Through the 18th century the questions about the source and content of morality were the main concern of moral philosophers. Explanations for what constituted a good life and a good person and how it could be achieved varied from one philosophical school to the next. How-ever, there was one question which kept coming up and on which one school after another had to pass: How can self-interested people be motivated to do the right thing? Why should one act justly, if one could gain more by an unjust action?31 Plato had been convinced that once people had really understood virtue they would automatically act virtuously—an as-sumption which later philosophers very much questioned—however, without being able to provide a satisfactory answer either. John Butler, for example, had introduced the notion of
30 Naturally, this differentiation was only applied to text by the author of this dissertation, not to quotes from other sources.
31 On first sight, this question seems pertinent especially in an individualistic culture. However, it applies equally to collectivistic cultures. The only difference is the point of reference: Whereas in an individualistic culture the reference point is the individual as against “the other”, in a collectivistic culture it would be the in-group as opposed to an out-group.
conscience. But he could not explain why people would want to follow their conscience if they could see that by doing so they would curtail their own happiness—a hard question indeed if one has proclaimed the attainment of happiness to be the ultimate goal of a moral life. Similarly to Butler, Sidgwick, an influential utilitarian, had to contend in the end that he had not found an answer to the question how utilitarianism and egoism could be reconciled—
over and over again moral philosophy came to a point of inertia in relation to this question.
This is an aspect which needs to be kept in mind as one considers the ethical claims of TRANS
-FORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP.
Even though theological ethics and general moral philosophy were close companions for several hundred years and have influenced each other, in terms of its foundations, theologi-cal ethics needs to be distinguished from moral philosophy. Schockenhoff defines Christian ethics as:
a theory of human behaviour under the claim of the Gospel. [Theological ethics] investigates a good life and right actions from the perspective of the Christian faith, and considers the implications for such life and action as resulting from the fact that the questions about their ultimate goal will be answered in the light of a specific concept of human fullfillment, a concept based on biblical revelation. (Schockenhoff 2007:19–20)32
Because this concept places the personality of God as described in the Bible and the prin-ciples God defined at the core of ethical thinking, and because this biblical concept is also not identical with the understandings of other schools of moral philosophy of what constitutes happiness (see Mt 5:3–12), theological ethics will necessarily be experienced as a critical counterpart for secular moral philosophy.33
Any ethical system is heavily influenced by the cultural background in which it develops.
In the case of Christian ethics there was clearly a strong hellenistic influence. Nevertheless, the roots are found in a Hebrew understanding of ethics, an understanding where happiness was a result of living in the covenant Yahweh made with a whole people group. The New Testament gave early Christians a deepened understanding of the character of this God:
1 John 4:16 formulates it very simply as “God is love”—God as the prototype of morality
32 Original: “[Theologische Ethik] versteht sich als eine Theorie der menschlichen Lebensführung unter dem Anspruch des Evangeliums. Sie fragt nach dem guten Leben und richtigen Handeln in der Perspektive des christlichen Glaubens und bedenkt die Konsequenzen für dieses Leben und Handeln, die sich daraus ergeben, dass die Frage nach seinem letzten Ziel im Lichte einer bestimmten, nämlich einer der biblischen Offenbarung entnommenen Vorstellung menschlicher Erfüllung beantwortet wird.”
(Schockenhoff 2007:19–20)
33 Chris Wright compares the Biblical account of reality with postmodern thinking and finds many areas where they would conform. But then he indicates the point where the two part, which is in the Bible’s
“insistence that through all this variety, locality, particularity and diversity, the Bible is nevertheless actually the story. This is the way it is. This is the grand narrative that constitutes truth for all” (Wright 2006:47). Both the decision for as well as the decision against the acceptance of such a reality is a decision based on faith.
(Bruce 1909:38, quoted in Schirrmacher 2011b:27), as someone who in the very essence is a moral Being.
Such a claim as equalling God with love is only possible on the premise of the trinity, because the concept of love presupposes relationship (Nullens & Michener 2010:154ff; Schirr-macher 2011b:34, 200). The triune God does not need creation to give or receive love. Jesus, as part of the trinity refers to this when he prays: “Father, I want those you have given me to be with me where I am, and to see my glory, the glory you have given me because you loved me before the creation of the world” (Jn 17:24; emphasis EM).
In terms of the relationship with the created world, God’s character of being love shows itself in passionate concern:
for justice (Ex 23:1–3; Dtn 24:14,17; Isa 10:1–2; Jer 9:6–8; Amos 1:3);
for the care of the weak, the abandoned, or strangers (Ex 23:9; Amos 2:6; 3:9; 4:1–2;
8:4–7; Jer 7:5–6);
for mercy (Ex 22:22–26; Jer 9:23; Mt 18:23–35);
for the wellbeing of creation and human life (Ex 23:4–5; Dtn 28:2; Isa 35:4–7;
Hos 11:12);
for reconciliation and restoration (Is 48:17–18; Prov 16:7).34
The fact that God’s passion for these things needed to be formulated shows that human life does not happen in a perfect world. Theological ethics takes the fallenness of human nature into account, which “goes deeper than the ethical concept of lack of virtue or the legal concept of crime” (Kretzschmar 2009:29), because it indicates separation from God—the re-sult of which is the desire of human beings for personal gain even to the detriment of others, which is at the root of many of the immoral situations that can be observed even today. But it is the strength of theological ethics that it also counts on God’s answer to the fallenness of human nature: redemption made possible through the death and resurrection of Jesus, and the resulting possibility of profound change (see section 2.3.5.3 for a further development of this thought). Through the indwelling of God’s Spirit a believer would be enabled to follow God’s example of love.
Love can only command whoever can awaken it. It is something bestowed before it is commanded. It is an offering before it becomes a task, it is given before it is demanded. Because love only develops out of love, it is always requited love. Therefore it can only be a gift of the creator, an echo of the
34 It will be noted that some of the passages quoted refer to several of these points. It is difficult to separate them neatly into distinct categories—which is not surprising, because they are expressions of the unified character of God.
creator’s love, which—as the creator’s love—in itself is creative.
(Lütgert 1938:30; quoted in Schirrmacher 2011b:201)35
It is important to note that the difference between secular moral philosophy and Chris-tian ethics does not originate in the areas of normative ethics or even applied ethics; it is in the basic convictions about the foundation of morality where the distinction between the two is to be found today, and it is indeed a very distinct foundation! According to Bonhoeffer, “the source of a Christian ethic is not the reality of one’s own self, not the reality of the world, nor is it the reality of norms and values. It is the reality of God that is revealed in Jesus Christ”
(Bonhoeffer, Floyd & Green 2008:49).36
Such a starting point in the person and character of God has profound effects on many aspects of normative ethics: “Of ultimate importance, then, is not that I become good, or that the condition of the world be improved by my efforts, but that the reality of God show itself everywhere to be the ultimate reality” (:47–48).37 The question which Christian leadership therefore needs to ask of TRANSFORMING and TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP is: Do the princi-ples and methods promoted by these leadership methods contribute to the manifestation of this reality of God in a leader’s sphere of influence?