The main two aspects of counterfactual thinking are causality – the ability of counterfactual statements to imply causal judgement – and possibility, since they are choosing among inherently possible alternatives to any given event or action. Generally, a counterfactual is defined as a conditional statement with a false antecedent specifying a past event that did not take place (Roese and Olson 1995, 2). Counterfactuals have been attracting increasing attention in philosophy and other disciplines thanks to their methodological value as a tool for explaining causality. Causality and causal relations are among the basic conceptual tools that enable people to make sense of their world (Piaget 1974). Counterfactuals are not the only method whereby causation can be explained, for there are other methods to explain causality, chief among which are explanation by direct causes, explanation by covariational factors, and the covering law model, which we shall explain below soon.
Counterfactuals are set apart from these other methods of causation in two important respects: their principle of explaining causality and the kind of causal explanation they yield. As far as the first point is concerned, counterfactuals are based on a special use of the possibility principle. Direct causal explanation is based on actuality, for it explains an event by only looking at what really happened (A, therefore B), while counterfactual reasoning explains an event by looking at what might possibly have happened if it were not for the existence of the cause in question (not B, therefore not A). "Whereas counterfactual reasoning is about possibility, causal reasoning is about reality" (Spellman, Kincannon and Stose 2005, 28). Causal explanation is reality-based. But both counterfactual and covariational explanations are possibility-based. Both counterfactual reasoning and covariational reasoning work on evoking possibilities. However, they differ in that the goal of the counterfactual is “finding
ways to undo the outcome or something like it" while that of the covariational is
that of "finding ways that would increase the probability of the outcome or
something like it"(Mandel 2005, 23; emphasis in original). This entails another
difference between the counterfactual and the covariational modes of reasoning: the former can only undo one factor at a time and so it attributes causality to one cause only, while the latter, also called contributing factor explanation, looks at the relative importance of different factors or causes. Consequently, while covariational reasoning works well with equifinality (the idea that the outcome can be brought about separately by many different causes), counterfactual reasoning does not (see Spellman, Kincannon and Stose 2005, 28; Mandel 2005, 26; Goertz and Levy 2007, 13).
The second difference is related to whether the causes attributed through counterfactual reasoning are sufficient, necessary or both. Goertz and Levy (2007, 24) arrange these variables from the strongest to the weakest as (1) necessary and sufficient conditions, (2) sufficient conditions and (3) necessary conditions. It has been argued (Mandel 2005, 15) that one problem with counterfactual scenarios is that they invoke necessary causes while in everyday use causation tends to imply sufficient causes. However, in common sense uses as well as the way causality is attributed in literature, the differences between these modes are mostly blurred. As we will see later, Shakespeare’s
characters always imply both necessity and sufficiency in attributing causality, but necessity can be seen as more basic in these counterfactuals.
Thinking about possibilities is the main characteristic of counterfactual reasoning. Although causal relations generally imply necessity, yet paradoxically the essence of counterfactual thinking is rooted in possibility and contingency (Hawthorn 1991, 13). So, although causality implies that when the cause exists the result should follow, counterfactuals argue about the cause itself that its existence was one possibility among many alternatives; one that could have been avoided and, when avoided, the result would not have happened either. This is why counterfactuals cannot be imagined without imagining possibilities. Our ability to think counterfactually is facilitated by our ability to imagine alternative possible scenarios that diverge from the actual. This is made clear by the psychological, historical and philosophical treatments of counterfactuals. Psychologically speaking, "People imagine counterfactual alternatives by keeping possibilities in mind" (Walsh and Byrne 2005, 72). Byrne (2005, 115) distinguishes between direct causal reasoning and counterfactual reasoning on the basis of imagining possibilities: when people think causally they imagine only one possibility but when they think counterfactually they think in terms of two or more possibilities. That is why people tend to practice causal reasoning more frequently than they do counterfactual reasoning: "Inferences based on one possibility are easier than those based on multiple ones"(ibid., 23). Historically speaking, a counterfactual approach to the past legitimizes the existence of countless possibilities of the actual past. It is based on the inherent potentiality in human action to open up for countless alternatives. Human history has been no more than the collective of millions of human decisions, all of them contingent, all of them mutable. Consequently, “the past becomes present (or is renewed) as a function of the possibilities objectively implied in this past" (Scalmer 2006, 3; see also Cowley 2005, xvii). Philosophically speaking, traditional treatments of counterfactual conditionals in philosophy (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973) have been based on the ‘possible worlds’ theories, and have endeavoured to account for counterfactuals in terms of possibility.
However, ontological possibility is not an end in itself in counterfactual reasoning. Rather the ultimate aim behind constructing counterfactuals is cognitive: counterfactuals enhance causal reasoning and causality is one of the
basic principles whereby humans make sense of their world and how things tend to happen in it. Thus, it turns out that one way to understand and make sense of the actual events and their causes is through the possible. The possible is conceptually indispensable in our cognitive development and it is a skill that humans start to develop through imaginative work in the early stages of their childhood (Harris 2000). The utility of the possible in explaining the actual has been recognized in different disciplines. According to Robert Cowley, "There is no better way of understanding what did happen in history than to contemplate what very well might have happened" (2005, xvii). Since the possible, with its inherent potentiality, is an integral part of reality, then its recognition is a prerequisite for the understanding of that reality. Although the direct experimental methods are still profitably in use, investment in the possible can widen the range of our understanding of historical and social phenomena: “From the imaginary, unexploited traces of the actual might be discerned” (Scalmer 2006, 4). In the field of the social sciences, Max Weber made the resounding claim that "In order to penetrate the real causal interrelationships,
we construct unreal ones"(1949, 185-6; emphasis added).
Counterfactual thinking, moreover, is a form of rational thinking. It is far from being mere fancy, based on playful flights of the imagination. Although it has been dismissed by many as such, its proponents have managed to set certain criteria for its rational orientation. Firstly, as Robert Cowley has put it, “Probability is the key” (2005, xvii). Counterfactual scenarios must be kept within the range of what is considered probable according to the standards of the field in question. This buttresses the dialectic between possibility and probability which we have emphasized throughout this thesis. That is why the counterfactuals constructed by historians are viewed as more probable since historians know more of the details and have enough experience of what could happen in any given situation (Scalmer 2006, 3). Another criterion is consistency with the agreed historical facts, for understanding and interpreting these facts is the ultimate aim behind the construction of counterfactuals (Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 23). Consequently, some writers have suggested that counterfactual scenarios should differ as little as possible from the historical facts, calling this the ‘minimal re-write’ rule (for a list of these criteria see
Scalmer 2006, 7). All these criteria are set in order to elevate counterfactual thought experiments into more valuable, reliable and sense-making experiences.
Thus far we have remarked the main two sources for interest in counterfactuals as causality and possibility. This interest has ranged over many disciplines like philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and others. However, some of the philosophical nuances about causality surveyed above might not be readily applicable in Shakespeare, where a more flexible and common-sense meanings of that aspect might be applicable. The possibilistic aspect of counterfactuals has proved to be a liberating strategy for opening ever new horizons for human existence. Below we shall see how these aspects of counterfactuals are reflected in Shakespeare’s plays as well as the uses to which they are put.