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The term ‘conflict management’ could be used to refer to any management process through which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and do something about their conflict (Mwagiru 2000 (b): 43). It is important to note that a wide variety of procedures exist to manage conflict. Hence, any simple description of ‘conflict-containing’ procedures is by no means easy. The boundaries of the field are hardly well-defined, and relevant processes and methods are not classified in any straightforward manner. As such, the generic title of ‘conflict management’ is often used interchangeably with other terms, such as ‘conflict control’, ‘conflict regulation’ and ‘conflict resolution’ (Mitchell 1981:256).

This is also echoed and recognised by Mwagiru, as earlier mentioned, who asserts that the language, philosophy and methodologies postulated by settlement and resolution are inclusive enough to cover almost any management effort to which third parties might resort. He further asserts that the field is complicated enough without the introduction of another category. To suggest this usage of the term ‘management’ is, therefore, an attempt to avoid further complexities. The term ‘conflict management’ is, therefore, to be used as a term referring to a whole range of techniques (see Figure 1.2 below) employed in any society to prevent the development of conflict situations; or, once these have developed, to prevent them from resulting in disruptive and widely destructive conflict behaviour; or, once this has arisen, to halt the undesired conflict behaviour, or remove its source, through some form of settlement or resolution of the conflict.

One such ‘conflict management’ process, by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together, is the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, which will be investigated in this study. This is the process that started late in 2002 and ended in 2005; a process whereby the Somali people were encouraged and given a chance to do something about their conflict. A critical analysis of the post-2004/05 mediation and intermediary processes will also be conducted, especially in terms of contemporary Somali politics and diplomacy.

It is also important to note that conflict-management theorists see violent conflicts as the inevitable consequences of differences of values and interests within and between communities. The propensity to violence arises from existing institutions and historical relationships, as well as from the established distribution of power. Resolving such conflicts is viewed as unrealistic: the best that can be done is to manage and contain them; and occasionally, to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed (Miall 2004:3).

Conflict management is, therefore, also seen as the art of appropriate intervention to achieve political settlements, particularly by those powerful actors having the power and resources to put pressure on the conflicting parties, in order to induce them to settle. It is also the art of designing appropriate institutions to guide the inevitable conflict into the appropriate channels. In the words of Bloomfield and Reilly (1998):

“Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of

difference” (Bloomfield and Reilly 1998: 18).

Figure 1.2: Conflict dynamics and conflict resolution adapted from Miall et al. (2000:16)

2.2.4 Human security

Another concept utilized in this study is ‘human security’, which is closely connected to the already-discussed phenomena above. The new definition of security represents a shift from military concerns to other aspects of human existence, including personal safety, access to basic needs, and the right to exercise basic freedoms. This new focus is perhaps better captured by the two-fold definition of human security established by the UNDP (1994: 23). It firstly views human security as the protection of people from

chronic maladies, such as disease, famine, oppression and other conditions. It secondly, also highlights the need for what Muloongo, Kibasomba and Kariri (2005:43) describe as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (see also Rankhumise, Shai & Maphunye 2008:116).

Simply put, this form of security is loosely defined as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, as respectively illustrated in the above statements.

2.2.5 Track-one diplomacy

The aspect of track-one diplomacy is also predominantly used in this research. This is the kind of diplomacy practised by States and international organisations. It is characterised by formal rules, some legal and others based on practice, to which all states and international organisations agree. Track-one diplomacy is also based on formal operating procedures (Figure 1.3 above) and formalised relationships (Mwagiru 2000 (b): 123).This study entails the observation of track-one diplomacy as practised by Kenya, as the main point of interest. This practice is also observed within the UN and IGAD. Within IGAD, there are member states that also individually have this diplomatic capacity.

2.2.6 Track-two diplomacy

Another manifestation of diplomacy is ‘track-two diplomacy’. This is a term that was first coined officially by a Foreign Service officer in the US State Department. Montville (1982:145–157) described it as an unofficial, informal interaction (see Figure 1.3) between members of adversary groups or nations with the aim of developing strategies, influencing public opinion and organising human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. This diplomacy is evident to the extent that in the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, the Somali House of Elders (Guurti) was recognised in one committee as representing an important constituent towards peace, and was present and consulted in the whole process. This is a track-two entity or role.

2.2.7 Track-three diplomacy

In track-three diplomacy, unofficial third parties work with people from all walks of life and sectors of their society, to find ways to promote peace in settings of violent conflict. This work is aimed at rebuilding broken relationships across the lines of division among ordinary citizens, in communities in a range of sectors. The premise of track-three diplomacy is that peace can and must be built from the bottom up, as well as from the top down (see grassroots section in Figure 1.3 above).

For any negotiation or settlement to be achieved, a “peace constituency” must exist. Likewise, for any settlement/peace agreement that is eventually reached, there must

be support and some capacity for its implementation (Chigas 2003). Another manifestation of diplomacy that is closely connected to this study is ‘multi-track diplomacy’.

2.2.8 Multi-Track Diplomacy

Multi-track diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions and communities that operate together in the achieving of a common goal. The multi-track system originated due to the inefficiency of pure government mediation. Moreover, increases in intrastate conflict in the 1990s confirmed that track-one diplomacy was not effective enough to secure international co-operation or to resolve conflicts. Rather, there needs to be a more interpersonal approach, in addition to government mediation. The term multi-track diplomacy, therefore, incorporates all aspects of mediation from the ground-level work of private citizens to the top-level meetings of State heads. Multi-track diplomacy utilizes all levels of society, in order to determine the needs and to facilitate communication between all levels of society (Diamond and Mc Donald 1996: 1-6). Another term that is adopted in this research is ‘small States’.

2.2.9 Small States

The idea of small States has been adopted in this study. To qualify the reason why Kenya could be viewed as a ‘small State’ it would be constructive to look at what this idea of a State is understood to be. The definitions of what comprises a small State are several: A small State could be viewed as a State that is not a great power, or in terms of capabilities, that is the possesser of relative or absolute power, or by a combination of objective (material) and subjective (based on perceptions) factors (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 652-655).

However, a caveat could be observed pertaining to the discourse on small States, as considered in fields of international relations, conflict and development studies – the small State has seen varied definitions, and may have escaped a consensus on its actual definition. In fact, there is a substantial disagreement even over what type of

criteria, quantitative or qualitative, are most appropriate to characterize the small State. One could argue that such fundamental disagreement over what makes a State small has actually benefited the areas of small State analysis by providing it with conceptual flexibility to match different research designs, as well as the quite substantial variations among actual small States in the world. In short, in the discipline and practice of international relations and international development studies, more than one definition of the small State does, and should, exist.

2.3 Post-conflict reconstruction

Before discussing ‘post-conflict reconstruction’, it is essential to understand the ‘post- conflict’ phenomenon. The concept ‘post-conflict’ refers to the period following the end of a conflict in any given country. Despite its apparent simplicity, this concept has two definitional problems. The first is the determination of the beginning of a post-conflict period. It is often impossible to determine a precise date when a conflict is supposed to have ended. Even after the signature of a peace agreement by belligerents, low-intensity hostilities might still continue (Nkurunziza 2008:4).

One might use two major events to determine the beginning of a post-conflict period. The first is the immediate period following a landmark victory by either of the warring parties. This could be the fall of the capital city, the seat of political power, following a long protracted war. For example, the long war between Ethiopian government forces under the so-called “Derg regime”, headed by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and rebel forces, led by Meles Zenawi, is known to have ended when Addis Ababa fell on 29 May 1990 (Nkurunziza 2008: 5).

The second major event used to determine the official end of a war is the date of signature of a comprehensive agreement between the warring parties. Even when such an agreement does not necessarily end all acts of violence, it reduces them dramatically. Hence, it is easier to take the date of the signature of a ceasefire agreement as being the end of the conflict, and the beginning of the post-conflict period.

For example, the war in Burundi ended officially when the government signed a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the main rebel group on 29 November 2003, even if some sporadic violence by other small groups persisted until the middle of 2008 and upto this focus period on a small scale. Other lenses of the term “post- conflict” have been used to explain the phenomenon. Handrahan (2004) looks at the phenomenon from a gender and ethnic dimension. In this line, post-conflict is generally referred to as the period when predominantly male combatants have ceased to engage in ‘official war’. Because conflict is still perceived through male paradigms by both international and national community leaders – by and large men – the ‘formal’ period of fighting and conflict is what the international development community focuses on.

Once such fighting has stopped, a conflict is perceived to have moved beyond conflict. Although the new phase is not without violence, there is no more ‘official’ conflict. Apart from isolated incidents, the threat of violence is apparently over (Handrahan 2004: 429). Or so the dominant perception would have it.

A feminist analysis, Handrahan argues, defines such a situation otherwise. Handrahan argues that while it can take a war for personal security to become an issue in most men’s lives, insecurity is all too common for women, regardless of war. Female insecurity is so prevalent that it becomes invincible, and is accepted as the norm. Building on a substantial body of feminist literature that has been documented, for the past thirty years, the levels of violence committed against women, largely by men, during so-called non-conflict periods in the developing and the developed world, feminists started to ask what happens to women’s security during wartime, if such levels of male violence are tolerated during non-conflict periods.

They found that violence remains a common denominator in many women’s lives, but that gender identities shift during war; and this, in effect, changes the type and intensity of violence (Handrahan 2004: 430). Her thesis is that solutions to the terror that people experience during and after conflict have roots in the under-explored linkages among gender, ethnicity, patriarchy and conflict. Such an analysis problematizes the complexities of social realities, the concepts of community and any understanding of conflict and post-conflict dynamics.

Opening out this debate, is the aspect of “post-conflict reconstruction”. The topic of post-conflict reconstruction is currently one of the most relevant policy issues in the world, with major efforts under way in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example. Kumar (1997: 17-22) asserted that post-conflict reconstruction involves building or rebuilding both formal and informal institutions. Coyne Christopher (2006: 325-328) asserts that, specifically, it involves the creation and restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, minimal social services, and structural reform and transformation in the political, economic, social and security sectors. It is also often argued that ultimate success in the reconstruction process is defined as the achievement of a self-sustaining, liberal, democratic, economic and social order that does not rely on any outside assistance.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) understands post-conflict reconstruction as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-medium and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace (NEPAD 2005: 6). Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. It requires a coherent and multi-dimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies.

These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the

security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society, and that

collectively and cumulatively address both the causes and consequences of the conflict; and in the long term, establish the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development (Japan International Co-operation Agency, JICA, 2004).

Other lenses of post-conflict reconstruction are provided by Damon, Deckro and Wiley (2004). They define post-conflict reconstruction as the process of putting the pieces of civil society back together after a conflict. It includes the rebuilding of both the physical infrastructure and the re-establishment of the intangible socio-economic institutions that make civilized society possible (Damon et al. 2004: 201).

The establishment of the rule of law, good governance, and social and economic wellbeing all fall within the purview of post-conflict reconstruction (Harme & Gordon 2002: 85-96). Damon et al. (2004: 202) use the example of the United States of America’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction operations, to explain the attributes and essence of this activity. They assert that since World War two, the U.S. has become involved in a number of post-conflict reconstruction operations.

These operations range from the larger efforts of post-war Germany, Austria and Japan, to the smaller and more limited operations, and others like them. It is over the years that these operations, and others like them, have been studied. An important lesson in these efforts is that security must be established for a successful post- conflict reconstruction operation. “Play to Win”, the final report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, concluded that security is essential to post-conflict reconstruction, pointing out that while “every case is different, there is one constant – if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail” (Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 2003).20

In certain instances also, military interventions or operations aimed at bringing about this security are termed as ‘stability operations’. The development of security institutions is, therefore, essential for the protection of the fundamental rights that make a free and fair civil society possible. Without a sense of personal safety, refugees, and internally displaced persons will not return home; former combatants will not lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life; farmers and merchants will not engage in food production or business activity; and parents will not send their children to school or seek economic opportunities (Bi-Partisan Commission on Post- Conflict Reconstruction 2003).

Another interrogation of the nature and extent of post-conflict reconstruction or post- war reconstruction in Africa is provided by Olawale (2008: 259-279). He considers this activity from a ‘power-elites’ perspective. He asserts that post-cold war conflicts 20

See Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. 2003. In. http://www.pcrproject.org/PCRFinalReport.pdf. As accessed on 12 October 2012.

in Africa have accentuated the emergence of war-making power elites, as ‘executors’ and ‘trustees’ of peace treaties, or ‘peace celebrities’ with considerable leverage on the course and outcomes of post-war reconstruction (Olawale 2008: 259).

Post-war reconstruction, which is also termed ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ represents a subset of peace building, defined as a whole gamut of activities undertaken for the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving violent or potentially violent conflicts (Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens 2002: 4). It involves ‘the rebuilding of the socio- economic framework of society and the reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and [the] rule of law’ (World Bank 1998, cited in Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 89).

The contemporary post-war reconstruction agenda is founded on a quadruple reform of the security, economic, political and justice (or reconciliation) systems. To connect this to Olawale’s thesis on the role of power elites, it is normally the case in the continent that the major players in theatres of post-war reconstruction include a consortium of international aid agencies, international organizations, international non-governmental organizations and local non-governmental organizations and ‘favoured political elites’ (Olawale 2008: 273).

2.3.1 Peace

Another phenomenon or concept worth interrogating is ‘peace’. Elias and Turpin (1994: 1-7) asserted that just as war is seen in peace studies as a pervasive aspect of society as a whole, so can peace be reconceptualised in a broader way. According to peace-study scholars, peace should be defined as more than just the absence of war. The mere absence of war does not guarantee that war will not recur. As Kant pointed out, each peace treaty ending a European power struggle in the sixteenth century merely set the stage for the next war (Kende 1989: 233-47; Goldstein 2001: 153). Nor can the absence of power struggles in the cold war be considered true peace: third- world proxy wars killed millions of people; while a relentless arms race wasted vast resources.

Goldstein (2001: 153) asserts that because the realist school of thought, for example, assumes the normalcy of military conflicts, it recognizes only a negative kind of peace – the temporary absence of war.

In contrast to this, positive peace refers to a peace that resolves the underlying reasons