Información cuantitativa, cualitativa e indicadores de los

As it turned out, Russia’s individual partnership program (IPP) with NATO proved unsatisfactory to both Russia and the West. During 1996 and 1997, Russia and NATO engaged in negotiations on a new body for consultations on security issues.106 _{Although NATO’s plans for enlargement were taking}

shape and continued to sour Russian–Western relations, the scope and speed of enlargement, and its implications for Russia, remained issues unresolved. Accordingly, negotiations focused primarily on the type of compensations Russia would be given along with NATO’s enlargement, with Moscow seek- ing a maximum level of ‘damage limitation’ (Bluth 1998:338).

The West did not want to stimulate negative Russian perceptions of NATO. Yet developments in the Balkans had convinced the alliance that it needed to be able to act independently of Russia when situations so de- manded. Moscow, in its turn, wanted veto or at least a say-so with regard to important NATO decisions and guaranties that enlargement would not imply negative military consequences for Russia. In particular, Russia demanded constraints on NATO deployment of nuclear as well as conventional capa- bilities and on development of military infrastructure on the territory of new member states (Bluth 1998:337–339). Moscow also called for a review of CFE provisions in order to compensate for changes in Russia’s security situation (ibid.:337).

The outcome of these negotiations was the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Re- lations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federa- tion’ adopted in Paris on 27 May 1997.107 _{This document laid down the}

principles according to which the parties would engage in mutual consulta- tions on matters of common interest in order to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation with the overall aim of contributing to security and stability in the Euro–Atlantic area. For this purpose, a Permanent Joint Council (PJC)

106 The idea that Russia and NATO might develop a ‘special relationship’ with consultations

outside PfP was discussed already in the spring of 1994, and may actually have been in-

strumental in bringing about Russia’s June 1994 decision to join PfP (Zagorski 1997:534).

107 The text of the Founding Act is available on: www.nato.int/pfp/nato-rus.html (2002-04- 30).

was established. Here, NATO and Russia would meet regularly on various levels for mutual consultations, and, ‘where appropriate’, make joint deci- sions and take joint action. The alliance acceded to a central Russian demand by formally restating the so-called ‘three ‘no’s’: that the alliance has ‘no in- tention, no plan and no reason’ to deploy nuclear weapons or establish nu- clear storage sites on the territory of new NATO member states. It also agreed to adapt the CFE treaty in light of changes in the European security environment. Beyond this, NATO did not commit to any constraints on mat- ters of internal military planning and force posture.

The Russian obsession with non-deployment of NATO military capabili- ties and infrastructure in the new member states reflects a zero-sum reading of Russian–Western relations and may have been dictated by a need to ease remaining concerns in the Russian military derived from the security logic of East–West military antagonism. This was particularly important at a time when the armed forces were experiencing some serious difficulties with re- gard to internal finances and structural reforms (Baev 1996). On several oc- casions, the Russian government had threatened to respond to NATO enlargement by withdrawing from various arms control agreements, to de- ploy nuclear weapons westwards, and to form new military alliances (Old- berg 1999a:14; Bluth 1998:336). Yet the credibility of these threats, and the feasibility of Russian alternative security strategies, had to be questioned by the West. As a consequence of the poor performance of the Russian military in Chechnya, there was a growing feeling in the elite that one couldn’t es- cape the need for structural reforms and a downscaling of the armed forces. And let alone the absence among central policymakers of a perceived need to balance the military might of the West, Russia simply couldn’t afford it – taking into account also that ‘the West’ was extending its geographical boundaries. Hence, the poor state of the Russian economy and armed forces, which was increasingly being recognised in official and quasi-official policy documents, undermined any threats by Moscow to adopt costly military measures in response to NATO enlargement.

Accordingly, the fact that Russia signed the Founding Act can be as- signed to a perception of this as a potential answer to the threat of institu- tional isolation. In one sense, the alternative was in a sense self-imposed iso- lation. PJC presented Russia with an exclusive security arena where Russia could voice her interests and concerns and consult with NATO countries on a wide range of security issues.108 _{The new arrangement also reflected a spe-}

cial status vis-à-vis NATO and apparently eased Russia’s fear of being ne- glected as a major European power. Still, the Founding Act and PJC did not remove altogether the concern in Russia that she might be kept out of impor- tant decision-making processes. The West had decided on NATO enlarge- ment and a more active role out of area despite Russia’s strong objections. Also, the Founding Act contained no legally binding guaranties that NATO would consult with Russia on security issues perceived to affect Russia’s in- terests. Accordingly, there remained some concern in Russia that she might

108 The Founding Act lists 19 areas for (possible) consultation and cooperation. This in- cludes conflict prevention, crisis management, arms control, non-proliferation, informa- tion concerning security strategies and military doctrines, conversion of military indus- try, terrorism, civil emergency and other issues.

still be deprived of influence on important political decisions and on overall security developments in Europe.

During 1998 and early 1999, NATO and Russia met regularly in the PJC format to discuss security issues from areas listed in the Founding Act.109

The new body arguably had a certain potential for increasing Russia’s ‘weight’ and for mediating Russian–Western interests and differences in views concerning how to handle security matters of common concern. How- ever, it appears that neither the West nor Russia had the political will to real- ise this potential, and consequently put little effort into making PJC a con- structive arena for security cooperation and consultations. In many cases, the West was ready to listen to the Russian views only after NATO decisions had (already) been taken. This rendered the PJC format rather meaningless from a Russian point of view (Wallander 2002).110 _{On the other side, Rus-}

sian politicians and diplomats signalled little interest in listening to NATO’s arguments and often adopted an excessively confrontational language vis-à- vis the West in defence of proclaimed Russian interests. Hence, consulta- tions in PJC had a pro forma character and often amounted to having the two sides state and restate views and arguments already well known. This im- pression stems not least from the handling of events in 1999.

4.2.3 The ‘watershed events’ of 1999? Kosovo and a first round of enlar-