FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. The spouses then executed another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Mercedes which contained the condition that the donors, Danlag spouses, shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the donors without their prior consent and approval. Consequently, Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels of land's tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels of land and alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the donation openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and transferred the tax declarations to her name. She also alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses.
In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated to her.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the properties was transferred.
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004 Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated “Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties” in favor of the petitioners. On the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauro’s death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the produce went to his wife. As wife’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners. HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. Where the deed of
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.