Instrumentos empleados para la investigación

The inextricable binding of science and politics is demonstrated by the science used by all parties in environmental issues: health scares, genetic science and all other areas in which scientific expertise functions, Science is used to legitimate and

reinforce political decision-making, and also is political in its own right, in terms of the legitimatory claims and the rationality employed to make such claims. In environmental disputes science is used by all parties to lend authority to their particular views. In the case of the Brent Spar, the conflict of such knowledges (Dickens 1996) became a central part of the dispute.

The two major tendencies in the sociology of science - Merton and Kuhn - have not given much attention to environmental science as a subject, and have not provided an adequate framework for the addressing of environmental issues (Buttel and Taylor

1994). But as it is the claim to neutrality and objectivity which lie at the heart of scientific knowledge claims about the nature of environmental problems and

recommended solutions, the politics of the environment are tied to scientific authority (Yearley 1995), which is itself a political construct. As Harwood (1984) remarks “Precisely because it seems so unpolitical, science has long been extremely attractive to those engaged in political combat (Harwood 1984 :50). Ezrahi (1971) urges a deeper understanding of science as a political phenomenon and, although there is cognisance of science as a political phenomenon, it is the conjunction of scientific knowledge, power and ideology that present a more comprehensive picture of science as politics.

Shapin (1979), using the case study of the Edinburgh phrenology disputes,

articulates a sociological theory for knowledge construction. But although knowledge is generated by people in the pursuance of some interest (Barnes 1977), this

(1979) study knowledge production is linked to political interests, although Shapin (1979:146) does not lay great emphasis on whether these interests are of a long or short term nature. The socio-political construction of science in environmental issues has been addressed directly (Atkinson 1991, Eder 1996, Dickens 1996, Vogel 1996, Yearley 1989,1991,1992,1995,1996) and of^en within the framework of the public understanding of science (Irwin 1995, Wynne 1982,1992,1994), and from a more general environmental perspective, for example in the work of Dickens (1992), Bckersley (1995), and Pepper (1984,1996). Elzinga and Jamison (1995:588) argue that the “The social movements that arose in the 1960’s - anti-war, student and environmental movements - led to what might be termed a repoliticisation of science”, a position also taken up in the work of Rose and Rose (1976). But it is arguable that science has always been politiçal, and it is not so much that science has become more political since the 1960’s, but that its authority has been increasingly enlisted by all sides of political debate.

In the view of Cozzens and Woodhouse (1995:551) “A major accomplishment of STS [science and technology studies] is to show that scientific practice is inherently political, because scientists help define a large part of what is taken for granted by billions of people - a type of influence that in some respects is the ultimate form of authority”. But the political nature of sciençe is not in its impact alone, it is deeply rooted in the history, philosophy and sociology of the scientific project.

To examine the inter relationship between science and politics, common frameworks need to be established. Ezrahi (1974:216) defines science for this

purpose in general terms, but within the public domainj: “In the context of politics it is primarily the attitudes and the perceptions of the lay public which count”. Ezrahi (1974: 223) sees the social authority and the political uses of science as based on the ‘social visibility’ of science in terms of the lay perceptions and the public image of science. “Scientific truths and theories have no presence in the public domain without

some form of social and institutional “articulation” Consequently, in a democracy, the authority of scientists, like the authority of statesmen or bureaucrats, though in fact it may be discretionary, may rest on the ability to sustain the fiction that its roots lie in public consensus or participation”. Yet this view negates the different and special authority of science over politics or bureaucracy (Wynne 1992, Wynne and Mayer 1993) in terms of the neutrality and authority it confers upon statements within environmental debate between environmental organisations and industry and the state. It also implies that science gains its authority and ‘truth’ status within democratic frameworks, or potentially democratic frameworks.

Cozzens and Woodhouse (1995:534) argue that research knowledge is a product of politics, dominated by the structure of the funding system and the relationships within it: “Because most research is supported with government funding, distributed through agencies established and maintained through political negotiation, the balance of knowledge among fields is a political produpt.... the assumptions and worldviews of science are shaped by expectations conveyed through the funding system and by the access it allows to various social groups”. This view conforms to many of the studies of science within the military/industrial context, where public access is at best limited, and usually non-existent (Dickson 1988, Gioyn 1983, Dobson 1990, Aronowitz

1988).

Although Ezrahi (1971) acknowledges that the political significance of science is not fully understood, his analysis does not fplly appreciate the co-productive nature of the relationship between science and politics — “both scholars and government officials reftain from examining the overall relationship between science and government, and thus public understanding is thwarted” (Cozzens and Woodhouse

1995:534). Don K Price’s (1967) analysis of the “scientific estate” views science as a major factor in politics, although the analysis is flawed in its acceptance of scientific

‘truth’, which when proved to be controversial is treated as normal political functioning (Dickson 1988, Cozzens and Wpodhouse 1995).

Science is the major source of cognitive authority in Western culture, but each different conception of science (in terms of (he modification and recombination of knowledge) implies a different foundation for the credibility and authority of science

(Barnes and Edge 1982:3). This perspective gives prominence to the relationship between science and the wider culture within which science is practised. Barnes and Edge (1982) see science as the main source pf authority in modem society. This situation has implications not only for the Western tradition in which science developed, but also for societies with different cultural bases. As Barnes and Edge (1982) point out “science is primarily a source of knowledge and competence: it is a repository of theories, findings, procedures (ind techniques which it makes generally available both directly, via expert interventipn and consultation, and indirectly, via its interaction with technology and with specialised institutions in the economic and political structure it is required also to evaluate the knowledge-claims and putative competencies of those situated beyond its boundaries. Indeed, in modem societies, science is near to being the source of cognitive authority: anyone who would be widely believed and tmsted as an interpreter of nature needs a licence from the scientific community” (Bames and Edge 1982 :2).

In this aspect science conforms to Weber’s (1964:328) concept of a legal-rational basis of authority. Yearley (1988) expresse? the view that scientific knowledge

should be regarded as socially constructed, and that questions as to the authority of science can be approached in much the same way as questions about the standing of particular knowledge claims, using the analpgy of a social movement. Yearley (1988) argues that science can be viewed as a social movement “science, as a way of gaining knowledge about the natural world, has developed as a social movement. Its

(Yearley 1988:64). This argument rests on the idea of science being an organisation set up to pursue certain objectives, which h^s an ideology to maintain, to encourage solidarity and to promote the goals of the organisation (Gieryn 1983). Yearley

(1988:66) further argues that “the historical success of the social movement of science has had a threefold basis: its conceptual vitality, the flexibility of its institutional and (professional) ideological resources, and its adaptability to a variety of legitimatory roles”, but maintains that “scientists’ professional ideology and organizational arrangements do not stem from the ‘essence’ of science” (Yearley 1988:60). This reference to the ‘essence’ of science could imply a mystification at the core of scientific knowledge, such an ‘essence’ being concerned with ideas of truth,

rationality and progress in science. This positivist outlook would seem to be at odds with a socially negotiated characterisation of science. Given that “cognitive authority and political authority are inextricably intertwined” (Bames and Edge 1982:9) the processes by which scientific authority gains and maintains its status must be analysed, along with how such processes are related, visibly or invisibly, to political processes.