La influencia de los objetivos de lectura en la comprensión del texto

2.9.1.1 Planning Process

The key to effective disaster management is the planning process, from which all related strategies, programs, and arrangements should flow (Emergency Management Australia, 2004). Chen et al. (2006) stated that the planning process is critical. Further, planning and training play a crucial role for successful disaster response (Steigenberger, 2016). Additionally,

planning is essential to being able to take effective and prompt action (McLoughlin, 1985). Current disaster can evolve into a prolonged disaster because of a fragmented and multi- objective nature of disaster planning. Lack of resources, and in some cases of expertise as well as inadequate scenario planning probably hamper the process of disaster planning (Trim, 2004). Moreover, Saeed (2012) noted that the plans of the organisations can be challenged by the

unexpected events and dimensions of the disaster. Further,Perry and Lindell (2003) pointed out that continuing terrorist attacks worldwide are likely to enhance attention to disaster response planning, especially in Western democracies. Whilst, Schneider (1992) emphasises that the dependence upon the extent to which post-disaster human behaviour corresponds to prior governmental expectations and planning is the key to a successful governmental response. Therefore, Goodyear (2009) stresses the need to establish a disaster management system within the Government of Iraq for appropriate response and preparedness planning to human-made disasters and natural disasters.

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There is a critical debate about the usefulness of plans for disaster response management and organisational preparedness more generally (Steigenberger, 2016). According to Uhr et al. (2008), both the literature and empirical findings indicate that sometimes response operations

diverge from existing plans when adapting to an event and its consequences. Likewise, the

response to the attack in Sweden collapsed in 2005 as it did not follow fixed plans or procedures which are criticised by an officer who participated in the response operation. While in Britain, one of the problems of disaster planning is that goals set by central government may not appeal to those responsible for their implementation (Handmer & Parker, 1991). In the same context, although hundreds of hours were put into planning development, many organisations fall prey to numerous unexpected problem areas along the way. Often, the plan is ineffective or worse yet, improperly executed (Barenbaum, N.D.). In agreement, one of the disaster response practitioners criticised the fact that the response did not follow fixed procedures or plans (Uhr et al., 2008). This might because of poor understanding of the response plan, which is one of the different recurring problems that are plague response to disasters (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). However, Saeed (2012, pp. 3-4) attributed that to the dynamic situation in a disaster. As a result, new activities (which have not occurred before) may be required apart from those already planned. So the system should allow for ad-hoc creation of activities and

dependencies by the command centre or the field teams. Saeed (2012) added that new plans

have to be made and incorporated with old plans and plans of other organisations. Based on the magnitude of the disaster, one organisation might establish more than one command centre. There can be one or more field teams controlled by a command centre. Within the same context, Banipal (2006) noted thatdependence on the central dispatch centrewas considered one of the major operational problems experienced during hurricane Katrina. Banipal (2006) explained that due to being highly dependent on the central dispatch centre to coordinate emergency response, it is not only prone to human error but also to the events that can influence the command centre including disruption of power, floodwater damage to the building and wind damage to communication antennas, leaving the field officers on their own as it happened in New Orleans.

In the context of creating plans for terrorist incidents, an inter-organisational testing process is complex because it includes varieties of organisations that might not normally deal with one another (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Uhr et al. (2008) added that despite the fact that a complex and dynamic environment might need certain flexibility in organisation plans and procedures, too little attention appears in planning processes and in bureaucratic structures.

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In the US, two problems have arisen. Firstly, the assertion on the existence of a plan as a

document rather than an assertion on the planning procedure brings positive outcomes for

the threat. Secondly, the literature on planning for technological and natural disasters has a general lack of awareness in terms of policy actors, elected officials and law-enforcement officials who guide much of the terrorism plan creation (Jenkins, 2001; Smithson & Levy, 2000) cited in (Perry & Lindell, 2003, p. 336). Whereas, an important issue in disaster response in Australia is competition and conflict over responsibilities (Handmer & Parker, 1991). However in Taiwan, Chen et al. (2006) found a phenomenon that is very analogous to the findings of Lindell, Whitney, Futch, and Clause (1996) and Lindell and Perry (2001) that lacking full-time staff support had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the Local Emergency Planning committees in the US. Moreover, the planning process doesn’t include other

organisations, let alone community contribution. Many supporting organisations don’t even know what their jobs in the disaster management technique are. Lindell et al. (1996) and Lindell and Perry (2001) had analogous findings on this matter in the US. In Iraq, Goodyear (2009) stated that there is absence of the paradigm shift in disaster management thinking in Iraq. Goodyear (2009), within this context, criticised the reactive disaster response operational mechanisms. In agreement, (Money & Harrald, 1995) highlighted the problems of ‘create- review-revise planning’ since plans are not reality, they are like models when the disaster occurs, there may not be an exact match to that of the plan. Money and Harrald (1995) also state that it is difficult to build consensus among experts about what the plan should look like.

2.9.1.2 Financial Resources

Disaster response planning comprises the allocation of resources, especially budget and personnel. Budget allocation should be commensurate with the role of every department within its jurisdiction. According to Rudman, Clarke, and Metzl (2003, pp. 1-3), America’s emergency preparedness efforts are hampered by some obstacles. Funding for emergency responders that was stalled and side-tracked is considered a major obstacle due to:

a) The slow distribution of funds by federal agencies. b) A politicised appropriations process.

c) Bureaucratic red tape at all levels of government.

Equally, in Taiwan, local government did not have enough budgets to perform all four phases of disaster management (Chen et al., 2006). While in Turkey, strong financial resources are neededto agencies responsible for DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) activities. Such resources become inadequate when distributed among several units (Baris, 2009).Whilst in Europe,

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funding is fragmented because fragmentation phenomenon appeared, in the prevention of risk

caused by natural hazards, between spatial planning and civil protection (Greiving, Fleischhauer, & Wanczura, 2006) cited in (Greiving et al., 2012). Despite the fact that many vulnerable countries have created permanent funds for robust disaster response activities, Iraq’s draft National Disaster Risk Reduction Law does not assign specific funding for disaster risk reduction at national and sub-national levels. Such activities are as an alternative financed using estimated allocations in the national budgets, in addition to donations and grants. Nor does it create any permanent fund for supporting disaster risk reduction at national and regional governorate level (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014).

2.9.1.3 Management Framework, Program and Factors, and Supporting Ordinances

Power allocation is considered one of the important components of disaster planning. To ensure an integrated response, every organisation within the jurisdiction needs to recognise its role when the disaster occurs to avoid conflicts. Beginning with disaster response management framework and factors, according to Baker and Refsgaard (2007), an adoption of new frameworks was required to make institutional development in disaster response. Whilst, Baris (2009) explained that weak awareness and lack of action of population and institutions results from a lack of knowledge of modern disaster risk factors. Similar to Rudman et al. (2003) who stated that due to the lack of preparedness standards, it is impossible to recognise exactly what is required and how much it will cost. Pelling et al. (2004) added that devising the tools required for policy makers are considered one of the challenges for integration to make transparent justifications for development policy and the better operations for disaster. Regarding disaster response program integration, Unlu, Kapucu, and Sahin (2010) claim that the success of multi-task response actions relies on the disaster and crisis management integration of programs prepared in diverse disciplines and organisation of a generated cooperation. Chen et al. (2006), on the other hand, shed light on the development of

supporting ordinances and regulations at different government levels that are needed for

the operation of the disaster management system in Taiwan. Whereas in Iraq, according to Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014), the current institutional and legislative system is excessively complex. Institutions and laws have overlapping jurisdictions and DRR-related functions are located in different ministries. Such overlapping and conflicting mandates can contribute to a fragmented response capacity. Despite the fact that an efficient and effective response to disasters needs a national perspective, there is no institution which can accomplish a

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coordination role to ensure an integrated response from government departments and agencies working under multiple DRR related resolutions, regulations and laws. As a result, there is a need to better integrate responsibilities. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) also noted that Iraq has traditionally followed a relief and response-oriented approach to disaster risk management, as is evident from the review of legislation, and makes only partial reference to preparedness. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) further criticise the restrictive scope of the existing institutional arrangements at national, regional, governorate and district levels, which is focused mainly on post-disaster conditions. Furthermore, the capacity of line agencies to be involved in disaster response is narrowly concentrated on disasters related to natural hazards and does not cover the whole spectrum of disaster situations.

2.9.1.4 Education on Disaster Risk

In disaster situations, education is an integral part of the planning and provision of the humanitarian response, as lives can be sustained and saved by providing quality education. Such education can give physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection to learners. Further, education and training are accepted as cornerstones of an effective disaster response, (May et al., 2015). According to Baris (2009),despite the education about disaster risk is offered in primary and high schools in Turkey, there is no organised educational program for the general public. There was no consideration for developing standards for community organisations and public education, reaching the public at active, large participation, producing training materials and training the trainers. Goodyear (2009) stresses that capacity development is the main ingredient of strengthening public-level preparedness. All levels of the preparedness and response system need skilled people in disaster management with an obvious understanding of their role within that system. Such capacity development should not only comprise public members but should produce learning and dialogue between all actors that form part of the disaster management system. However, Harding (2007) concluded that social

development strategies and human rights principles should be promoted by professionals

through political practice and within social work education to face human-made disasters. As a result, social work would be given a central role in avoiding human-made disaster and in reconstruction and development following disaster.

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