INFORME DE SITUACIÓN CON CARACTERIZACIÓN ANALÍTICA TIPO B

After acquiring ownership of a lot in Bacolod City through his predecessors, Prudencio Fernandez tried to eject Jesus Ciocon and other occupants off the property. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a “last chance” to repurchase the lot, to which Fernandez refused. After this rejection, Ciocon instituted against Fernandez for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after deducting portions already sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance price to Fernandez, for which Fernandez signed a receipt.

FACTS:

The case was tried in the sala of Judge Jocson, who noted that the parties were indifferent about submitting to a decision based on extant. Incomplete records proceeded to render judgment that dismissed both complaints and ordered private respondent Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate possession off to the heirs of Fernandez. Ciocon filed an appeal. Judge Jocson, upon motion for reconsideration subsequently rendered a second decision that set aside the first judgment. In this second decision, the judge explained that the Court of Appeals, after receiving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records, “remanded” the case and ordered the re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino. The second decision was a complete reversal of the first decision and directed the return of the disputed lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being litigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to Fernandez and the issuance of a new title in the name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors.

ISSUE

Whether or not the second decision was proper. :

HELD

The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to render or reverse the decision. The records show that the notices of appeal from the first decision of the trial court were filed within the reglementary period and were duly approved. At such time, the appeals were perfected. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that after perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a decision, and also to issue orders for execution pending appeal. The perfection of an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case and the trial court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual functions. No amount of rationalization, even a declaration that a new decision is being made in the best interest of justice, can confer on the trial court the jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired, waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.

166 | P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41

Neypes

v

Court of Appeals FACTS:

Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the grounds that the action had already been prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal in March 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court dismissed in July. Five days after receiving the court’s decision, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late, which was received by the petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this, too, was denied in September 3, 1998. The petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA, where the petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE

Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideraiton.

:

HELD

To standardize the appeal periods and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one

167 | P a g e

the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

168 | P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 42