INFORME N° 048-2009-SUNAT/2B

The six cases provide evidence of the concessions made by managers to the workers in response to workplace conflict. They describe various degrees of union involvement in contributing to the dispute resolution. In all of the three cases in DLDZ, the trade unions played dominant roles, being actively involved in the dispute resolution; while in the South, the unions’ participation appeared to be more diverse. The role of the trade unions in strike resolution can be categorized into three types. The trade unions in Nidec, Tostem and TDK in the DLDZ all negotiated with the company with only limited government involvement. They successfully achieved a resumption of production by having both sides make concessions. In the case of TDK, there was a complete avoidance of any strike. When it comes to the South, in the case of Honda Nanhai, workers themselves negotiated with the management without any actual involvement of either the trade union or the government. In stark contrast, in Honda Lock the government dominated the whole process, thereby constraining the behaviour of not only the workers and the trade union, but also of the company. In Denso, the approach was dominated jointly by both the trade union and the workers, and took the form of the institutionalisation of the workers’ autonomy through the official trade union organisation.

The six cases can be seen as three types of dispute resolution, if we distinguish the extent to which the trade unions’ contributions caused the employers to make concessions to workers. They are listed below.

Type 1. The Denso case and the three cases in DLDZ had similarities with the ‘union centered approach’, where the approach was controlled either by both the government and the trade union (e.g., cases of Tostem and Nidec) or the union alone (e.g., cases of Denso and TDK). This pattern had some characteristics of a ‘corporatist’ arrangement of dispute resolution regarding the conspicuous dualist functions performed by the

trade unions. Under the supervision of the party-government, the trade union played the key role of a mediator to help, encourage or urge both sides to make compromises and reach agreement. The party-government did not impose any direct instruction and intervention on the workers and managers in the dispute resolution process. In the case of Tostem, the government only intervened at crucial phases such as in prolonged strikes. The workers and the management, unavoidably linked with each other in the strike, came to agreement based on the trade union’s mediation. (See Figure 6)

Figure 6. Type 1

I.e. DLDZ and Denso.

Type 2. The second pattern can be described as a ‘unitary’ resolution, exemplified by the case of Honda Lock. The party-government dominated the resolution and left limited scope for both sides. In this case, despite being an integral part of the institutional arrangement of dispute resolution, the trade union did not play an independent role. The government, by virtue of its resources and authority in politics and administration, dominated in guiding the company and workers in achieving resolution of the dispute. The workers and the managers, necessarily linked, relied on government intervention to resolve the dispute. (See Figure 7)

Figure 7. Type 2

I.e. Honda Lock.

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Type 3. The last category is ‘pluralist’ resolution,440

the well-known Honda Nanhai case represented this type. The trade union, though institutionally linked with the other three actors, did not play any visible role. The party-government did not impose any direct instruction and intervention on the workers and the managers, but acted as a mediator to promote the resolution of the dispute. The dominant role was played by the workers and managers. (See Figure 8)

Figure 8. Type 3

I.e. Honda Nanhai.

The weakness of trade union arrangements lies in the lack of connections with the grass-roots workers. It was essential to ‘reconnect’ workers, thereby gaining workers’ compliance in the dispute resolution process. In resolving spontaneous strikes, the workplace trade unions, by virtue of their daily contacts with workers, benefited in building up an easy and smooth channel of communication with workers.

In both cases of Type 2 and Type 3, the trade union lacked sufficient credibility among the workers. This was partially attributed to the union president’s close relations with the company and also to the fact that the union’s internal institutions had been out of touch with grass-roots members. In the absence of a ‘usable’ workplace trade union, effective communication between workers and the employer cannot be implemented. In the approach of type 1, the trade unions successfully channeled workers to union-led bargaining with employers. The workplace unions, backed up by the higher level of the trade unions, had acted as the bed-rock of contacting workers in the dispute resolution procedure.

A closer examination of the cases within the first category revealed the different significance of the organisation at different levels within the union structure. The                                                                                                                

440 _{Pluralism has the connotation of laissez-faire pluralism, with emphasis on its full freedom}

for any interest group to press its interests and try to persuade others. G

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cases of Nidec, Tostem and TDK exemplified the dominant and effective role of strong grass-roots trade unions in resolving the disputes. Associated with the highly centralised union structure within the company, their approach had been characterised by ‘top-down measures’, in that the presidents employed their personnel influence to gain workers’ compliance. This method appeared to be effective in getting the workers to succumb to the union commands in these cases. The district union adopted a more dominant approach, which set up the range of the wage increase for the companies. This, on the one hand, constrained the workplace trade unions; on the other, it provided the workplace organisations with the administrative resources when necessary. The overall appearance of the DLDZ cases was characterised by a union dominant approach. This was attributed to the local tradition of socialist ‘paternalist’ labour relations. The district trade union had a strong government background. Meanwhile the workplace union presidents’ identity as full-time union presidents helped them to keep at an arm’s length from the managers. They also had the experience and legitimacy necessary for effectively dealing with the managers. A sense of sympathy with the workers was prevalent among the trade union officials at local level.

The achievement of these successful solutions in the DLDZ cases nevertheless displays differences from their counterpart in Denso within the same category. The Denso unions adopted a different, bottom-up approach in resolving the strike. In this process, the union at the district level played a significant role in deciding the approach and supervising the workplace union to implement it. The district union president assisted the workplace trade union officials to fully engage in ascertaining the workers’ demands in order to gain the workers’ approval to carry out collective bargaining. The resources from the superior trade union were the main supports for the district union to insist on a bottom-up approach, and these resources arose from the city trade union president’s dominant administrative and political status over the district authority.

In this approach, the Denso workplace union played an effective role in reaching workers, and two main factors may contribute to this achievement. Firstly, although the union president was a high-profile manager, it may be presumed that the president’s managerial position as a production department head to some extent

extenuated the workers’ hostility. It appeared that managers from the personnel department or the general affairs department, who were in direct charge of workers’ personnel and welfare management, were more commonly in a starkly opposed position towards the rank-and-file, and that caused workers to have more ‘feudal’ feelings of lack of trust. Secondly, in strikes, where there are serious political risks, the higher level organisations can provide the necessary guidance, resources, and even the political shelter that is essential for workplace trade unions to perform their representative duty. In Denso, when the district union had determined a bottom-up strategy in strike resolution, the workplace trade union implemented this strategy in an environment assured by the district union that precluded the external influence from the party-government pressures. In this sense, it is the rational choice of the workplace trade union to follow those who can protect them politically.

The district union possesses adequate political resources and authority in pursuit of resistance from the management, the district government and relevant government bureaus. In addition, the resources from the superior trade union were the main supports for the district union to insist on the bottom-up approach, and these resources were arising from the city trade union president’s administrative and political status over the district authority. The trade union officials led both the district and city trade union with exceptionally prominent enlightenment in their conceptions and preference in adopting the bottom-up approach.