Interpretación de los hallazgos de la subcategoría evaluación

FACTS:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western

Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more

information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.” HELD:

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.” The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid

in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self- preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-and- frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was

“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

WARRANTLESS ARREST cases:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

(SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL POWER; ESTOPPEL.

FACTS:

ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND ATTY. ABELLA, PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986 SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING THE RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT SIGNED BY ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS.

ISSUE:

IS THEIR ORDER VALID? RULING:

NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE PEÑA,[1][17] THE COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PCGG AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASI- JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE EXERCISE OF SUCH FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES OR SUBORDINATES OR TASK FORCES BECAUSE OF THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED.

PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF HER OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SAME. BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE VALIDATED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF

ESTOPPEL. FOR THE SAME REASON, THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT PETITIONER’S VIEW THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG. BEING VOID, THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT.

RULING OF THE COURT: The Court’s Ruling

Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing “of a prima facie case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2.[2][11] When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case, the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.[3] [12]

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v. PCGG,[4][13] the Court held that a prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required. The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an incident to its investigatory powers. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact. [5][14]

Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The Republic presented no evidence before the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant such a prima facie finding. Parenthetically, the Republic’s supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth,” and how former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of

the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered – whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten – should be necessary.

The issue in this case is not new. The facts are substantially identical to those in the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island Resort, Inc.).[6][15] There, the same Atty. Ramirez issued a sequestration order on April 14, 1986 against Dio Island Resort, Inc. and all its assets and properties which were thought to be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. Alerted by a challenge to his action, the PCGG passed a resolution “to confirm, ratify and adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration” that Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued “to remove any doubt as to the validity and enforceability” of their writs. Still, the Court struck them down as void:

It is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or freeze order be validly issued by one not a Commissioner of the PCGG.

The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. x x x

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio Island Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued is still void since PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and subordinates, and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective.

Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is the sole entity primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. x x x The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a property alleged to be ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced, the PCGG clearly has to

use its own judgment in determining the existence of a prima facie case.

The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed non-existent, as though it had never been issued,

The Court is maintaining its above ruling in this case.

Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18, 1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial following our above ruling.

In PCGG v. Judge Peña,[8][17] the Court held that the powers, functions and duties of the PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the well established principle that judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated.

It is the Republic’s theory of course that Commissioner Daza’s letter, directing Attys. Ramirez and Abella to search and sequester all properties, documents, money and other assets of respondents, should be considered as the writ of sequestration while the order issued by Attys. Ramirez and Abella should be treated merely as an implementing order. But the letter did not have the tenor of a sequestration order covering specific properties that the lawyers were ordered to seize and hold for the PCGG. Actually, that letter is of the same kind issued to Attys. Ramirez and Abella in Dio Island Resort. Consequently, there is no reason to depart from the Court’s ruling in the latter case where it said:

The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty.

Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. Thus, the respondent Court noted:

Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, nothing exists to support its contention that the Task Force had been given prior authority to place DIO under PCGG control. On the contrary, as the text of the above letters clearly show, Attys. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, had acted on broad and non-specific powers: ‘By authority of the commission and the powers vested in it. x x x.’”[9][18]

Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. Marcos should be deemed estopped from questioning the sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her actions in regard to the same. But a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. For the same reason, the Court cannot accept petitioner’s view that Mrs. Marcos should have first sought the lifting of the sequestration order through a motion to quash filed with the PCGG. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

Besides, the lifting of the sequestration order will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since it does not follow from such lifting that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten wealth. Such lifting simply means that the government may not act as conservator or may not exercise administrative or housekeeping powers over the property.[10] [19] Indeed, the Republic can be protected by a notice of lis pendens.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged resolutions of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan dated February 28, 2002 and August 28, 2002 in Civil Case 0002, which granted respondent Imelda R. Marcos’ Motion to Quash the March 18, 1986 Sequestration Order covering the Olot Resthouse.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Register of Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the

Republic of the Philippines’ claim over the same in Civil Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PADILLA V. CA 129 S 558 (1990)

Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition¬er's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished.

Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist. Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action. However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be established; (2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal.

PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO

234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994 Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine

and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE JUDGE

cases:

PEOPLE v. TEE

"rights of the accused to speedy trial"