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While the famine codes were taking active shape in India, what was the role of the colonial power at its highest level that is the British Parliament? What was the official discourse on famine at this highest colonial decision-making body? Further, what were the Indian National Congress discourse on famine which spearheaded the political campaign for India‟s self rule and independence and its effect on colonial rule? In this section, I will analyse the official colonial discourse and also counter-discourses on famines in India and the role they played in the governance of India.

When millions were dying due to famine in 1876, a „spectacular‟ Durbar was held in Delhi by the Viceroy Lytton to celebrate the proclamation of Queen Victoria as the „Empress of India‟, a title bestowed on her by the Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in the British Parliament. The ceremony had included the most colossal and expensive meal and a weeklong feast for 68,000 officials and Maharajahs. And it is during this durbar that about 1,000,000 of her Queen Empress‟s subjects had died of starvation (Davis, 2004 p. 28). The idea of the durbar was to co-opt the local princes who had decorative „princely‟ titles rather than real power and divert attention from real problems such as famine. The political response was then governed by the “strict laissez-faire approach to famine” of Viceroy Lytton – thoroughly supported by Secretary of state Salisbury and Prime Minister Disraeli – which ultimately led to famine conditions and deaths in 1876-1878 (Davis, 2004 p. 31).

Famine became an issue of considerable political importance in the British parliament from a governance perspective only after the birth of the Indian National Congress and the scalding critique by Dadabhai Naoroji which effectively had put the blame for famines in India on mis-governance and the economic drain of India by British rule. Naoroji had presented his analysis on the economic drain of India in 1878 in his „The Poverty of India‟; and had later elaborated it in several forums in India as well as England. His ideas got a public platform after the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. A comprehensive indictment of the British policy was presented by Naoroji in 1901, which not only included his earlier works since 1878 and correspondences but also a fresh spurt of facts and analysis. His analysis also influenced the debates on Indian famine in the British Parliament. Influenced by Naoroji‟s analysis, MPs such as Samuel Smith of Flintshire had in 1888 objected to the “oppressive” salt tax and new land taxes which were to be used for the creation of a new „famine fund‟ recommended by the Famine

113 Commission of 1880 (House of Commons, 20th Feb1888 p. 929). Bradlaugh was another British MP from Northampton who tirelessly took up the Indian cause as well as issues of „unjust‟ salt taxes and the effects of British rule and its impacts on creating famine conditions. However, Naoroji‟s and Indian National Congress‟s analyses were also bitterly disputed by other British Parliamentarians, as voiced by J.M Maclean, the MP of Oldham, who called Naoroji an “extremely ingenious statistician” who “availed himself of the slightest opportunity put in his power of setting the people of India against English influence and against English domination (House of Commons, 9th Aug 1888 p. 164) and that the:

“majority of the people were well affected towards British rule – that was to say, that they were contented with their position; they were lightly taxed, and every man had perfect freedom for himself and his property ” (ibid, p. 166)

Maclean was supported by Sir Richard Temple, who after his stint as special delegate during the Madras famine of 1876-77, and as Governor of Bombay in the later years had returned to England to become an MP (Worcester, Evesham). Completely oblivious to the harm caused by him, Temple said:

“[Temple] commanded great famine relief operations in the field when millions of people were threatened, who were, however, all rescued from starvation ... We did not, however, rule India by the sword. No doubt there were battalions and cannon in the background, but in the forefront of the administration was its benevolence, its thorough trustworthiness, and the general acquiescence of the people in it. In that acquiescence consisted the main element of our strength in India, financial and other” (ibid, p. 188).

Thus the main argument by not only Maclean, but also Temple and the majority of the British parliamentarians, was that British rule was benevolent, that it had taken care of famines, and, as a result was actually liked by the Indian people: notwithstanding Naoroji‟s and Congress‟s claims.

However, as a leading Indian intellectual of his time and as a member of the Indian National Congress, Naoroji consistently lobbied in different forums in India as well as England to argue his thesis that famines, pestilence and poverty in India occurred as a result of British „despotic‟ rule, which was “bleeding” India: an analysis which resonates to a large extent with the later Dependency theorists of the 1960s43although eight decades separated both these analyses. Dadabhai Naoroji argued that the “evil of the “bleeding”

114 and impoverishing drain by the foreign dominion” was the ultimate cause of famines (Naoroji, 1901 p. viii). Naoroji is here recalling the Secretary of state Salisbury‟s words, made in his minute of 1875, responding to the charges of excess revenue extraction by the colonial government which argued that: “The injury is exaggerated in the case of India, where so much of the revenue is exported without a direct equivalent. As India must be bled the lancet should be directed to the parts where the blood is congested or at least sufficient, not to those (the agricultural people) which are already feeble from the want of it”. Recounting this Naoroji wrote “This was said twenty-six years ago, and those who were considered as having sufficient blood are also being brought lower and lower. The „want of blood‟ among the agricultural population is getting so complete that famines and plagues like the present are fast bleeding the masses to death” (Naoroji, 1901 p. ix) The economic drain by Britain, Naoroji argues was the chief cause of poverty and famines in India and was a result of the „un-British‟ rule. Naoroji further comments:

“how strange it is that the British rulers do not see that after all they themselves are the main cause of the destruction that ensues from droughts; that is the drain of India‟s wealth by them that lays at their own door the dreadful results of misery, starvation, and deaths of millions...” (Naoroji, 1901 p. 212)

In another striking critique he says:

“This India, “bled” and exploited in every way of their wealth, of their services, of their land, labour, and all the resources by the foreigners, helpless and voiceless, governed by the arbitrary law and argument of force, and with injustice and unrighteousness – this India of the Indians becomes the “poorest” country in the world, after one hundred and fifty years of British rule, to the disgrace of the British name. The greater the drain the greater the impoverishment, resulting in all the scourges of war, famine and pestilence” (Naoroji, 1901 p. 384)

Alongside Naoroji, another study which made heavy taxation of land as the principal reason for famine was that by Romesh Dutt, an Indian civil servant and also one of the Congress Presidents, and that by Mr Rogers, a retired British civil servant (Dutt, 2005 [1900]).Around the same time, in 1898, William Digby the editor of Madras Times wrote a book highlighting the effects of famine of 1876-1877. These studies and their findings led to an intense polemical discussion of the causes of famine in India between, on the one hand, the Indian Nationalists and their sympathisers in the British Parliament led by William Wedderburn, and on the other hand, the Secretary of state, George Hamilton, and a majority of the MPs, who generally supported the official position as represented by the Secretary of state. Wedderburn, who was closely aligned with the Indian National

115 Congress and was the Congress president in 1889 and 1910, earned the ire of Secretary of state George Hamilton in the polemical debate which took place in the British Parliament in 1897.

Influenced by Naoroji‟s analysis, The Indian National Congress in its resolution on the famine of 1896-97 proclaimed:

“This congress deplores the outbreak of famine in a more or less acute form throughout India, and holds that this and other famines which have occurred in recent years are due to the great poverty of the people, brought on by the drain of the wealth of the country, which has been going on for years together, and by the excessive taxation and over assessment consequent on a policy of extravagance followed by the Government, both in the civil and the military departments, which has so far impoverished the people, that at the first touch of scarcity they are rendered helpless and must perish unless fed by the state or helped by private charity ... In the meantime the congress would remind the Government of its solemn duty to save human life and mitigate human suffering (the provisions of the existing famine code being in the opinion of the congress inadequate as regards wages, rations, and oppressive as regards task work), and would appeal to the Government to redeem its pledges by restoring the famine insurance fund (keeping a separate account of it) to its original footing, and to apply it more largely to its original purpose – viz, the immediate relief of the famine-stricken people ...” (House of Commons, 26th January 1897 p. 534)

At heart of the British parliamentary debate in January 1897 were two issues: on the one hand, a response to the challenge by the Indian National Congress which had put the blame of the famine and the mortality on British rule; and, on the other, the allegation that the „famine fund‟ created through excess taxation on the Indian population along the lines of the recommendation by the Famine Commission of 1880, was being diverted for other purposes, such as war, and not used for mitigating famine effects and the oppressive conditions of the famine codes. This resolution of the Indian National Congress and its analysis of the famine was supported by William Wedderburn (Banffshire) who lobbied for a full and independent inquiry in the Parliament into the conditions of chronic destitution of the masses which led to excessive mortality in times of famine. Wedderburn‟s passionate appeal to the other parliamentarians for an inquiry in famine did lead to a robust discussion on the Indian famine conditions; and was hotly contested by Secretary of state Hamilton who said that the Congress “resolution is both ungracious and ungrateful” (ibid, p. 534) adding that lack of rain was the main cause of famine and that with the famine codes, they were “much better able to combat the effects of famine now than ever before” (ibid p. 536). Led by Wedderburn, an amendment was put in the house to indict the

116 government over famine and famine fund; however it was defeated (House of Commons, 26th January 1897). Motivated by Wedderburn, the years 1897 -1898 also saw more of such attempts to hold the British government accountable for the famines. Mr Swift Magneill (Donegal S), moved an amendment that the House view famine, plague and pestilence in India with “grave disapproval” (House of Commons, 5th

August 1897 p. 437) and argued that “Much of the money raised for the last famine was appropriated to little wars” (House of Commons, 5th August 1897 p. 439). Although all such amendments were defeated, they did provide an alternative interpretation of famine. In yet another analysis of the Indian famine of 1896-97; Samuel Smith, the MP from Flintshire, spoke about the effects of land taxation and the costs of war waged by Britain on the Afghan borders, the cost of it borne by Indian peasants and its effects on famine. Smith said “It is no exaggeration to say that for every hundred Afghans whom we have slain in this unrighteous war, we have caused a thousand of our native fellow-subjects to perish of want and hunger” (House of Commons, 22nd February 1898 p. 1388).

This critique of British famine responses by the Indian National Congress and by some British Parliamentarians was rejected throughout the debate in Parliament by Secretary of the state Lord Hamilton who maintained:

“There are two theories current as to the cause and origin of this distress. There is a small but active body of propagandists who are never tired of complaining that British rule is bleeding India but that it is the result of persistent over taxation and heavy assessment which has so reduced the condition of the mass of the people, and that they are expiring of inanition. There is another school who maintain a wholly contrary opinion. They assert that from time immemorial famine, due to want of rain, has been a regular and periodical scourge of India, and that under our rule, decade by decade, the effects of famine when it occurs are being narrowed and arrested, not only by the increased resources of the people assailed, but by a systematic and progressive scheme of famine protection which the British Government has created and is continuously improving” (House of Commons, 8th August 1899 pp. 174-175)

Further using the famine commission‟s report of 1896-98 Hamilton told Parliament “That [the]report ... showed that, though here and there a mistake had been made, the campaign as a whole against famine was devised and carried through with prescience, with resource, and with success” (ibid, p. 174). Recalling the civilizing effect of British rule over India, Hamilton, countered Naoroji by following Malthusian theory of poverty:

“We are face to face with the consequences of the long establishment of the pax Britannica. India is the most prolific human nursery in the world. We have removed

117 or restrained all the influences by which in the past this prolific ness has been counteracted. War and Plundering are no longer permitted, and all the energy of modern science and civilisation is devoted to the arresting and stamping out of those epidemic diseases which in the past played such havoc with human life ... It is the one unnatural law of nature that when population rapidly increases, that section in which the increase is quickest is the one nearest to the brink of destitution. I am afraid that this residuum in India is expanding, and will continue rapidly to expand under our rule. We cannot reverse our past humane policy of protection of life, and we must therefore try and see how far we can otherwise ease the new economic and social difficulties we have ourselves created” (House of Commons, 8th

August 1899 pp. 179-180).

Thus Hamilton suggested that it was the humane policies of the British rule, the famine codes and its benevolent rule, that had in fact arrested deaths. The saving of lives, however, led to an increase in the population of India great numbers of which ultimately died in a famine as a result of, a law of nature. This meant that, more than ever before, India needed modern British rule which alone could create new and modern economic opportunities for the Indians to counter famine effects.

At times the Indian social system was blamed for the famine effects. Sir Lewis McIver, an MP from Edinburgh W, suggested that during the famine of 1900 “…savings in good years ... are devoured by the draconic effects of the customary law with reference to marriages and other ceremonies” (House of Commons, 3rd April 1900 pp. 1095-96)

The official colonial discourse of the civilizing impacts of British rule on India, a political justification of Britain‟s rule over India, was a sensitive point in the parliamentary debates, with some sympathetic British Parliamentarians using famine, and inadequate British response to it, as an indicator of the non-substantiality of such claims. Mr Souttar, MP (Dumfriesshire) had stated in one such debate:

“We have vaunted the Government of India; we have said to the nations of the world, “Come and see how Englishmen can govern Orientals,” and it seems to me that the miseries of our fellow-subjects in India to-day touch our honour, and are a blot upon the fair fame of our empire...” (House of Commons, 26th July 1900 pp. 1378-79)

All claims which made British rule accountable for famine effects were put down vehemently by the Secretary of state: for example, at one time, in 1900, Hamilton accused the Nationalists and their supporters in the parliament of “gross libel on the British Government” (House of Commons, 28th May 1900 p. 1576). Also the Famine Commission‟s work effectively absolved the Government of any blame in relation to the

118 famine. Hamilton said “In fact, they [Famine Commissioners] were to take upon themselves as regards relieving distress a higher and wider obligation than was ever undertaken by any civilized Government in Europe” (House of Commons, 26th July 1900 p1356). Davis (2001) suggests that Famine Commission reports were generally used to create a positive impression of the government. My analysis of the British parliamentary debates too supports this view.

The Bengal famine in 1941-43 came at a time when the Indian nationalist struggle was at its peak, with Congress demanding complete independence while British Government offered a dominion status. The famine debates in the parliamentary session on 28th July 1944 also disclosed this political tension. The Malthusian view of famine along with the need for more modern growth was propped up by academics such as Prof A. V Hill of Cambridge University, who in one of the parliamentary debates in support of the official position stated:

“No doubt there are many reasons for the Bengal famine of last year, some of them real and some of them imaginary. Among the imaginary ones are attributing it to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. The fundamental reason for the Bengal famine is that the factor of safety in India is almost zero, and tends to be held there all the time of excessive reproduction. Blame is thrown about for this ... in India it is customary to put the blame on the British (House of Commons, 28th July 1944 p. 1050).

Several other MPs also echoed the Malthusian view of famine, similar to that voiced by Sir Stanley Reed of Aylesbury:

“Much has been said about the famine in Bengal. If time permitted, I could prove conclusively to this House that there has been no famine in Bengal – not in the recognised Indian sense. What has happened is a symptom of the gravest economic problem any country ever had to face in its history – a colossal growth in population, without any corresponding expansion in the food supply” (ibid, p. 1102).

In this parliamentary debate, Lord Amery, the then Secretary of state for India admitted that there were more than 7 million deaths in the Bengal famine, but suggested, that what was needed was “increased efficiency” in the utilisation of India‟s natural resources and the “development of new industries” “without which political independence would be little