INTERCAMBIABILIDAD Y SISTEMAS DE AJUSTES Y TOLERANCIAS

Basically, their relations seem to divide into four types.

The First was the so-called "chummy brothers" type (geliahao), as workers describe

it. Close personal ties had traditionally existed between party secretaries and directors and

this provided room for continued effective cooperation and mutual support in their plants.

When disagreements arise, they are able to sit down and talk it over. Generally speaking,

their friendship guarantees a workable division of labour between them. That is, directors

actively counsel party secretaries before making any major decisions and the latter help

100 For the official view and regulations, see Wu Zhiqing, Xing shiqi qiye dangde jianshe (Party building in the new era), pp. 178-184. My analysis is based mainly on my field-work findings o f 1991 and 1992. Since the promulgation of the State Council's Regulation on Changing the Operational Mech­ anisms o f State Enterprises in July 1992, many of these requirements have been revoked, according to my interviews in China in late 1992. However, I have not come across an official document that specifies the changes.

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clear the way for implementation. The key to such a smooth relationship is personal rather than institutional. The following case describes how a good party secretary/m anager relationship works.

At Beijing Wool Textile Plant, party secretary Zhang Yuhe and manager Zhou Wen- kai were personal friends, allowing them to tackle difficult issues together in both manage­ ment and party work. For instance, in early 1989 the problem of labour shortage on the production lines became so acute that the fulfilment of production plans was threatened. The basic reason for this was that, while work was much harder on the lines, workers were paid lower compared with the supply and management staff. The secretary and manager decided that the only way to solve the problem was to raise the wages of the line workers. When the decision was announced, the supply and management staff became agitated. With the manager busy with other management affairs, Secretary Zhang ventured to bite the bull­ et by takinAt Beijing Wool Textile Plant, party secretary Zhang Yuhe and manager Zhou Wenkai were personal friends, allowing them to tackle difficult issues togg charge of the controversy, which would otherwise fall to the responsibility of the manager. In a short period of time he convened more than a dozen meetings of party members in the supply and management sections. By combining ideological pressure, party discipline and personal appeals to activists, resistance was finally overcome and the new wage package got implemented. As a result the line workers raised production.

M anager Zhu, for his part, gave a green light to conducting party activities during work hours. He also tried to raise the pay scales of party and political cadres, which were generally a bit lower than management staff. Channels for discussing production matters were extended to party committee members, to enlist party organizational support for his plans. All this was conducive to the unity of the two systems. In fact this benefited the two systems generously. The party branch in the factory was promoted as a model in Beijing's textile industry, because it "cultivated" enough party activities to meet one of the criteria for party cadres' promotion. On the managers' side, good relations with the party personnel

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can help guarantee smooth running of their production agenda, which also serves to advertise the ability of the manager in the eyes of both their superiors and workers. 101

The second type of manager/party branch relationship involves one power centre dominating the other. The major feature of this type is the overriding authority of one central figure, be it the director or party secretary, in controlling the agenda of both party affairs and management. The varied strength of their clientelist networks can imposes an asymmetry of power in the contention. Traditionally managers were groomed by party secretaries and subject to their control. Since the end of the party command system, and as many of these secretaries were retired, the balance of power has been moving towards managers. Yet the transition is far from complete, and a lot of party secretaries can still wield considerable power over managers.

A typical example of this type is the Capital Iron and Steel Corporation of Beijing. Officially the corporation is one of a small number of factories still practicing the 'director responsibility system under the leadership of the party committee'. However, overall pow­ er is concentrated in the hands of general manager Zhu Guanwu. The party secretary acts only as his assistant in charge of the party system within the corporation. But Zhu Guanwu rose to the status of indisputable authority through the party ladder. He preferred to keep the party command system largely intact because he, as a party leader for a long time, recognized that an effective managing mechanism lies in the party's organizational network, provided that he could firmly control the organization. 102 Yet there is a qualitative differ­ ence between the current party command system and that exercised before reform. Above the party committee there now sits another powerful committee called the corporation managing committee, something similar to a board of trustees. Most important issues are discussed first in this committee, with Manager Zhu as chair. Although the party secretary

101 This account was published in Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 10, 1992, pp. 27-28. I followed the case by visiting the factory in late November 1992 and found the story basically true, although the account given here also mixes in my personal findings.

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sits on the committee, all he can do, essentially, is to vote for whatever has been decided by