figure 3.1 dominate decision-making. The rules and regulations of the CFUG may not reflect the preferences and requirements of poor and lower castes, if the consensually integrated elite or plural elite situations exist.

A number of factors are important to distribution. The longer the open period, the more benefits flow to poor households. This is because the poor and disadvantaged households do have not labour resources to collect sufficient products in a short period. Typically, they have to manage their household labour force to work for elite farms, farm their own properties and collect CF products. EC members control the CF open period and regulate the allocation of forest products in terms of collection days for timber, firewood, fodder and grass and leaf litter. The structure of the EC affects the benefit and rules of distribution particularly to the poor and low caste household that if the organisation elite models exist.