2. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, EL HOMBRE QUE TRANSFORMÓ EL
2.2. INFLUENCIAS
Several shortcomings hamper the U.S. military’s current ability to perform maritime homeland defense. Gaps between current and required capabilities exist in every step of the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) chain. When deciding which capabilities gap to address first, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider which steps in F2T2EA have the largest capabilities gaps as these represent the military’s weakest operational areas. Prioritizing capabilities improvements can then guide acquisition, doctrinal development, and operational planning.273
The most acute maritime defense capability gaps facing the military are in the fix and track steps of F2T2EA. A key requirement of the fix and track step is the ability to distinguish vessels posing an asymmetric threat from the large volume of legitimate maritime traffic. The second most significant capability shortfall facing the military is its limited ability to engage suspect vessels with non-lethal or disabling force. Without robust capability in this area, certain scenarios limit the military to two unpalatable options: applying lethal force or no force at all. The third largest capabilities gap is in the military’s ability to find maritime defense threats. Improved performance in this area is required to ensure adequate warning of enemy operations and to enable subsequent step in the F2T2EA “kill chain.”
Air power offers a potential means to narrow or bridge the capabilities gaps facing the military in each of these areas. This potential derives from the unique operational environment of the maritime domain. One of the main factors that hampers operations in the maritime realm is its size. This creates a need for speed, range, flexibility in any maritime defense force. These capabilities are inherent to air power. Thus, while naval surface and sub-surface forces are indispensable to resolving the maritime defense challenge, air power also has a role to play in efforts to find, fix, and finish the asymmetric enemy in the maritime domain.
1. Air Power Enhancements to Fixing/Tracking
For the foreseeable future, the most effective means for distinguishing between friendly and hostile maritime traffic will be limited to DoD, Coast Guard, or other law enforcement agency boarding parties. To overcome the maritime domain’s operational factors of time and space requires both rapid and long-range boarding party delivery capability. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) would significantly enhance this capability. Particularly promising is using the LCS to ferry boarding teams to within helicopter ranges and then using helicopters to deliver the team to the target vessel. Finally, the V- 22 Osprey could also increase the time available for VBSS operations. Although adding this mission to the Osprey would require additional aircraft purchases, using V-22 aircraft would do much to overcome the factors of time and space which challenge the U.S. ability to rapidly fix the location of maritime homeland defense threats.
2. Air Power Enhancements to Engagement
In the limited scenarios where command authorities declared a vessel hostile (implying kill authority), aerial-refueled fighters, long-range bombers, or UAS platforms could provide rapid lethal response over the large distances inherent to the maritime realm. Still, the largest gaps in ability to target and engage maritime threats facing the U.S. military are the lack of non-lethal or ship-disabling weaponry. The first way to improve capability in this area is through faster delivery of boarding teams, since these teams are themselves a potentially non-lethal or ship-disabling weapon. Still, this represents an imperfect solution at best.
The most effective means of disabling a ship is to neutralize its propulsion or steering system. Accordingly, a small warhead kinetic weapon that homes on a ship’s screws, engine room, or bridge would be an appropriate attack tool. AC-130 and fighter/attack aircraft employing strafe are the most immediately available option of this type. Similarly, using non-lethal entanglement, directed energy, or EMP weapons would quickly neutralize any potential maritime threat to the homeland without destroying the vessel, without compromising any evidence or intelligence on board, and without threatening the lives of noncombatants. Air-delivery of these systems would enable rapid employment over long distances.
In scenarios where intelligence indicates an attack is in progress without knowing either the specific target of the attack or its port of origin, Combat Air Patrols (CAP) provides a flexible response capability. Command authorities can stand a CAP up or down or move it to a different location as the threat dictates. Aircraft on CAP could rapidly engage vessels that emerge as threats as they approach or enter U.S. ports. Until non-lethal weapons are fielded, the 20-30mm cannon on most fighter/attack aircraft or the various caliber weapons on the AC-130 gunship could be used to disable threat vessels by targeting screws, bridges, or engine rooms. Once non-lethal weapons are available, the best aircraft for their employment will likely be slow-movers, including helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft.
3. Air Power Enhancements to Finding
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) possess the range, altitude and payload to make them potentially useful for finding maritime defense threats. For example, the RQ-4A Global Hawk can fly 1,200 miles and still have an on station time of 24 hours, during which the aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electro-optical (EO), and infrared (IR) cameras “can image an area the size of Illinois.”274 Manned aircraft such as the U-2 or E-8 also offer a capability to find maritime defense threats. Short term, developing concepts and procedures for the use of air assets for sea surveillance offers a partial solution to the challenge of finding maritime defense threats. Longer term, the near- space platform offers significant benefits. Near-space platforms—usually some type of blimp or rigid airship—offer increased persistence over both space-based assets and UAS.