Información intermedia y demás información financiera

Unlike scheduled rights, non-scheduled traffic rights were tradition- ally not regulated by bilateral air services agreements. At the time of the 1944 Chicago Convention non-scheduled air services were not ex- pected to be of any significance, and a more liberal attitude was there- fore adopted. Whereas, under Article 6 of the Convention, scheduled air services specifically required ‘special permission or other author- isation’ from the destination countries, Article 5 left authorisation for non-scheduled services at the discretion of individual states (ICAO, 1980).

In practice most countries have insisted on giving prior authorisation to incoming non-scheduled flights, but attitudes towards authorisation have varied significantly. Some countries, such as India, have been

restrictionist in their approach and have refused to authorise charter flights unless they are operated by their own national carrier or unless it can be shown that no scheduled traffic will be diverted. Others may insist, before authorising an incoming charter, that one of their own airlines should be allowed to tender for the charter contract. In con- trast, many other countries, particularly tourist destinations such as Spain, Morocco or Tunisia, have followed a more liberal policy and have readily authorised non-scheduled services.

In 1956, the member states of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) agreed to mutually waive the requirement for any prior au- thorisation from the destination country for a wide range of non- scheduled flights (HMSO, 1956). This agreement greatly facilitated the development of charter services, particularly inclusive tour charters, within Europe. It was subsequently superseded by the various liberal- isation measures agreed within the European Union during the 1990s. While access to many non-scheduled markets was relatively open even from the early days, most countries, especially those with new airlines emerging, brought non-scheduled operations within some form of na- tional regulatory control. Such regulation was aimed at clearly delin- eating the area and scope of non-scheduled operations so as to protect scheduled airlines, while giving non-scheduled operators considerable freedom of action within their defined area.

In the United States, under a 1962 law, supplemental carriers, as US charter airlines were then called, were restricted exclusively to non- scheduled operations and certified by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to operate in designated geographical areas. In 1968 the Inclus- ive Tour Charter Bill empowered the CAB to authorise the operation of inclusive tour charters (ITCs). An inclusive tour is a holiday package where a single charge includes travel, hotel accommodation and pos- sibly local ground transport, visits, and so on. IT charters were

developed in parallel with ‘affinity’ group charters operated by both supplemental carriers and scheduled airlines. Similarly, the European airlines meanwhile had based their own non-scheduled operations on developing inclusive tour charters (ITCs) though several were operat- ing affinity charters to the US or Canada.

As charter flights grew in the 1960s and 1970s IATA and many govern- ments, under pressure from IATA, and to protect their own scheduled airlines, imposed arbitrary and often restrictive regulations on charter services. But as the tide of public opinion in many European countries and in North America swung strongly in favour of cheap charter flights governments were forced to gradually dismantle the various domestic controls on charters. This process was given added impetus by the moves in the United States after 1978 to deregulate both domestic and international air transport. In particular, the United States set out to remove all price and other controls on charters while at the same time making the granting of non-scheduled traffic rights explicit within bi- lateral air services agreements.

The gradual liberalisation of non-scheduled services and the dismant- ling of often arbitrary regulations led to a rapid growth in charter traffic. By 1977, nearly one third of passengers flying across the At- lantic were on inclusive tour or affinity group charters. This was the peak year. Then in 1978 the long-haul charter market collapsed. This was a direct result of deregulation of fares and entry on many North Atlantic scheduled routes. Several new entrant and lower cost airlines, such as Laker Airways, began operating scheduled services. Competit- ive pressure pushed both new and existing scheduled carriers to offer fares which were charter competitive. With little price advantage to of- fer, charter airlines found their traffic shrinking rapidly. Today charters account for well below 5 per cent of North Atlantic passenger traffic. However, in other areas, especially in European holiday mar- kets, charter operations continued to grow rapidly, normally

outstripping the growth rates of scheduled carriers, until they were undermined by the emergence of low-cost airlines after 1996. (See

Chapter 7for more on charter economics.)

Generally speaking, non-scheduled operations have been subject to two different regulatory regimes. While in many parts of the world, such as the European-Mediterranean market or that of the North At- lantic, they have traditionally been subject to less regulatory controls than scheduled carriers, at least until the 1990s, in some states there has been a virtual ban on allowing incoming or even outgoing charter flights, except in exceptional circumstances. But here too the need to encourage tourism arrivals is leading to a gradual relaxation of the regulatory constraints.

2.9 Operational

constraints