come sooner than later. On July 15, 2003, the government and the AUC signed the
Santa Fe de Ralito (Córdoba) accord.4 In this accord, both parties agreed to begin a process of formal negotiations that stipulated the demobilization of the AUC by the end of December 2005, and the government’s pledge to “reinsert the paramilitaries into civilian life.”5 If the demobilization of the AUC’s does come to fruition, there is a dangerous possibility that without a state military presence, FARC will expand and consolidate previously disputed territory making the group even more difficult for the state to counter. Recalling Chapter III, while guerrillas and paramilitaries may control 40% of the countryside, much of this territory is disputed between the two parties. Consequently, Colombia must be prepared to rapidly and aggressively implement a rural pacification strategy prior to the AUC’s demobilization to not only deter other paramilitary groups from filling in the vacuum of the AUC, but also to prevent FARC from capitalizing on those peasant communities that were targets of paramilitary violence and hence may be more likely to support the guerrillas vice the state.
While the very mention of pacification may cause some U.S. policymakers to cringe recalling failed pacification efforts in South Vietnam, it is a viable counter- insurgency strategy in the Colombian case. Pacification applied to the Colombian case would mean Colombia’s military would provide rural security for both government and non-government agencies to implement needed socio-economic reforms (i.e., land reform), all working towards the common goal of ending the most enduring rural insurgency in all of Latin America. Based on the South Vietnamese case successful
4 International Crisis Group. “Colombia: Negotiating with the paramilitaries.” [Electronic version]
ICG Latin America Report No. 5 (16 Sep., 2003), 22,
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=973&type=pdf
pacification hinges on the strong commitment of the state to socio-economic reforms, and an equally committed military to provide rural security.6
Already in Colombia there is strong evidence that supports this hypothesis as a 2002 USAID internal audit of ongoing alternative development programs stated:
The successful accomplishment of the CAD [Coca alternative development] program is hindered by security constraints…includ[ing] kidnappings, threats, detainments, thefts, and killings of USAID/Colombia partners and recipients. Because of the imminent dangers in rural areas of Colombia, non-Colombian staff cannot perform site visits without massive security precautions…In addition, security threats make it more difficult to find people willing to work with Chemonics [USAID contractor for CAD] because to do so is seen as a danger in and of itself.7
While alternative development is not land reform, they are similar processes, and the security issue facing alternative development serves as a good predictor of a similar outcome for land reform without security. Yet while pacification is a viable in Colombia, the Colombian president faces much difficulty in getting the military to commit to rural security.
Throughout this thesis there has been a strange absence of the Colombian military from the current land and conflict analysis. This is due in large part to the military’s current counter-insurgency strategy of “containment” that has focused on: (1) “keeping the guerrillas out of the strategic economic areas and political centers;” and (2) capturing or eliminating the guerrilla leadership.8 Consequently, with much of the countryside devoid of a state-military presence, the paramilitaries and guerrillas have been fighting a “no-holds-barred turf war.” The unwillingness of the military to engage the guerrillas and paramilitaries “head on,” also stems from a restrictive U.S.-Colombia foreign aid policy, which although now incorporates counter-terrorism, has continued to make counter-narcotics, not counter-insurgency the number one U.S. national security priority
6 See Richard A. Hunt’s, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds
(1995), the best comprehensive scholarship on this important aspect of the Vietnam War.
7 United States. Agency for International Development (USAID). “Audit of the USAID/Colombia-
Financed Coca Alternative Development Program Under the Plan Colombia Supplemental Appropriation, No. 1-514-02-005-P).” [Electronic version] (USAID: San Salvador, 16 Jan. 2002), 4,
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy02rpts/1-514-02-005-p.pdf .
in Colombia. U.S. legislators have purposely avoided supporting a U.S.-Colombia policy that bears any resemblance to the “quagmire” of South Vietnam or the “human rights” nightmare of El Salvador. While these indications may lead some to conclude that it will be difficult for Colombia’s military to commit to rural security, many forget that it was this same military that conducted a successful counter-insurgency and civic action strategy during the 1960s bringing peace to post-Violencia rural Colombia.9
Some may argue that in light of President Uribe’s June 2003 “Democratic Defense and Security Policy,” in which 15,000 peasants were recruited in a planned 20,000 strong peasant self-defense force, that the military is not required in pacification.10 Yet as was shown in South Vietnam, relying on a peasant based militia force is no substitute for professionally trained full-time military forces. In the South Vietnamese case, similar forces called “Regional and Popular Forces,” who were “lightly armed, poorly disciplined, and partially trained,” were routinely overrun by main force Viet Cong units.11 Already there are indications that a similar fate could occur to Colombia’s peasant militias.12
Putting aside the difficulty of Colombia’s military to commit to rural security, it must also be acknowledged there are certain “trip wires” inherent in the military’s role in pacification. It is well recognized that during counter-insurgency operations indiscriminate government terror at the hands of the military most often favors increased peasant support for the insurgents (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua).13 Furthermore, as T. David Mason found in the Salvadoran case, any gains made by the government in reforms, specifically land reform, evaporate after indiscriminate violence
9 Rempe, 30.
10 International Crisis Group. “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy.” [Electronic version] ICG Latin America Report No. 6 (13 Nov 2003), 4,
http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/latin_america/06_colombia__uribe_dem__security.pdf See also, “Peasants Join Colombian Army.” BBC News (17 June 2003) [On-line version]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2995716.stm .
11 Hunt, 27. In 1969 South Vietnam’s regional/provincial forces numbered 470,000 (Hunt, 275). 12 International Crisis Group. “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” 4. This
report notes that initially Colombia’s peasants were to “serve and protect” the same geographic area they live in. However, as it was well known in the communities, which peasants were serving in, they became easily recognizable for both FARC and the ELN.
13 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. “Terror and Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, 1956-1970.”
by “death squads” and security forces.14 It appears that Colombia’s military is very well aware of the “double-edged sword” the broadening of a counter-insurgency strategy represents as one “think tank” recently reported:
The security forces appear to be divided between “hawks” or “hardliners”, who are fully behind the president [Uribe] and seek quick and spectacular military results, and “soft-liners” or “traditionalist”, who are less aggressive and more conscious of the legal and strategic limits on the military.15
Yet it is exactly this healthy “checking force” represented by “soft liners” that what will be required to implement a balanced pacification strategy. Furthermore, much of the international community (i.e., Europe) that distanced itself from Plan Colombia’s heavy reliance on military force may be more receptive to supporting a balanced pacification strategy that utilizes the military for security to implement land reform and other socio- economic programs. Pacification represents a viable policy option for Colombia to close the “gap” that currently exists between Colombia and the international community.
4. Merging Asset Forfeiture with Pacification: Variation on a Theme