January. Press reaction to Sukarno's statement was varied: the Age and
West Australian reported it without comment; the Advertiser and the Sunday
Maü carried a leading article by Denis Warner in Djakarta, stating that
"Australians in Djakarta accept it /Indonesian control of Dutch New Guinea in 1950/ almost as an accomplished fact" and remarking that "some
Australians in Indonesia do not know where to draw the line between building good fellowship and preserving Australia's defence lines"2 (4.1.50). With this comment, Warner defined the dilemma that was to trouble many
Australians for the next twelve years. Both the Melbourne Herald and the
Sydney Morning Herald took a stronger line on Sukarno's statement. The ^e^kourne Herald insisted Australia must have a full say in the disposal of this territory, and said it was vital that a friendly, strong and
II
The Sunday edition of the C.M.
Warner's report criticised the Indonesian case that Dutch New Guinea had always been administered as part of East Indonesia and therefore should
be transferred automatically. He also referred to the Dutch case,
pointing out that a fair section of the Dutch people were not interest- ed, and that most of the pressure came from a Catholic minority wanting to protect their missionary interests, and from a section of the Dutch
military who were concerned with vague strategic considerations. In
any case, the economic potential of Dutch New Guinea, said Warner, was not regarded as important.
progressive administration take care of Dutch New Guinea until "its
peoples are competent to decide political questions for themselves". It
concluded that Indonesia had no clear cut claim and had huge
responsibilities already (2.1.50).
The Sydney Morning Herald strongly denied Indonesia's claim,
saying that "this lordly range of covetousness has no basis in history,
ethnology or practicality". It argued that it was time for the government
to make a frank statement "of our vital interest in the maintenance of the status quo in an island so closely adjoining our mainland....it is an
imperative requirement of Australia's security that no dangerously premature nationalism should be injected into New Guinea" (5.1.50).
At this point, it was clear that all papers preferred to see the
status quo maintained in West New Guinea. Concern with Australia's
security, with the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory, and the effect that a nationalist Indonesian administration would have on East New
Guinea, were all put forward as reasons for this preference. The descript
ion of the Indonesian claim as captious and pretentious, and the
denigration of Indonesian capacity to administer the territory also began
at this time, and added a quasi-xenophobic element to attitudes. It was
soon apparent that defence considerations were paramount. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial conveys something of the fervour of this concern:
Australia is hard up against the frontiers of Asia and....her empty lands represent a temptation to teeming millions crowded into limits too narrow for comfort and sometimes even for subsistence... the day will surely come when, with new strength and assurance, and under the powerful stimulus of nationalism, it /Indonesia/ takes tally of its 70 million people and looks
at Australia's north with covetous eyes. (25.9.51)
This concern centred chiefly on New Guinea, but Australians' confidence in
the efficacy of Dutch-Australian control of the island as a defence barrier
had been undermined by the near success of the Japanese invasion. This had
reinforced tremendously their belief that "if there was one military lesson to be drawn from the war with Japan, it was that New Guinea must be an
integral part of Australia's defence system" (S.M.H. 28.3.50).
The press perception of Australia's "vital interest" in New Guinea is clear but to which threats was New Guinea to act as a barrier? Fears of a Japanese military resurgence remained potent for some time after
the signing of the peace treaty with Japan in 1952, but unlike W.M. Hughes who believed that Sukarno wanted control of Dutch New Guinea "in
2
order that he may sell the pass to his friends the Japanese" (S.M.H. 16.6.50), the press did not link fear of Japan with the claim for West New Guinea. The chief threat envisaged by Australians in the post-war period was that of Chinese communism. The general tensions of this period were made specific for Australians first by the successes of the Chinese Communist revolution, by the Korean war in which Australian troops were engaged against the communists, by upheaval in Southeast Asia where Indo china seemed likely to "turn communist" if the French withdrew, and in Malaya where communist insurgency was beginning to be a problem. This external instability which was always linked with communism, together with the Menzies government's propaganda war against Australian communists, gave a powerful ideological character to Australians' threat perceptions.
The reasons put forward by the press for opposing the Indonesian claim were reinforced in 1950 by fears, first of an Indonesian expansion into East New Guinea and then by a perception that Indonesia might turn communist.
Fears of Indonesian expansion were triggered by a statement reported on 31 January in The Hague, by Muhammad Yamin, adviser to the Indonesian delegation at the Round Table Conference. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Yamin "gave Indonesia's territorial claims in this order: 1. Dutch New Guinea, 2. Australian New Guinea, 3. Portuguese Timor, 4. British North Borneo" (31.1.50). In spite of an avowal from Djakarta that Yarnin's statement was officially unauthorised, most Australian papers took his claims seriously, as a pointer to Indonesian government intentions. The West Australian, as the most extreme, argued that if the Dutch failed to retain sovereignty or control under trusteeship "the best way of protecting Australia's national interests is to prepare to take steps directed towards the extension of Australian control over the whole of New Guinea" (31.1.50). The Melbourne Herald told its readers that the claim "opens a new chapter in the imperialistic tendencies of the new republic" and "must be taken as a pointer to the way some official minds
See P.C. Spender Exercises in Diplomacy, and J.G. Starke The A .N .Z .U .S . Treaty Alliance.
2
in Indonesia are thinking on this subject". This last point was of some
importance: the claims put forward by Yamin in 1950, with the exception
of the Australian New Guinea claim, were made by Yamin in 1945 (on grounds of race and security) in an address to a committee preparing for
Indonesian independence."^ They were opposed by Mohammad Hatta (later premier of Indonesia) who stated that "our precise objective is that area
2
of Indonesia which was previously ruled by the Dutch". Hatta felt that
/
not only would Yarnin's demands be regarded as imperialist, but believed
they were unrealistic on grounds of defence and administration. Yet
Yarnin's views, however narrow their currency within the Indonesian govern ment, served to add substance to fears of Indonesian expansion into East New Guinea.
3
The growing membership of the P.K.I., and Indonesia's "active and independent" foreign policy which the Sydney Morning Herald
characterized as playing "ball with the agents of Soviet-Communist imperialism" (8.5.50), fed these fears in the following years, as did a
widespread distrust of Sukarno, "the Japanese puppet" or "quisling" and
"self-confessed Marxist". Of all the papers, the Sydney Morning Herald and
the West Australian saw the threat of an Indonesian communist expansion as immediate and inevitable, and a conflict emerged between their evaluation of Australia's defence interests in New Guinea and its role as a friendly neighbour to Indonesia. Although the dilemma remained unresolved, the Sydney Morning Herald saw Australia's interests in New Guinea as "cardinal" and "paramount" and whenever it perceived the government to be hesitating in its priorities, it grew increasingly impatient and critical of the
government's stance. Thus it pressed the government to state definitively
Australia's opposition to an Indonesian takeover (28.3.50), to develop East New Guinea rapidly as "other people had hungry eyes on it" (31.3.50), and to campaign for a United Nations grant of strategic trusteeship of the
territory to Australia (8.6.50); an impracticable suggestion as the
U.S.S.R., which supported Indonesia's claim, would have vetoed any Australian claim in the Security Council.
Yet most Australian newspapers, not completely convinced of the merit or strength of the Dutch case, began to look to some kind of United
^ H. Feith and L. Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-65, p. 438.
2 Ibid, p. 442. 3
The P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party) had 12,000 members in 1951, and in 1954, 160,000 according to the S.M.H. 26.11.54.
Nations trusteeship for West New Guinea as the best solution, although the Age and Courier Mail continued at this stage to expect that the Dutch
could hold on indefinitely. The case for an Australian takeover was echoed widely in the community.1 2 Dr Evatt pressed for Australian trusteeship "but if she /the Netherlands/ is willing to hand it over, it might be possible for Australia to purchase that territory" (S.M.H. 9.6.50), a view that was put in the letter columns of the Sydney Morning Herald (for example,
26.8.50).
When the case for Indonesian control appeared (infrequently) in the letter columns of the press, it produced an immediate reaction. Most of those few who wrote to the press to support the Indonesian case were either Indonesians, other Asian students, or people who had lived in Indonesia or who had travelled there. One such letter, supporting
Indonesia's claim (S.M.H. 17.6.50), produced a spate of emotional replies: one correspondent told the previous writer that he should travel over the Kokoda trail, and asked rhetorically "if Indonesia had had New Guinea during the war would they have stopped the Japanese?". It is interesting that although the Dutch do not figure largely in the heroic myth of the salvation of New Guinea, this letter writer felt "our very existence is at stake - with the Dutch we are safe" (S.M.H. 16.6.50) .
When Sukarno's 17 August 1950 Independence anniversary address was reported in Australia, most papers found in it the threat that
Indonesia could and might use force to gain Dutch New Guinea, although an estimate of Indonesia's capacity to mount an invasion could not be reconcil ed with the belief that "Indonesia is militarily incapable of co-operating effectively in the defence of New Guinea" (S.M.H. 11.12.50) .
The Indonesian Foreign Ministry, in a reply to Mr Spender's
2
official statement in August opposing the claim, attempted to calm Australian fears: it reassured Australia that Indonesia would not
interfere in East New Guinea, that Australians could regard West New Guinea in Indonesian hands as "a neutral barrier to the north of Australia" and felt that "if Australians could achieve a good understanding of Indonesian claims this would establish a lasting friendship between the two countries"
(S.M.H. 2.9.50) . The implication that Australians did not understand the 1 See above, pp. 17-18.
2
See below, p. 169, where this statement is discussed. Mr Spender was Minister for External Affairs, 1950-51.
Indonesian case was correct. Readers of the Australian press in 1950 (and for some years later) would have searched in vain for a reasoned
examination of the Indonesian claim. The press avoided arguing the merits of the Indonesian case except on the most legalistic of grounds. Australian readers would have had a more balanced view if there had been some
discussion of the rights of successor states in the decolonisation process, and some discussion of why India and other newly independent states support ed the claim. Some balance might also have been provided by a more critical review of Dutch motives for holding on to the territory. A flat rejection of Indonesia's claim by the press, although understandable in the climate of Australian opinion, was so rigid and unforeseeing that it only led to extreme positions being taken up. There was no acknowledgement in the press that Australia had no legal right to insist that her interests be taken account of in the dispute, nor that she lacked the power to back up such insistence. Thus statements like "Australia must reserve the right to take whatever action she thinks necessary to protect her own security /If the Dutch leave7" (S.M.H. 11.12.50), could only lead to a false sense that Australia could decisively intervene in the dispute.
In 1951 and 1952 there was little news of West New Guinea or Indonesia in the Australian papers. Apart from the Browse Island "scare"
2
in September 1951, there was little public comment on the issue in Australia. It was not until July 1953, when Mr Casey, Minister for
External Affairs and Mr J.M. Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, met to discuss technical co-operation in both territories in New Guinea,3 that there was a resurgence of press interest in the issue. Some of the hysteria of 1950 had gone by 1953, and a more sober and informed appraisal of the issue was beginning to appear. For example, when Dr Tamzil, the Indonesian charg£ d'affaires, asked Casey to make an unequivocal statement on
whether Australia had entered a military pact with the Dutch over West New ^ See below pp. 43-44, for comment on a different kind of assessment appearing 2 in the press.
A ship's captain, returning from the north coast of Western Australia, reported that Indonesian fish poachers had landed on Browse Island in the Timor Sea. Both governments - Perth and Canberra - initially had some difficulty in finding out who actually owned Browse, but meanwhile "Fears were expressed in Darwin that the Indonesians may be using illegal fishing operations to cover up the dumping of fuel and ammunition on the islands" (S.M.H. 24.9.51). These fears proved groundless and the fishermen in two sailing ships and a number of dugouts, together with a quantity of dried fish, soon returned home. 3
Guinea (S.M.H. 9.7.53), this was reported without comment, as was a later Indonesian Foreign Ministry warning that "Indonesia will consider any relationship between the Netherlands and a third country concerning West New Guinea a violation of the friendly relations between such a third country and Indonesia" (S.M.H. 20.9.53) . One might wonder whether Mr Casey's diplomatic tactic of "cold storage" abroad had also been applied to cool opinion at ho m e .
As the year went on it was clear that the Australian press was generally more hopeful about the outcome of the dispute. The Casey-Luns discussions of July brought to the attention of the press Dutch moves to develop West New Guinea. The Sydney Morning Herald now looked for further developments in Dutch-Australian co-operation so that as the eastern and western halves developed, the ultimate self-determination of both would be achieved, and the Indonesian claim thwarted. Increased Dutch investment was welcomed as a sign that the Dutch intended to stay and also the proposed elective council for West New Guinea, which was a pointer to future political development. A series of articles by Jack Percival in the Sydney Morning Herald dealt with the difficulties that the Dutch faced, with a population of more than a million Papuans, of whom only 200,000 had been brought under administration. For the first time it was acknowledged in the Australian press that the Dutch had shown little interest in the territory when Dr Jan van Baal, the Governor, was quoted as saying: "Here we have been serious
about development for only about three years" (S.M.H. 16.11.53).
The hope for dual development of New Guinea over a long period could not long disregard the renewed strength and impatience of Indonesian feeling in 1954.^ The Hague Conference of Dutch and Indonesian officials opened on 29 June 1954, but on the Dutch refusal to negotiate on the West New Guinea issue, the Conference broke down and Indonesia withdrew from the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.
Indonesia's reply to the Dutch refusal to negotiate was to appeal to the United Nations to discuss the question. A day or so before Mr Casey announced that Australia would resist the inclusion of the issue
2
on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, the Sydney Morning ^ The Ali Sastroamidjojo government (1953-1955) pursued the West New
Guinea issue more assertively. See J.A.C. Mackie "Australia and Indonesia, 1945-60" in G. Greenwood and N. Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1956-60, pp. 287-88.
2
Herald doubted "the advantage to peace of opening up another question which will provoke bitter debates year after year without gain to either party,
or to the U.N. itself" (18.8.54). The Courier Mail was similarly opposed
to an appeal to the United Nations on the grounds that: "The U.N. has no
competence to judge the dispute unless both parties ask it to do so"1 (20.8.54) , but the Melbourne Herald regarded it as "a matter of principle
for us not to obstruct the attempt of the Indonesian government to have the claim discussed in the U.N. General Assembly....We can concede the right of the Indonesians to be heard at the U.N. without in any way admitting that their claim is sound" (19.8.54) .
In the last two months of 1954, the Australian press devoted increasing space to the passage through the United Nations of the Indonesian request urging negotiations over West New Guinea. A leading article by
Mr Casey arguing for a waiting period "until they /the West Papuans^7 are sufficiently articulate to express their desire for self-determination, as one day they surely will be" appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald
2
(23.11.54) and other papers, and Sir Percy Spender's speech in the Political Committee which claimed "There is not one dissentient voice in Australia today, political or individual, which would deny that the security
of Australia and the security of New Guinea are indivisible" (S,M.H.
26.11.54) also received wide coverage. In the event, Indonesia won the vote
in the Political Committee but failed to gain the necessary two-thirds
majority in the General Assembly to support its call for the parties to the dispute to seek a solution.
In 1955, the West New Guinea issue lay dormant except for some Australian press comment on the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April.
Guy Harriott reported to Sydney Morning Herald readers that "Irian has