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According to Lamarque & Olsen (1994) “speaking metaphorically, engaging in the practice involves utterances governed by constitutive rules” (363). What are constitutive rules that govern certain practices and speech acts? Let us consider how two philosophers, Searle (1969) and Williamson (1996, 2000), who think that speech acts like assertions are governed by constitutive rules, describe what constitutive rules are. Searle (1969) draws a distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. The crucial difference between them is that: “Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules” (p. 34). Rules of etiquette, for instance, are regulative rules which govern interpersonal relationships and where these relationships exist antecedently of the rules. The rules of games like football and chess are constitutive rules for they create the possibility of playing such games; the rules constitute the playing of those games.

Searle emphasized two features of constitutive rules: one, they “create the possibility of new forms of behaviour” (p.35) and two, they “often have the form: X counts as Y in context C” (p. 35). On the first feature, he explains that for constitutive rules, “behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if the rule or rules did not exist” (p. 35). For instance, ‘they played football’ and ‘he hit a home run’ are specifications which could not be given without constitutive rules. In contrast with regulative rules, specifications like ‘he wore a tie at dinner’ could be given whether or not any rules requiring the wearing of ties existed at all. The second feature – the form, X counts as Y – Searle explains, is not intended as a “formal criterion” for distinguishing constitutive rules from regulative ones since any regulative rule can be “twisted” to take that form. But where the rule is

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framed that way and the Y term is a specification then the rule is constitutive. In the case of games, acting in accordance with an individual rule like just having twenty-two players on a field may not count as playing football but acting in accordance with a system of rules governing the game will count as playing football.

Given these characterizations of constitutive rules by Searle, could we say that speaking metaphorically is governed by constitutive rules? And that the constitutive rule is that of invitation and a task undertaking? In the first place, it does not seem right that engaging in the practice of speaking metaphorically is logically dependent on any rules or the rule of invitation for that matter. The invitation to see one thing as another does not constitute the act of speaking metaphorically. For, in the case of soliloquies, one can speak metaphorically without inviting any one to do anything. Speaking metaphorically, or engaging in that practice, is not dependent on the rule of invitation, and it is not dependent on any set of rules. Possibly, we can assume that the aim of invitation regulates the use of metaphors but then this will cease to be constitutive of that practice. In the second place, we can provide specifications and descriptions for metaphors independently of any rules that could constitute the practice. We can give specification for ‘he spoke metaphorically’, ‘he used a metaphor’, or even for metaphors like ‘Juliet is the sun’ even if there are no rules for speaking and using metaphors.

Davidson’s (1979) suggestion that “understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules” (p. 29) is very apt here. And Taylor (2016) has asked us to take seriously the creative or ‘figuring dimension’ of language use by which metaphors are employed. For him, a metaphor constitutes the figuring of one object through another object that creates a tension between the two objects, but the tension also yields certain insights the grasp of which contributes to the “information-bearing function” (p. 140) of

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language and our articulation of linguistic expressions. The creative dimension of metaphors that Davidson (1979), Black (1955, 1962, 1993) Taylor (2016) and others emphasize suggests that metaphors, the creation of metaphors, and the comprehension of metaphors cannot be reduced to certain constitutive or regulative rules. For the positing of constitutive rules governing a practice takes away the creativity on the part of speakers in making novel and ad hoc acts within that practice. The creative aspect of metaphors and the making of novel metaphors, count against any rules that might be thought to be essential to metaphors.

Now, to Williamson’s characterization of constitutive rules in his discussion of assertions: According to Williamson, a rule or norm will count as constitutive of an act only if it is essential to that act: “necessarily, the rule governs every performance of the act” (1996, p. 490). For the speech act of assertion, Williamson provides this schema of constitutive rules, where ‘P’ is a schematic sentence letter and ‘C(P)’ expresses a condition:

The C(P) rule One must: assert that P only if C(P).

Williamson explains that the imperative ‘must’ expresses the kind of obligation characteristic of constitutive rules. Of importance to our discussion here are the features of constitutive rules. Firstly, according to Williamson, constitutive rules are not conventions. “If it is a convention that one must , then it is contingent that one must ; conventions are arbitrary and can be replaced by alternative conventions. In contrast, if it is a constitutive rule that one must , then it is necessary that one must ” (p. 490). Secondly, the rule must be simple and singular, that is, it should say that there is exactly one norm for the act (in his case, assertion). Third, and most crucially, the constitutive rule must be individuating, that is, necessarily, assertion must be the unique speech act that has the rule as its unique constitutive rule.

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The analogue of Williamson’s schema for the speech act of metaphoring will be something like:

The C(P) rule One must: metaphor P only if C(P).

And for the Invitational Account, where the constitutive rule is the invitation to do something we get:

The invitation rule One must: metaphor P only if by P one (intends to) issue(s) an invitation for her audience to see one thing as another thing.

There are many invitations that are not metaphorical, but if one is to speak metaphorically, then one necessarily performs an act, and only the act, of invitation. Is the invitation rule individuating of metaphorical utterances or speaking metaphorically? Certainly not! A simile, an oxymoron, a proverb, and other literal cognitive phenomena like conjectures, comparisons, and analogies or even the literal statement ‘I invite you to explore one thing as another’ can invite hearers to do something by exploring certain comparisons. It is not unique to metaphors or the speech act of metaphoring to invite the audience to undertake certain actions.

Is the rule simple and singular? The intention to invite others cannot be the singular norm or aim for speaking metaphorically. This is so for one good reason: violation or breach of a constitutive rule and the accompanying criticisms and penalties for violation. Williamson (1996, 2000) and others who posit norms for assertions (Weiner 2005, 2007; Lackey 2007) agree that when one breaks a rule of a game or a rule of a language or a rule of a speech act, one does not thereby cease to be playing the game, or be speaking that language, or be performing the speech act respectively. However, one is subject to certain criticisms and penalties because of the constitutive nature of the rules governing those acts. One who employs a metaphor without intending to invite others to do something will succeed in speaking metaphorically. However, we cannot conceive of the use of a metaphor without the accompanying intention as a breach or

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violation of speaking metaphorically. And there seem not to be any criticisms and penalties that we can charge the one who violates the invitational norm. This is basically because the invitational rule is not the singular rule for characterizing the act of speaking metaphorically. Speaking metaphorically is governed by variable norms and rules, none of which is constitutive of the act, and hence the violation of any of those norms does not warrant criticisms and penalties.68 _{Another reason too is that mastery of the use of metaphors or the mode of speaking}

metaphorically is independent of knowledge of any particular norm or rule that is supposed to constitute the act of speaking metaphorically. Indeed, mastery of the use of language itself presupposes mastery of using certain linguistic expressions literally and non-literally, and there are no norms or rules for intending to use literal or metaphorical expressions; there are no rules constituting literal uses of language just as there are no rules constituting metaphorical uses of language. A speaker may be driven by certain aims and purposes in deciding to use one mode of speech and not the other but this does not suggest that in employing the metaphorical mode of speech one is acting in accordance with certain constitutive norms.

We can safely conclude from the above that:

1. Speakers have variable aims, intentions, and purposes that accompany their speech acts whether such speech acts are employed metaphorically or literally. There is no distinct aim for speaking literally just as there is no distinct aim for speaking metaphorically. 2. When speakers speak metaphorically they may intend by their metaphors to inform their

audience about something, or invite their audience to do something, or state that

68 _{For instance, in the metaphorical sentence “philosophy is a noble lady, partaking of the divine essence by a kind}

of eternal marriage” one could say that the maker of the metaphor is issuing forth an invitation for others to do something, perhaps, to see philosophy as a noble lady. However, in saying that “true it is that Death’s face seems stern and cold, when he is sent to summon those we love” the maker of the metaphor cannot plausibly be said to have intended to invite others to do something. Similarly, in saying that “if we put on the whole armour of righteousness, we shall be less likely to yield to the allurements of sin”, the speaker is n ot committed to inviting others to do something – to see one thing as another thing.

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something is the case. In stating that something is the case, or informing their audience about something, or inviting their audience to do something, they can simultaneously be persuading, encouraging their audience. None of these acts constitute the making of metaphors.