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A superior strategic and tactical ability is not restricted to insurgency. It is in fact one of the most fundamental aspects of warfare regardless of what form that engagement takes. In an insurgency, however, when the insurgent is fighting an opposing force with superior technology, numbers and resources, the ability of its commanders to tactically out-think, their opponent takes on even more fundamental importance. This is because the stronger side can often afford to absorb mistakes that could ultimately be devastating to the weaker side. This is a lesson learnt as early as AD66 when an attempt by a Jewish force to retake Jerusalem from a superior resourced Roman force failed.1 This superior tactical element is what a great insurgent military leader excels at and what develops into legends.

Every nation is different. Its individual culture, beliefs and methods are shaped and developed by its history. A nation’s military is no exception. It is shaped by its past battles and its nation’s individual threats and Western and European militaries have been molded as a direct result of their enemies’ capabilities. For the United States, this has essentially led to its fighting forces’ doctrine being based on its resource and technological advantages in an open theatre and characterised by an inherent over- confidence which can border on arrogance when faced with an irregular force.

1

“Conventional training, tradition and a reliance on technology have often combined to produce a false sense of security and a dangerous tendency to denigrate the enemy’s capabilities.”2 This attitude was aptly illustrated by the Russian General Alexei Yermolov, who led the Russian forces in the early 1800’s against Chechnya.3 Yermolov’s underestimation of the Chechens as fighters was only equaled by his belief in his own talents as a commander.4 This arrogance only served to harden the resolve of the Chechen people against their Russian invaders and lead directly to the emergence of a more radicalised population. This doctrine, combined with over-confidence and a lack of understanding of irregular warfare, has continued to create a dilemma for stronger forces and is one which, even today, the stronger force has failed to solve.

Insurgent force commanders and their soldiers live in the environment in which they fight. They know the country extremely well and will utilise the natural advantages provided by the land. These advantages include aspects such as the weather. By reading local conditions far more accurately than a military meteorologist, an insurgent force’s tactician can use local knowledge to plan the force’s next move. This can, for example, lead to moves such as a sudden push for the mountains, which may draw an enemy force in only to find that the weather has turned and their escape route has been cut off by rising rivers.5

2

Howard. R. Simpson, Dien Bien Phu:The Epic Battle America Forgot, Brassey’s, Washington, 1994, p. xix.

3

Gall & de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, p. 39.

4

John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998,p. 14.

5

Stasys Knezys & Romanas Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1999, p. 155.

The terrain also provides a good tactician with opportunities to gain the advantage on the battlefield. Mountains and rivers are used as a means to escape quickly or pull an enemy force into a prepared kill zone as was seen in 1722 when Peter the Great’s forces were pushed back against the banks of the Aktash River and destroyed by local Chechen men.6 The Chechens guerrilla skills continued to cause Russian forces problems in more modern times. When in the 1990’s the Chechen rebels were forced by the Russians back to the mountains, the Chechens used the forests to their advantage forcing the Russian troops into spaces which negated Russians technological advantages.7

This situation had previously occurred in Indochina, where the Viet Minh used vegetation in different ways to negate French technological advantages.8 This was one of the primary reasons that French air interdiction operations failed to rupture the Viet Minh’s lines of communication.9 Many of these countries have little in the way of accurate maps and this can place a foreign soldier at a distinct disadvantage while they are still familiarising themselves with the area. There will be many small enclaves and escarpments which may well not be present on a map. This results in the local insurgent force utilising them to trap an enemy force which has been encouraged to chase down an apparently fleeing rebel force. A great insurgent tactician will use every means at his disposal to minimise his own force’s weaknesses while simultaneously exploiting the

6

John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 7.

7

Gall & de Waal; Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, p. 44.

8

Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 322.

9

enemy’s weakness. This is where legends are made.