La Interpretación de las formas simbólicas (gif, sticker, emoji) desde el contexto

Sweden has a high rate of lone parenting, cohabitation and divorce rates, with over half of children born outside marriage. Nearly a quarter (23 per cent) of children live in lone parent families (OECD, 2005, p.18). Over a quarter (26 per cent) of lone parents are men, a far greater proportion than in other OECD countries. The lone parent employment rate is above 80 per cent, sustained in part by a generous system of parental leave and extensive and high-quality childcare provision. Unemployed lone parents also have access to employment services and labour market programmes. The poverty rate among non-employed Swedish lone parent families is 34 per cent; half of the comparable rate in the UK (OECD, 2005, p.135).

There are parallel systems of income support for working-age people, including lone parents, without jobs or other adequate sources of income. Earnings-related social insurance benefits cover those who have paid enough qualifying contributions, covering risks associated with unemployment and ill-health or disability. For those who do not qualify or who exhaust their insurance entitlement, there is a ‘safety net’ social assistance system delivered by local municipalities.

5.5.1 Employment assistance and labour market programmes Sweden invests heavily in active labour market programmes. Such programmes have played a major role in the system since the 1950s and, while open to voluntary participants, there is a long standing ‘reciprocal obligation’ principle whereby at a specified point the long term and young unemployed, including eligible lone parents, are obliged to participate. Once an insured unemployed person enters mandatory ‘activation’ programmes they continue within the system until they Lone parent work-related requirements in the US, Australia, Sweden and the Netherlands

either get a job or otherwise leave the system, albeit the intensity of provision will vary. There has been little emphasis on sanctions in the Swedish system, with the OECD recommending that ‘more should be done to enforce requirements for active jobsearch and participation, supported by moderate sanctions’

(2007b, p.6).

The Swedish model was highly successful until the recession of the 1990s, after which the unemployment rate counted by the government increased to 8.2 per cent, with another 6.2 per cent of the working-age population on employment programmes (Köhler et. al., 2008). There was intense debate about the effectiveness of the system and of individual programmes within it, and there has since been a continuous process of reform. In 2007, a new Government introduced further reform designed to create a ‘work first’ system (Littorin, 2008). This has involved changes to social insurance contribution and eligibility rules and a reduction in the level of out of work benefits. There has also been a reorganisation of the public employment service, where ‘coaches’ are now expected to develop individual action plans and place more people into jobs. Young people (aged between 20 and 25 years) are covered by a Job Guarantee for Youth, and the long-term unemployed are covered by a Job and Development Guarantee.

When unemployment increased in the 1990s the number of working-age people claiming social assistance also increased, partly because eligibility rules for social insurance were tightened. This increase was made up largely of young unemployed people, new migrant families from non-European countries, and lone parents (Dahlberg et. al., 2008, p.7).

The social assistance system had a long standing ‘availability for work’ requirement that municipalities could apply but few made use of it in the full employment era. As unemployment and caseloads increased, municipalities began to tighten their eligibility rules and introduce ‘activation’ requirements. In 1998, national legislation clarified the law – making it possible for municipalities to require working-age recipients to participate in work-related activities and to determine and apply appropriate sanctions. In 2002 it was estimated that there were some 800 municipal activation programmes, with 13,000 participants covering, at that point, about 12 per cent of social assistance recipients (Thorén, 2005, p.6).

Front-line social workers are responsible for implementing requirements and when doing so should take into account individual preferences and respect the

‘client’s self determination’ (Thorén, 2005, p.9). Requirements do not apply to lone parents with children under three years of age. Other lone parents may be expected to look for appropriate work, subject to the discretion of the social worker. ‘Employable’ claimants are generally required to register with the public employment service before they can make a claim. More intensive support for employable social assistance recipients is at the discretion of the municipality. In practice, it appears that such municipal discretion has resulted in a ‘vast array of interpretations of who can be required [to work] and what clients are required to do’ (Köhler et. al., 2008, p.283).

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5.5.2 Evaluations of labour market programmes

There are many evaluations of the impact of Swedish labour market programmes for those receiving unemployment benefits. Researchers have investigated impacts through analysis of comprehensive longitudinal social insurance data sets or through surveys of participants and leavers. Many such studies have explored the differential impact of various requirements or programmes on anticipation and treatment effects.

Several reviews of the findings from such evaluations report that jobsearch activation is the most effective way of shortening unemployment spells, and that the most effective intensive programmes are those more similar to a regular job, especially employment subsidies, while classroom-based vocational training and temporary job programmes are the least effective (Adda et. al., 2007; Sianesi, 2007; Köhler et. al., 2008). Other studies that consider aggregate data on employment trends qualify such findings pointing out, for example, that programmes like employment subsidies have far greater displacement effects, thereby reducing any net impact they show in micro-level studies (Köhler et. al., 2008). Only a few evaluations discriminate between the impact of programmes on men and women, and they provide little insight into the specific experience of lone parents.

There is no systematic monitoring, and few evaluation studies, of the smaller scale and diverse municipal activation programmes. Dahlberg et. al. (2008) cite two such evaluations. In the first model participants were required actively to seek work and report regularly to their case worker on their efforts. A cross-sectional analysis revealed the programme had no effect on the length of time a person claimed benefits or on their probability of getting a job. The other study assessed the impact of eight projects in one city, involving some 600 participants. There were variations in the programme but all involved case-manager support aimed at stimulating jobsearch, with an emphasis on persuasion, albeit some sanctions were imposed. The study compared outcomes with earlier matched cohorts who had not received such assistance. It reported a ‘modest’ effect on employment outcomes but no reduction in welfare payments.

In their own study, Dahlberg et. al. (2008) evaluated mandatory activation programmes that were implemented across Stockholm at different times between 1998 and 2004. The programmes required all employable applicants to register with the public employment service prior to processing their application, to report on jobsearch activities, and to attend a jobsearch support centre for three hours each day. This quasi-experimental evaluation took advantage of the variation in administrative data generated by the gradual implementation of the requirements.

The researchers controlled for local labour market conditions. They were able to capture both anticipation and exit effects reporting that the introduction of mandatory activation led to a reduction in the probability of claiming welfare and an increase in the number who entered employment. The intervention appeared to work best for unemployed young people and immigrants, with lesser effects for lone parents with young children.

Lone parent work-related requirements in the US, Australia, Sweden and the Netherlands

Swedish studies report variation in how requirements and sanctions are implemented by front-line staff. Not only is there variation between official municipal policies, but it appears that social workers are able to influence the

‘message’ of welfare reform and that front-line practices ‘frequently diverge from formal intentions’ (Thorén, 2005, p.1). Such variation has been found also in the public employment service, even though there are standard national rules, with one study finding that, in some local offices, ‘almost every unemployed person that fits the requirements is activated in the programmes, while in other offices there are none’ (Köhler et. al., 2008, p.284).

5.6 Lone parent work-related requirements in