Inserción del sistema en el lado del cliente

This chapter examines President Ronald Reagan’s “War on Terror”

from historical, political, and legal perspectives. Upon winning the presidential election in 1980, Ronald Reagan came to office determined to combat international terrorism more forcefully than his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, whose term in office was marred by the hostage crisis in Iran. Indeed, as discussed below, the Iranian hostage crisis contributed to Reagan’s electoral win. After a series of well-publicized terrorist incidents in the mid-1980’s, Reagan launched the United States’ first “War on Terror.” After the September 11 attacks, the second Bush administration borrowed from, and expanded upon, concepts and doctrines from the Reagan administration to implement George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” as discussed in chapters 7 and 8.

Like the Bush “War on Terror,” President Reagan’s campaign to end international terrorism relied upon his Commander-in-Chief powers and involved the use of military force to punish and deter further attacks.

Throughout this chapter, the “War on Terror” (WOT) refers to Ronald Reagan’s campaign, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Ronald Reagan was in office for two terms, from 1980 to 1988 when several infamous terrorist attacks occurred including the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut and marine barracks in Beirut, the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.

During the Reagan administration, the concept of state-sponsored terrorism came into prominence and directly influenced policy-makers; it is defined as “the active and often clandestine support, encouragement and assistance provided by a foreign government to a terrorist group” (Hoffman, 1998: 23). While members of the Reagan administration may have anticipated contending with Communist terrorist groups and plots

“orchestrated by the Kremlin and implemented by its Warsaw Pact client states,” by 1985, they were focusing on state-sponsored terrorism as a “type of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals” (Hoffman, 1998: 27).

Historical Context

Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter (a Democrat) in 1980 partially due to the American public’s concern about the weak economy.

Carter was also portrayed by Reagan as a foreign policy failure due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Iranian hostage crisis. The hostage crisis, which began on November 4, 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini’s Revolutionary Guards seized control of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, dominated the media. The Iranian students seized 66 American personnel, including those with diplomatic status, and 52 of the hostages were held for 444 days in an ordeal that was televised to the American public and discussed constantly. After repeated efforts to end the standoff peacefully failed to work, President Carter authorized a rescue attempt to free the hostages. On April 24, 1980, the rescue mission was forced to abort after encountering difficulties in the Iranian desert; eight U.S. servicemen were killed and four injured in the attempt. For many Americans, the failed rescue

added to a sense of American impotence regarding terrorism and incompetence on the part of the Carter administration in dealing with it. (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 42) One year after the students took over the U.S.

embassy, on November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President. The day Reagan took the oath of office, January 20, 1981, the remaining 52 hostages were released and left Iran. One week later the new President set the tone of his administration’s rhetoric regarding terrorism by stating, “Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.” (Wills, 2003: 1)

Many conservatives who came to Washington with the Reagan administration in 1981 arrived with the same strong worldview about the Soviet Union as Ronald Reagan; it was an “evil empire” with an insatiable desire to dominate and control countries around the globe. In addition, it was the mission of the United States, as leader of the free world, to resist this domination wherever possible. This worldview acerbated the tendency to analyze international tensions and policy challenges through the prism of the East-West ideological divide and to view things in a “black or white”

dichotomy. The problem of terrorism was no exception to this tendency; an example of this is a book by Claire Sterling called The Terror Network that explored terrorism as a “calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy.” (Hoffman, 1998: 27) The perception that international terrorism was part of a Soviet effort to dominate the world may have persuaded many in the Reagan administration to believe it was more analogous to warfare than to criminal activity, a perception with important policy implications.

The goal of the “Reagan doctrine,” a term used to describe Reagan’s foreign policy, was stopping the perceived expansion of Soviet power and communist ideology. Instead of containing communism, the conservatives under Reagan wanted to roll communist countries back by increasing the Defense Department budget, developing new weapons, and helping anti-communist forces in states such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. (Evans and Newham, 1998: 464). A related concept was the “Shultz doctrine” named for the Secretary of State who advocated using military force “not only against terrorists, but also against states that support, train or harbor terrorists.”

(Paust, 1986: 711) The Reagan administration did not use the Reagan doctrine as a legal justification for the use of force; rather it was a political statement about policy and goals.

Some of the most important players in the Reagan administration regarding terrorism include the following: Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) William Casey. George Shultz was Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989 and equated terrorism with warfare. (Shultz, 1993:

645) In his book, Turmoil and Triumph, Shultz explained that the U.S had to become more aggressive regarding terrorism by responding with force so that terrorists would learn acts of terrorism do not work. (Shultz, 1993) In October 1984, Shultz gave a speech at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City and declared, “The United States must be ready to use military force to fight terrorism and retaliate for terrorist attacks even before all the facts are known.”

(Maogoto, 2005: 90)

Many of Shultz’s views of terrorism from the 1980’s became standard rhetoric in the second Bush administration. In 1984 he affirmed, “We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses [to terrorism] should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation.” (Henninger, 2006) A Wall Street Journal editor named him the “father of the Bush Doctrine” for his advocacy of preempting threats well before the 9/11 attacks. (Ibid) After 9/11, Shultz, a former marine, approved of Bush’s war on terror approach, stating, “The law-enforcement mentality is not going to do the job for us. You have to have a war mentality. You have to have an offense and defense; you have to be active about it.” (Ibid) However, in the 1980’s, these views of terrorism did not find the same level of acceptance that they received after the 9/11 tragedy.

Shultz’s readiness to use military force contrasted with the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, who held that office from 1981 until 1987 (when he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Affair). Weinberger viewed terrorism as criminal activity but not warfare and frequently clashed with Shultz over the most appropriate means for the U.S. to respond to terrorists. (Wills, 2003: 30) For Weinberger, six criteria needed to be evaluated prior to committing U.S.

combat troops abroad:

• The mission had to be in the vital interests of the U.S.

• Overwhelming force should be used for a decisive victory.

• There should be clearly defined military and political objectives.

• The situation should be continually reassessed.

•

There must be reasonable assurance---before committing combat forces abroad---that both the mission and troops have the support of the American people and Congress

.

• The commitment of troops should be the last resort.

(Weinberger, 2001: 309-313)

Shultz, who advocated using military force against terrorists, concluded that Weinberger’s criteria applied to a “major, conventional war” but amounted to “a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis” in the face of terrorists. (Shultz, 1993: 650) The inability of Weinberger and Shultz and their closest aides to agree on the nature of terrorism (was it war or crime?) frequently led them to disagree on the fundamental question of how to respond appropriately to acts of terrorism.

Another notable personality influencing Reagan’s WOT was the director of the CIA from 1981 until his death in 1987, William Casey, a man described as a conservative who was “fixated on the Soviet Union” and firmly committed to halting the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology. (Coll, 2004: 92) When Casey took over at the CIA, he applied the “message endorsing action, entrepreneurship and simplicity” from the book In Search of Excellence:

Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies to improve the CIA.

(Woodward, 1987: 314) He also viewed terrorism as warfare, not criminal activity, and supported Shultz in advocating the use of military force to fight terrorists. (Wills, 2003: 33) After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter administration sent approximately $75 million dollars to the mujahedin soldiers who were fighting the Soviet army. (Persico,

1990: 225) Although most members of the Reagan administration disdained Carter’s foreign policy initiatives, aid to the mujahedin was viewed as a way to counter the forcible spread of communism without sending American troops, so Casey continued it. (Ibid) The possibility of the mujahedin later opposing the U.S. and forming a non-state terrorist network, al Qaeda, never seems to have occurred to Casey and those who funded the anti-Soviet campaign.

Colin Powell, who held various posts in all four administrations in this study, worked in the Reagan administration as National Security Adviser from 1987 to 1989. He then became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration (1989-1993). During the second Bush administration, Powell, by then the Secretary of State, presented the American case for invading Iraq to the UN in February 2003. In his book, My American Journey, Powell remarked upon the continuing tension between Weinberger and Shultz while cautiously avoiding agreement with either man’s views on terrorism. (Powell, 1995) In addition, Powell endorsed Weinberger’s rules on committing U.S. forces to combat, writing that they operated as a “practical guide” by Powell when he advised Presidents on the desirability of committing troops abroad. (Powell, 1995: 303)

Other influential people in the Reagan administration were Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor from 1983 to 1985, and John Poindexter, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1981 to 1986. Both McFarlane and Poindexter were involved in the Iran-Contra scandal; McFarlane plead guilty to four counts of withholding information from Congress and was pardoned by the first George Bush in 1992 and Poindexter

was convicted of multiple felonies in 1990 but the convictions were reversed a year later. Finally, Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor at the State Department during the latter half of Reagan’s term, provided explicit legal backing for the administration’s use of force against terrorists. His published works on terrorism and the law were assessed in the literature review chapter. As some of the most important participants in Reagan’s foreign policy team, these men were responsible for shaping and implementing counterterrorism policy.

Counterterrorism Policy under Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 determined to change many Carter administration policies including counterterrorism. While the Carter administration championed human rights, the new Reagan administration

“announced international terrorism would replace human rights as the number –one issue for the U.S.” (Weiner, 2007: 388) Terrorist incidents increased throughout the 1980’s with half of the incidents “aimed at only 10 countries;

one-third of the total were targeted directly at the US.” (Task Force Report, 1987: 8) From the start of his administration, Reagan pledged a policy of

“swift and effective retribution” against terrorists; the second pillar of his policy was “making concessions to terrorists was not an option.” (Wills, 2003: 4) State sponsorship of terrorism dominated the foreign policy agenda of the administration and the two main sponsors of terrorism, the Soviet Union and Libya, received most of the administration’s attention. In fact, during a hearing by the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in 1986, Ambassador Robert Oakley, Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning at the State Department, called Libya “far and away the most active supporter of terrorism, especially against Americans and Europeans.” Libya

was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1979 under the Export Administration Act, during the Carter administration, and this meant it was subject to export restrictions. Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was not rescinded until June 2006 during the second Bush administration.

The Vice President’s task force on combating terrorism, chaired by Vice President George H. W. Bush, concluded in 1987 that U.S. policy was

“no concessions to terrorists.” (Task Force Report, 1987: 12) In addition, the task force noted that the U.S. government was prepared to act “unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.” However, the Reagan administration’s strong rhetorical stance did not always result in the use of force or other counterterrorist activity. In many cases in the 1980’s, the empirical evidence reveals the strong rhetoric did not match reality in that there was no response by the Reagan administration to terrorist acts.

Specifically, one study identified 636 terrorist incidents from January 1981 to January 1989 (the Reagan years) and “in the overwhelming majority of cases, the administration did not respond at all.” (Wills, 2003: 6) Sometimes the terrorist incident was minor and other times the lack of clear evidence as to culpability or the whereabouts of the perpetrators made responding too difficult. In other cases, the government response was not swift and effective retribution, but rather, defensive measures such as improving security at potential targets and increasing intelligence gathering capabilities. (Ibid) In addition, despite all the talk in the 1980’s about combating terrorism, the President and Congress were slow to enact laws to protect American citizens.

It was not until 1984, for instance, that taking an American hostage overseas

became a crime under U.S. law and only in 1986 did assaulting, maiming, or murdering a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world became a crime. (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 367)

Much of Reagan’s counterterrorism rhetoric “reflected the scene, characters, and themes of Cold War discourse,” with the Soviet Union occupying the position of evildoer. (Winkler, 2006: 80) The Reagan administration tended to focus on one region of the world, Central America, and on Lebanon, where they believed democracy was fragile and under attack. Throughout his two terms, Reagan portrayed the Soviet Union as the

“evil empire” bent on destructive expansionism, with assistance from its satellite states and often working through the tactic of terrorism. Winkler detailed how Reagan transformed the political debate on counterterrorism so that “terrorism became less about individuals committing crimes and more about the Soviet Union and its client states permitting and encouraging terrorism as the means of furthering their ideological perspective.” (Winkler, 2006: 82) As the public became more accustomed to viewing international terrorism this way, responding with the use of force, as opposed to law enforcement methods, became more of an acceptable option.

The following sections examine the major terrorist incidents of the Reagan administration by describing the events and detailing the response, if any, of the administration. In addition, in the cases where the administration responded with force, the administration’s legal justification for the use of force and the international community’s reaction are analyzed. The pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance,

expounded by Koh and explained in chapter three, is the lens applied to assess how the Reagan administration responded to international terrorism in the 1980’s.

Marine Barracks Bombing

In June of 1982, Israeli troops under the direction of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defence Secretary Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to move Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces north. Some critics accused the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, of tacitly agreeing to the Israeli invasion, but Haig denied it. Although the PLO was eventually expelled from Lebanon and the Syrian troops fighting the Israeli army suffered more casualties, it is often cited as an Israeli political failure despite their military victory. Graphic images of civilian deaths in the media helped turn world public opinion against the Israeli invasion. American policy toward Lebanon soon became “the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, a sovereign, independent Lebanon, and security for Israel’s northern border.” (Wills, 2003:

50)

In August of 1982, eight hundred U.S. marines were sent to Lebanon to facilitate the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. Secretary of Defense Weinberger resisted the deployment of the marines from the beginning because he feared the assignment was too vague. On September 10, 1982, the marines left Lebanon and returned to U.S. ships in the Mediterranean.

However, two events quickly brought them back into Beirut: President-elect Bashir Gemeyel was assassinated on September 14, and Israeli Defence Minister Sharon allowed Phalange militiamen to kill over 700 Palestinian

civilians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. (Wills, 2003: 53) Disturbing images of dead Palestinians put pressure on the Reagan administration to prevent more violence.

The second deployment of marines, part of a multinational force with French and Italian troops, entered Lebanon to stabilize the political situation and allow the Lebanese government to reestablish control over its territory.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the second marine deployment due to the “intractable political and military problems on the ground,” but their caution was overruled. (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 97) Intelligence reports that indicated possible terrorist attacks against American installations were ignored and on April 18, 1983, a truck bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, 17 of them Americans. A group called Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack, which indicated Hezbollah and Iranian involvement. In a sharp departure from the rule of law, one CIA officer, Keith Hall, extracted confessions from four suspects arrested by the Lebanese with “overly harsh”

techniques that led to Hall’s discharge from the CIA. (Martin and Walcott, 1988: 105)

Despite the vulnerability of their position, the marines remained near the Beirut airport and on October 23, 1983 suffered their largest single-day losses since the Vietnam War when a truck bomb destroyed the marine barracks, killing 241 Americans. Shortly thereafter, another bomb exploded at the French headquarters, killing 59. After the bombing of the marine barracks, President Reagan stoutly declared that he was committed to keeping

American forces in Lebanon to complete the “peacekeeping” mission. Two days later, on October 25, U.S. forces invaded the tiny island of Grenada and a storm of controversy engulfed the Reagan administration as questions were asked about the legality of invading Grenada. In addition, the Reagan administration was forced to deflect questions about whether the timing of the Grenada invasion was intended to turn attention away from the sight of dead and wounded marines in the rubble in Lebanon. Although unrelated events, the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut both threatened to derail Reagan’s hopes for re-election.

In the aftermath of the marine bombing many in the Reagan administration called for strong action against the terrorists who had carried

In the aftermath of the marine bombing many in the Reagan administration called for strong action against the terrorists who had carried

In document Herramienta de instalacion para el Sistema de Gestion Penitenciaria Venezolano. (página 38-41)