The Communist Party of China has always recognised the indispensible value in information. Even in its early days, the CCP understood that the pen (笔杆子) is just as important as the gun (枪杆子) in gaining and maintaining political power.90
Propaganda was used widely and effectively as a vital tool for the CCP to gather support and popularity during the War of Resistance (1937-1945), from which the CCP had firmly established its political legitimacy over China.91
The commercialisation of the media and the emergence of the internet have revolutionised the way Chinese leaders and the public interact in both domestic and foreign policy issues. Instead of the old dogmatic propaganda directed from the top, the interactions between the media, the public and the leaders have become multidimensional. Opening up the marketplace for media outlets in China means that media companies jousting for readership and competing for the market. As a result, like editors everywhere, Shirk observes, “Chinese editors seek to attract audiences by dramatizing international news events, exaggerating threats, and emphasizing conflict over cooperation” (2011b: 226). For reporting international affairs, this sensationalist reporting style runs much less risk with the propaganda officials than doing so for
90 Several old guards of the CCP had reiterated this. Collectively, it called the power of the “Two
Sticks” (两杆子), i.e. the pen and the gun. Mao Zedong once famously declared, “political power grows out of the barrel of the gun” (枪杆子里出政权). Lin Biao, once Mao’s most trusted lieutenant, is attributed to have commented, “gun and pen: to seize power needs them, to consolidate power also needs them” (枪杆子，笔杆子，夺取政权靠这两杆子，巩固政权也靠这两杆子).
91 The Communist Party also used sympathetic foreign correspondences to spread out its messages
regarding the Chinese Revolution and its efforts against the Japanese. The best example of this perhaps is Edgar Snow and his book Red Star over China.
domestic issues. This is because being critical in domestic reporting often means criticism of CCP officials. The government is very sensitive to domestic issues, thus critical report of which is considered as destabilising factors for the society and ultimately the CCP’s rule.
On international affairs, on the other hand, in a reversal of the old cliché – no news is good news – China’s commercial media seems to believe good news is no news, as it does not generate big sales (Shirk, 2011b: 226). The more threats, crises, and hostilities, the more viewers are attracted to news programmes, hence the better for the success of the media company. Japan, always an emotional and sensitive subject, provides a perfect platform for this new nationalistic sensationalism in media. Unlike most foreign policy issues, which receive relative little public attention and media coverage, even minor events and seemingly irrelevant news to bilateral relations can become headlines and evoke a strong nationalistic response. In today’s China, Sino- Japanese friction emerges not only in traditional state-to-state diplomatic relations, but also in popular nationalist movements (Callahan, 2010: 161). Every remark and action by Japanese officials, every flaw in Japanese products, every misbehaviour of Japanese student or tourist to China, even every comment on Japan by Chinese public figures, is an opportunity for tabloid newspapers and internet websites to attract audiences and whip up popular nationalistic passions (Shirk, 2008: 156). For example, when a famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei appeared on a fashion magazine’s cover wearing a short dress with patterns similar to that of the imperial Japanese flag in December 2001, it made a huge public stir. Hours after its revelation, angry messages flooded Internet forums and chat rooms, as the flag is considered as a potent symbol of Japanese militarism and the atrocities it committed to the Chinese people. The
editor of the magazine was forced to resign, and Zhao had made numerous public apologies on television and online. Nevertheless, none of this was enough to ease the public anger, at a New Year’s party in Hunan province, an enraged man walked on the stage while Zhao was performing, and smeared excrement on her.92 Other similar
examples that caused widespread fury towards Japan include a large Japanese tourist group was exposed to have involved in a three-day orgy with Chinese prostitutes at a luxury hotel in Zhuhai, South China, on and around 18 September 2003, a painful anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931;93 and the Toyota delayed recall
request in its Chinese market as part of its global product recall in early 2011.94
All three incidents highlighted above attracted great interests and sparked fury among the Chinese public. Although none of the event had anything to do with politics or diplomacy, they potentially could become political because of sensational reports and infuriating nationalistic messages exchanged on the Internet. As a result, stories had been followed continuously as they made good business sense for the media. Sensational coverage in the official media of incidents like these has served to stoke the flame of Chinese resentment; resentment, anger and nationalistic passions have helped the media outlets to sell more newspapers and rise the popularity of their websites in return for potentially more advertising revenues. Shirk sums up very well on this nationalism-sells phenomenon, “Anti-Japanese stories are too good a draw for commercial media to give up” (2008: 157).
92 The event attracted such public interest that a special report site was created to follow it on
people.com.cn, the official website for People’s Daily, see
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenyu/223/7010/index.html. Accessed on 15/03/2011.
93 This is first revealed by Beijing Youth Daily, see Xiang and Lin (2003); for report in English see
BBC News Online (2003).