57 de sus instintos son peligros, persecuciones y catástrofes, hasta sus propios sentimientos

(i) Independents 1920s–1940s

One noticeable trend from figure 3.1 on the vote for Independents in the early years of the state is the continuous swings in their vote, veering from 11

percent in 1922 to 10 percent in 1923 to 14 percent in June 1927 to 8 percent in September that year, and so on. This pattern of a series of ups and downs continued until 1944, when for the first time Independents managed to increase their vote at consecutive elections. A number of reasons can be hypothesised to account for this topsy-turvy performance. To begin with, because Independents do not have a core identity (that is, they lack a party label), it is difficult for voters to forge a concrete attachment to them. Consequently, unlike parties, Independents do not have a core support level they can rely on, and their vote is often very much a floating vote from electors wishing to register a temporary protest with the political parties, which may explain why it is prone to such swings.

A straightforward reason accounting for the variation in the Independent vote during this period may be related to the number of Independent candidates. Any type of candidate who stands for election is always going to attract a certain number of votes, no matter how minuscule; a change in the number of candidates is therefore likely to affect a change in the vote. The figures from table 3.1 appear to provide some evidence for this hypothesis, since the 42 percent decline in the number of Independent candidates was matched by a 33 percent fall in their total votes across the two 1927 elections; similarly, a 62 percent decline in the number of Independent candidates from 1932 to 1933 was accompanied by a 51 percent fall in their vote. A simple correlation between the number of candidates and vote share for Independents for the period 1927–1944 confirms the strength of this relationship, since it produces a score of r=0.93 (p<0.001). What is interesting is that a correlation between votes and candidates for all elections from 1927 to 2002 produces a far lower correlation coefficient of r=0.39. The difference between this score and the value for the 1927–1944 period indicates that the number of candidates did affect the overall vote for Independents during the early years when there was no established Independent vote, but its significance declined once a certain pattern of Independent voting emerged.

During this same period, there was something of a cyclical pattern about Independents’ electoral performance. At an election after a long Dáil,

Independents usually fared quite well, increasing their vote (and usually their seat) share at every such election within this time-frame. This resulted in difficulties for the main parties in forming a stable government, leading to an early election where Independents lacked the resources to compete, and may also have been punished by an electorate that favoured a stable government. This in turn led to the major parties making gains at such elections, forming a stable government, and hence a long Dáil. This led back to a rise in support for Independents, which re-iterated the cycle.23 Table 3.1 confirms this pattern of events, where Independents prospered at the June 1927 election, fell back at the next election three months later, experienced gains in 1932 and losses in 1933, a pattern that continued until the 1943 election.

Apart from the volatility of this infant stage, there are other factors that account for the prominence of Independents in the early years of the state. Because the new state and party system were still evolving, it was not surprising that there was a large number of unattached deputies who had yet to find their niche (Busteed 1990: 40). The new party system, founded on a division over the Anglo-Irish Treaty that had established the new state, did not cater for all interests, ranging from agrarian to business to Protestant communities, who nominated Independent candidates to represent their views. Both Manning (1972: 85–6) and Chubb (1957: 133) point to the newly adopted electoral system (PR-STV) as a causal factor in the initial success of Independents. They claim the presence of PR, especially the introduction of the multi-seat constituency, encouraged candidates to run and that an over- estimation of its inclusivity (largely based on an ignorance of the workings of the new system) led to ‘an optimistic rush of Independent candidates’ in the early elections (Chubb 1957: 133). However, PR-STV did not prove to be the Pandora’s Box that the parties had feared, and once this was realised, the number of Independent candidates fell to just over 30 in the 1930s, around which figure the average number of candidates hovered until the late 1970s. The causal influence of PR-STV is examined in more detail in later chapters.

23 _{This is adopted from a model used on the Labour Party by Gallagher (1982: 155}

Another explanation for the success of Independents in the early decades of the state is a lack of aversion to these candidates, which deviates from the comparative trend, where Independents are often perceived as eccentrics preaching irresponsible politics (Sharman 2002: 53). Independents were accepted as important contributors to political life in the newly established Irish state, since they could provide an independence of thought and sound judgment in a parliament that was composed of inexperienced politicians, who had little practice in the running of a country. An article from

The Irish Times in 1937 echoed these positive attitudes towards Independents: There is one strong reason why the competent Independent

should be preferred to the equally competent party nominee…Parliamentary records show that Independent deputies have contributed much more than their share to the interest and the constructive value of Dáil debates. Their influence on legislation has consequently been far in excess of their numerical strength. More than once they have succeeded in “leavening the loaf” of discussion, which otherwise would have been flat, stale and lacking in nutriment…the value of deputies who are free from castigations by party whips may be even greater than it has been in the past (Politicus, The Irish Times, 24 June 1937).

Independents were also acceptable because they were a part of the political establishment. Many of them were from the upper echelons of society, largely the business and unionist communities, and the majority of them were ideologically conservative, with almost all the Independent TDs openly supporting Cumann na nGaedheal (in part a reflection of their opposition to Fianna Fáil (Chubb 1957: 134)). When this wave of pro-establishment Independents gradually disappeared in the late 1950s, the vote for Independents declined. They were replaced by a new breed of anti-establishment Independents, who initially fared poorly in elections. However, once they had established a source of support to tap into, this generation carved out an electoral base for Independents in the late 1970s that was far different to the support of the 1920s–1950s period, as they were predominantly left-wing ideological Independents, who openly expressed a dislike for the major parties.

Apart from a blip in the 1930s, the number of Independents elected to the Dáil remained fairly constant from the 1920s until the mid-1950s. After the poor election showing of 1954 when they lost nine seats (largely because eight Independent TDs joined or rejoined parties in the 1951–1954 period (Chubb 1957:133)), Independents recovered somewhat in 1957 to win nine seats, but this redemption proved only temporary, and they fell into long-term decline in the 1960s, not making a significant recovery until the 1990s.

If the 1920s was the decade of the Independent, then the 1960s and 1970s were the decades of the two-and-a-half parties, as Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour consolidated their dominance of political life to such an extent that they won all bar one of the seats at the 1969 election. Manning claimed the decline of Independents was due to the evolution of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as catch-all parties, and the renewed shift of Labour to the left to capture a far- left vote, which was often a source of support for Independents (1972: 86). The latter argument certainly makes a credible point, since the return of Labour to the centre, following its merger with Democratic Left in 1999, has been expounded as a factor in the recent rise of left-wing Independents (Sinnott 2002).

One major reason for the declining fortunes of Independents may have been changes in the electoral rules in the 1950s and 1960s, a premise to which Garvin subscribes (Garvin 1972: 367). Beginning in the 1950s, the large-seat constituencies disappeared, as 3-seat constituencies became ever more commonplace. In theory, the latter magnitude is not favourable to Independents, since the quota of votes needed to guarantee a seat is 25 percent, a substantial challenge for a candidate lacking the attraction of a party label (Chubb 1957: 138). Sacks buys this theory, and claims that the loss of seats for Independent Unionists in the late 1950s and early 1960s was largely due to the creation of 3-seat constituencies in the border constituencies of Donegal and Cavan (where they had previously held seats), which made the electoral quota larger than the number of Protestants in those constituencies (Sacks 1976: 535–

6). While this may well account for the decline in the number of Independent TDs, it does not explain why their vote fell (Carty 1981: 60). Carty says the

reasoning behind such an argument is that once voters realised Independents had less chance of victory, they were less inclined to vote for them (ibid.), which in itself is not a conclusive argument, as it is usually argued that strategic voting is not expected to occur under PR-STV (Bartholdi and Orlin 1991). Gallagher also plays down the influence of boundary changes (known as redistricting in the US), stating that the only possible effect this had on the declining fortunes of Independents was by ‘adversely affecting their ability to win votes rather than by making it harder for them to win seats from a given number of votes’ (1975: 506). Other reasons expounded to explain the fall of Independents in this period include the increasing expense of election campaigns, the inclusion of party labels on the ballot paper, and the change in the media, where the decline in the number of local newspapers and the increasing importance of television made it difficult for Independents to have a ‘competitive presence’ (Carty 1981: 61). The latter argument overestimated the impact of television on Irish elections, as the continued importance of premodern campaigning meant that local mediums, particularly newspapers and radio stations, were still crucial channels of communication for candidates. Since one did not need extensive resources to access these channels, Independents were not at a disadvantage (in comparison to television, for example).

(iii) Independents 1970s –

The final trend of interest is the rise in the number of Independent candidates since the late 1970s, as indicated clearly in figure 3.4. Until 1977, this number had not risen above 30 since the 1943 election, averaging 26 per election, less than 8 percent of the national average number of candidates. However, in 1977 this figure took a significant leap as 52 Independents ran for election, almost 14 percent of the national total. This figure remained relatively steady until it increased again in 1987 to 85, from which point it has continued to rise, apart from the snap election called in 1989, to a level of around 100 candidates and one-fifth of the national total. There is no clear answer as to what caused this rise in Independent activity. In terms of eligibility to run, there was no major

easing of restrictions (which were not severe in the first place), although the required deposit remained fixed at £100, meaning it actually declined in real terms.24 A premise that the public simply became more politically active and were more willing to contest elections does not stand up in light of the declining membership rates for political parties and interest groups (Laver and Marsh 1999: 160). Another reason may be that the type of Independents changed and a new-style candidate emerged, a factor alluded to by Garret FitzGerald, a government minister in the 1970s and Taoiseach in the 1980s.25 A categorisation of Independent candidates, described later in this chapter, indicates that a new type did emerge in the late 1970s – that of community Independents, mobilised on local issues. They tended to win seats outside Dublin (an Independent candidate elected in Dublin in 2002 was the first new Independent TD from the city since 1981), which could be because localism has a stronger presence outside of the capital.

In line with the increasing number of candidates, the number of Independents elected to the Dáil has been steadily increasing since the late 1980s, to the point that 2002 was their best electoral performance since 1951. A number of reasons have been put forward for the resurgence in the Independent vote, but a key factor has been the ‘pork-barrel’ arrangements negotiated by individual Independent TDs with minority administrations. These involve Independents supporting a minority government in the Dáil, in return for which some of the formers’ policy demands for their respective constituencies are met. Two prime examples of such arrangements were the aforementioned ‘Gregory Deal’ of 1982, and the individual deals brokered with the ‘Gang of

24 _{The deposit was trebled in 1997 to £300, but concurrently was made easier for candidates to}

retain, requiring just one-quarter of the quota. Following a court case in 2001 by an individual who claimed that the deposit restricted his ability to run as an Independent, the deposit was deemed unconstitutional and was replaced by the requirement of 30 signatures, which has to be verified by public officials, and which was claimed to be a more expensive and time-consuming process than the £300 deposit (Gallagher 2003: 88-89). This may explain why the number of Independent candidates did not increase radically in 2002 as had been predicted (see Michael

Clifford. 2002. ‘If you want it done properly…’. The Sunday Tribune, 17 March), but actually

fell from its 1997 figure. These rules were again amended for the 2007 election, where Independents have the option of supplying 30 signatures of registered constituency voters, or paying a €500 deposit.

25

Comments made by Garret FitzGerald at a seminar held by Centre for Contemporary Irish History, Trinity College Dublin, 24 January 2007.

Four’ Independents in 1997. The first was a written 30-page document detailing between £150 million and £250 million worth of provisions promised to the Independent TD Tony Gregory for his various pet projects (for details of what this involved see Brennan 1982a; 1982b). The second involved unwritten arrangements with four Independents (initially three). As well as securing funding for their constituencies, they also gained weekly access to the government chief whip. This was more than just a token meeting, as the Independents exerted their influence on two major pieces of legislation, namely an abortion referendum, and the proposed ban on the holding of multiple elective offices (known as the ‘dual mandate’) (for details of these arrangements see O’Connor 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; O’Regan 2000).

While approximately 40 percent of all governments have been dependent upon the support of Independent TDs (see table 3.2), the latter have not always been able to extract ‘pork’ from the ruling parties. The quid pro quo deals struck in the 1980s were the first example of their kind since the 1940s, the last period of sustained electoral success for Independents. The influence wielded by Independent TDs on the minority government formed in 1997 was a major factor in the doubling of the number of Independents elected in 2002, as many of the successful candidates had campaigned on their ability to procure such a deal for their own respective constituency.

Table 3.2. Governments dependent upon the support of Independents, 1922–200226

Government (Taoisigh) Years William T. Cosgrave 1927–30 William T. Cosgrave 1930–2 John A. Costello 1948–51 Éamon de Valera 1951–4 John A. Costello 1954–7 Seán Lemass 1961–5 Garret FitzGerald 1981–2 Charles J. Haughey 1982 Charles J. Haughey 1987–89 Bertie Ahern 1997–2002

Source: The Irish Times; John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds.). 2005. Politics in the Republic of Ireland. London: Routledge in association with PSAI Press.