Interstellar

We are going to set up a Joint Consultative Commission which will in effect, act as a a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

• falsification of num ber of test range ABM launchers dism antled in 1973.

These critics of SALT charge the C arter regim e of unseem ly delays in raising questions w ith the Soviets over the issue of Soviet compliance w ith SALT.48 Senator H u m p h rey s charges th at w ith respect to the construction of Soviet launch control silos (III-X Silos), these w ere first constructed in 1970, and challenged by the US in 1973, and not resolved u n til 1977, representing a 'delay' of seven years. As Senator G ordon H um phrey pu ts it:

... while III-X launch control silos first appeared in 1970, we did not question the Soviets about them until mid-1973, and we did not resolve the question to our satisfaction until 1977. N evertheless, the A dm inistration claims th at on detection, all SALT com pliance p ro b lem s have been im m ed iately p ro teste d to the Soviets, and th en have been p ro m p tly resolved in the Standing C onsultative Com m ission (SCC). ... From first construction of the X-III Silos, it took three years before w e d etected a p ro b lem and even q u estio n ed the Soviets, and seven years before we "resolved" the question. A nd o u r re s o lu tio n a m o u n te d to n o th in g m o re th an accepting the Soviet position.49

The strid en t tone of Senator H u m phrey's accusations requires closer inspection. Firstly, the silos w ere detected at least as early as 1972, and h a d been erro n eo u sly counted am ong existing ICBM silos for the pu rp o ses of SALT I. Secondly, w hen additional silos w ere ad d ed in early 1973, these were questioned in June 1973 - only 3-6 m onths after detection. The collection and analysis of intelligence evidence is a time consum ing process, requiring judgem ent and skill to w ork w ith often

48 Buchheim, R.W. & D. Caldwell. The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.

49 Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification." International Security Review. 5.1 (1980): 1-26. p.5

am biguous data. To present a case through the SCC requires reasonable certainty th at an am biguous or questionable com pliance behaviour is occurring. D u rin g the four years in w hich this question (am ong a n u m b er of others) w as d iscu ssed , th ere w ere ju st eight ro u tin e m eetings of the SCC, betw een which, respective replies to questions w o u ld have been an aly sed by the a p p ro p ria te o rg an isatio n (see o rg an isatio n a l ch art F igure 2.1). T hat the issue w as resolved by ’accep tin g the Soviet p o sitio n ' reflects and confirm s th a t launch control silos are not restricted by the ABM Treaty and therefore was not a violation in the first instance. The idea that am biguous (and in fact not a com pliance issue) behaviours should be im m ediately "protested" to the Soviets completely fails to recognise the purely consultative and non-judicial function of the SCC. Finally, to rush in to protest w ithout p ro p er evaluation of the intelligence data w ould be nothing short of irresponsible. This and other issues will be raised later u n der the aegis of the respective adm inistrations u n d er review . The po in t I w ant to m ake here, is that any evaluation of the perform ance of the SCC m ust keep in m ind its purely consultative function. The compliance agenda, how ever, represents only p art of the SCC's function.

Im portantly, as Buchheim (1979) points out, the SCC was given a w ide brief from the outset as authorised in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. In a d d itio n to its resp o n sib ilities relatin g d irectly to the raisin g of compliance questions arising from the ABM Treaty itself, the SCC was also charged with:

consideration of possible changes in the strategic situation, c o n s id e r a tio n of a m e n d m e n ts to th e T re a ty , a n d co n sid eratio n of p ro p o sal for fu rth er m easures aim ed at lim iting strategic arm s.50

By incorporating such provisions into a treaty of unlim ited duration, B uchheim notes, a channel of com m unication betw een the parties on the issue of arm s control in strategic w eapons has becom e chartered and institutionalised in an arrangem ent that will alw ays be available to them . Furtherm ore, by em phasising the distinct and separate character of the SCC from the SALT process, a channel of com m unication rem ain s available even d u rin g tim es w h en a difficult negotiating clim ate prevails.

2.5 Privacy

The SCC has been described as "a silent service of our time."51 The resolution of com pliance issues is, by nature, a delicate and sensitive process. R ecognising this, the R egulations of the SCC52 (num ber 8) stipulate that:

50 R.W. Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979, p.5 see notel.