Influencia de los compañeros en el contexto escolar

Because the military requirements of the occupa- tion and reconstruction of iran are so daunting, and the likelihood of international support in this scenario appears so low, the first and most impor- tant requirement would be the overwhelming po- litical support of the american people for an in- vasion. simply put, compared to U.s. involvement in iraq, the invasion and reconstruction of iran is likely to be a more taxing task—even assuming that the United states avoids repeating the mis- takes of iraq—and there will be even less foreign assistance to accomplish it.

This means that the president would have to have such strong and enduring support from the american people that he would be able to con- duct the invasion and occupation of iran employ- ing essentially only american resources and in the face of widespread international animosity. he might need to mobilize fully the National Guard as well as the army, Marine, and possibly Navy reserves and keep them in uniform for months or even years if there is considerable iranian re- sistance, as there may well be. in worst-case sce- narios, the president might even need to ask the american people to accept some form of limited conscription. if the occupation of iran were to go badly, there might be considerable american ca- sualties for long periods of time—possibly even more than in iraq at its worst because of the more difficult terrain, the likely greater hostility of the populace, and the greater proficiency in guerrilla warfare of the iranian military.

if the president can secure this kind of support, an invasion of iran is a viable option. Without such support, the invasion and occupation of iran

on both the extent of iranian resistance and the competence of the american security effort. The remarkable success of american forces in iraq since 2007 dem- onstrates that the right numbers of troops employing the right tactics in pursuit of the right strategy can secure a country at much lower cost in blood than inadequate num- bers of troops improperly employed. Prior to the surge—and during its heated early months when U.s. troops were fighting to regain control of iraq’s streets—american military deaths were running at 70 to 80 a month. once that fight had been won, they fell to roughly 5 to 15 a month. This suggests that U.s. casualties during the oc- cupation and reconstruction of iran could vary enormously; however, only in the best-case scenario—where the securing of iran is as smooth as the Nato securing of Bosnia—should policymakers expect min- imal casualties. in more plausible but still favorable scenarios where iranian resis- tance approximates iraqi levels of violence after the surge, the United states should still expect a dozen soldiers and Marines to be killed each month, on average, for sever- al years. in worst-case scenarios, in which the United states mishandles operations in iran as badly as it did initially in iraq, those numbers could run into the hundreds each month, or worse.

 _{Washington would have to expect tehran} to retaliate against american targets outside of iran. iran has a more formidable ballis- tic missile arsenal than saddam had in 1991 and a far more extensive and capable net- work to mount terrorist attacks beyond its borders. Whether the iranians could pull off a catastrophic attack—along the lines of 9/11—would depend on how much time they had to prepare for such an operation and how well developed their contingency american armed forces—to “fix” the iran

problem. Neither american covert opera- tives nor diplomats nor aid mavens have had a track record as good as U.s. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines over the years.

Disadvantages:

 _{an invasion of iran would be extremely} costly in a whole variety of ways. iran is arguably a more complex, convoluted, and conflict-ridden society than either iraq or afghanistan. But like iraq, it would be too important to be cast aside after deposing the regime and razing all its nuclear and terrorist-support facilities. The invasion it- self would be large and costly, but the effort needed to occupy, secure, and then build a new iranian state—one capable of govern- ing the country effectively without falling into chaos or inciting new anti-american- ism—would be far more so. even if Wash- ington has learned all of the lessons of iraq and afghanistan and handles an invasion of iran in a much better fashion, this option would cost tens—if not hundreds—of bil- lions of dollars a year for five to ten years. it would require the commitment of the better part of U.s. ground forces for several years, and could necessitate a much greater commitment and expansion of american ground forces than at any time since the second World War. it might even require the institution of partial conscription for some period of time and would divert bad- ly needed assets away from both iraq and afghanistan.

 _{another inevitable cost would be in ameri-} can lives lost (not to mention iranian civil- ian deaths). hundreds or possibly thou- sands of american military personnel would die in the invasion itself. Thereafter, casualty levels would depend dramatically

financial crisis and a dozen or more press- ing geostrategic crises. it may be diffi- cult for other countries to heed america’s wishes on Darfur, the arab-israeli conflict, North Korea, alternative energy and global warming, Nato enlargement, or other similarly thorny issues in the aftermath of an invasion of iran that many may see as even less justified than the invasion of sad- dam husayn’s iraq.

 _{Moreover, an invasion of iran has the po-} tential to damage the longer-term strategic interests of the United states. such an inva- sion could well redefine america’s position in the international order in a particularly deleterious manner. especially given that such a war would probably have less sup- port than the invasion of iraq, and would be undertaken by an administration other than that of George W. Bush, it would likely loom far larger than the iraq War in the thinking of other people and governments. it could well settle the debate over whether the Unit- ed states is an aggressive, unilateralist impe- rial power or a mostly benign and uniquely unselfish hegemon. americans have always seen themselves as the latter, and there are many people around the world who still view the United states that way despite the events of 2001-2008—in large part because some agree that there were justifications for the war in iraq, and others simply blame american actions on an aberrant admin- istration. an invasion of iran could elimi- nate the lingering basis for that support and profoundly alter global perspectives on the United states, which over time would inevi- tably translate into commensurate shifts in policy against this country.

plans were at the time. Washington has long believed that tehran maintains extensive contingency plans for all manner of terrorist attacks against american targets for just such an eventuality, and may even have practiced them at various times. even if such attacks ended with the fall of the regime, since an invasion might take as much as six months from the time the first U.s. Navy warships began to clear the strait of hormuz to the removal of the clerical regime, the United states would have to prepare to prevent such attacks—and live with the failure to do so— for at least this time period.

 _{in addition to the potentially heavy costs, an} invasion also entails running a very signifi- cant set of risks. as noted, iranian society is hardly pacific. a botched reconstruction, like the one in iraq, could unleash a Pando- ra’s box of problems both inside the coun- try and out. Various iranian ethnic groups might attempt to declare independence, in- evitably setting off a civil war with the coun- try’s Persian majority and creating the risk of drawing in iran’s various neighbors to protect their own interests. as in iraq, iran’s oil wealth would be a tremendous driver of both internal conflict and external inter- vention. chaos and conflict could jeopar- dize iran’s oil and gas exports, and would certainly complicate the security problems of iraq, afghanistan, and Pakistan.

 _{Under the circumstances postulated in this} chapter, a U.s. invasion of iran could an- tagonize much of the world. in the short term, this could jeopardize the interna- tional cooperation Washington so desper- ately needs to deal with the international

chapter 4

the osiraQ oPtioN