Much like Golding and Middleton cautioned in the early 1980’s, it can be argued that “the diffuse waves of public anxiety that rippled out from the storm centre of economic
recession were closing in over the poor and the welfare systems on which they depended”
(1982:4). Although written some time before the economic crash of 2008/09, this also appears to be the case following the recent recession, heightened further by the
implementation of austerity measures. Hills argues further, that the word welfare itself is now increasingly “used to conjure up a picture that the source of Britain's budget deficit”
(2015:19) were benefit recipients and their plentiful welfare payments. For Park et al. the
consequences of such a rhetoric are clear; we are living in a society inhibited by
scepticism, where the “public appear unconvinced by…current collective responses to key social issues like welfare, inequality, housing or the environment” (2012a: xx). Hill
continues, describing an increasingly polarised society, one comprised of the “strivers” and
“skivers” (2015:1). Explaining this mentality further, Hills (2015:1) argues:
it’s skivers against strivers; dishonest scroungers against honest
taxpayers...benefits street against the rest of the country; undeserving and deserving. It's them against us. We are always in work, pay our taxes and get nothing from the state. They are a welfare-dependent underclass, pay nothing to the taxman [sic], and get everything from the state.
The above is descriptive of what Bottero refers to as “symbolic demarcations between them and us” of which “have important consequences for the fate of people who become assigned to such categories” (Bottero, 2005:234). As noted above, this mentality not only perpetuate acts of “symbolic violence" (Mckenzie, 2015:16), such expressions also exist as a form of “class racism” (Atkinson et al., 2013:35). That said, however, these
perceptions are not necessarily reflective of the British population in its entirety. What they do highlight, however, is how class abuse is both in existence and is problematic, arguably acting as both a symptom of and cause of class polarisation and thus operating as a barrier to successfully ending inequality.
Notably, trends in perceptions of inequality and poverty, demonstrate that the proportion of people who believed there was “very little” poverty in Britain, based on BSAS data,
increased from 28% in 1994, to 35% in 2000, before increasing further to 45% in 2006 (Park et al., 2012a:166). This is whilst the proportion, who believed there was “quite a lot”
of poverty, decreased over the same period, falling from 71% in 1994, to just 52% in 2006.
Further, although in 2000 36% of people believed poverty had increased over a ten-year period, by 2006 just 32% believed it had, whereas 23% stated it had decreased (Park et al., 2012a:166). More recently, further changes have occurred. As Clery and Dangerfield (2019:11) highlight, by 2018, 62% of the British public agreed that poverty had increased over a ten-year period, and this is increase from just 48% in 2009. These attitudinal
changes suggest that the British public have become more likely to recognise the extent of poverty in Britain over time. Further, by 2018, showing an increase from 2009, and 2006, 65% of the British public felt that “quite a lot” of real poverty existed in Britain (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:11).
Although both inequality and poverty remain substantial, the proportion of people who are aware of this, appears to fluctuate over time. Whilst the proportion of people able to recognise the extent of income inequality in the UK has increased over time, Clery and Dangerfield argue that this may be a result of “the rise in political and media discourse around poverty”, and this they argue further may have “influenced perceptions of its prevalence” (2019:11). That said, for a considerable proportion of the British public, poverty remains under recognised or perhaps misunderstood. Relatedly, Hall et al. found in their research, that the word poverty itself is “problematic” when used in the context of the UK (2014:4). People thus find the word poverty a “loaded” concept, one that often
“evokes issues faced by people in the developing worlds, rather than in their own
communities” and thus as a UK phenomenon (Hall et al., 2014:5). The failure to recognise inequality and poverty as a UK phenomenon could perhaps begin to explain why poverty in Britain is often under recognised (Hall et al., 2014).
For the majority of people (82%) in 2000 however, the gap between those with high incomes, and those with low incomes was “too large” (Park et al., 2012a: 24). This figure fell, year on year, before increasing again to 74% in 2006, yet the proportion of people who believed that such differences were “about right” held at 15% in both 2000, and 2001, before increasing to 22% in 2002 and 2006 (Park et al., 2012a:24). More recent data shows some consistencies, in 2018, 78% of the public agreed that the gap between people on high and low incomes was “too large”, whilst far fewer (16%) felt that this gap was “about right” (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:13). Comparatively, just 2% agreed that the gap was “too small” (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:13). This data suggests that large
numbers of the British public are consistent in the view that the income gap between groups is “too large”.
Despite this, other research also suggests that there is a strong sense of inevitability found, when addressing all aspects of economic inequality, including the pay gap, where people express a “sense of fatalism”, noting that such occurrences are “inevitable” or explained by the assertion that this is “just the way it is” (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:15).
Interestingly, as Bamfield and Horton found, despite relatively high numbers stating that the gaps between incomes are too large, perceptions of people on lower incomes are markedly “more negative and punitive”, in comparison to the views held of those at the
“top” (2009:6). Their research revealed that the majority of people believe that individuals are responsible for their economic and social positions, noting further that
conceptualisations of those impoverished and receiving benefits, were largely drawn from stereotypical assumptions (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6). So much so, that people
“struggled to conceptualise them [the poor] in positive terms” (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6). Bamfield and Horton note that such opinions are not only widespread, but that these relate to the view that there are opportunities for all, yet these are effectively untaken by all.
Thus, individualistic explanations of disadvantage are particularly prevalent.
Such views are further compounded where individuals are believed to be feeding into the
“something for nothing” criteria, where there is concern that not all people will make
“reciprocal contributions back to society”, often in the form of future employment (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6). Perhaps reflecting this view further, public support for the
government redistributing income from the “better off, to the less well-off” also declined, from 38 per cent in 2000, to 32 per cent in 2007 (Park et al., 2012a:27). Park et al. also note that support for more taxation and a rise in public spending has also seen a reduction since 2001 from 61 per cent to 30 per cent in England in 2010 (2012a:28). Similarly, Bamfield and Horton highlight a strong sense of entitlement throughout their research, noting how people tend to resent “the idea of their hard-earned money going to support layabouts who were bleeding the state dry” (2009:22, my italics).
Throughout the literature scrutinised to date, the idea of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’
remains consistent, as does the idea of ‘inevitability’ and ‘choice’. For instance, perceptions of why there were people living “in need”, highlighted that the numbers of people who believed “laziness and a lack of willpower” was the cause, rose from 23 per cent in 2000, to 28 per cent in 2003, before decreasing slightly to 27 per cent in 2006 (Park et al., 2012a:166). The majority of people each year, however, believed that this was
“inevitable in modern life”, whereas the third largest proportions of people were found to respond asserting “injustice in society” was the reason (Park et al., 2012a:166). For Bamfield and Horton “much of the UK population subscribes to some type of belief in fair inequality on the basis of desert” or described differently, “that some inequality is fair because it is deserved on the basis of differential effort and contribution” (2009:7).
More recently however, Hall et al. found that people offered a number of potential causes for poverty (2014). They found that people believed that poverty had worsened following the 2008/09 recession, noting how both structural and economic reasons were drawn
upon, including the cost of living, a lack of job opportunities and the numbers experiencing in work poverty were cited (Hall et al., 2014). There was however a continuation of
perceptions of people as ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ their experiences. Those within the former groups, were seen to have “chosen a life of poverty”, whereas those falling within the latter category were seen to have “no control of their situation” (Hall et al., 2014:5) and therefore, did not deserve their plight.
Curtice (2016:1) points to further attitudinal changes amongst the British public, where he believes “there are signs of a reaction against the fiscal discipline of recent years”.
Strengthening this point, Curtice highlights how in 2016, 48% of the public agreed with the statement: “the government should increase taxes and spend more” (2016:1). Whilst less than half the British public subscribed to this view, the proportion of people holding this view increased each year from 2012, where just 34% of the public agreed that the
government should spend more (Curtice, 2016). Thus, the level of agreement recorded in 2016 was “a higher proportion than at any point during the last 10 years” (Curtice, 2016:1).
These changes are reflective of the “Thermostat effect”, whereby the public, “like a thermostat”, begin to push against government policies, intimating that they do not wish a particular “policy direction” to continue to be pursued (Curtice, 2010:2). Alternatively, again utilising Curtice’s approach, had the public’s attitudes fit more closely with the
“Weathervane effect”, attitudes towards an increase in taxation and greater spending by the government, may have been less popular amongst the public (2010:2).
In the context of voters, Curtice explains the “Thermostat effect” succinctly where he states:
if government starts spending more money on something, and as a result the quality and/or quantity of a service improves, voters gradually come to the view that no further action needs to be taken. If on the other hand, government cuts back on spending and as a result the service comes to be seen as less satisfactory, then there are calls for government to spend more (Curtice, 2016:3).
Reflective of this latter point, as Curtice contends, the shift in attitudes toward an increase in taxation, and more spending over this period suggests that people were “beginning to react against the ‘austerity’ of recent years” (2016:11-12). Given this, it could be argued that the public are becoming increasingly aware of wider structural issues and how these impact on fellow citizens lives.
Reflecting much of the literature drawn on, the following section continues to draw out public perceptions of inequality and poverty, utilising research concerned with the content and impact of the series Benefits Street.
2.5.2 Perceptions of Benefits Street
Notably, there are consistent negative opinions held towards people experiencing poverty and inequality. However, there have been instances where the public have revolted, demonstrating a distinct sense of public distaste for the representation of people
experiencing poverty and inequality in programmes such as Benefits Street. For instance, Red Faction, supporters of Middlesbrough Football Club, wielded a banner which read
“being poor is not for your entertainment”, alongside an additional banner, which read
“Fuck Benefits Street” (Love, 2014: no pagination). Reportedly, residents from Stockton, also expressed their disdain, throwing eggs and chasing Benefit Street’s film crews away (Cain, 2014).
Research has also sought to understand how members of the public reacted to Benefits Street on social media platforms like Twitter (Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 2015; Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 2018). van der Bom et al. (2018:4) emphasise how “cultural products, such as television programmes, are one popular topic of discussion on social media”, with their research highlighting conflicting perspectives.
With a focus on the second series of Benefits Street, van der Bom et al. followed
“instantaneous reactions” from 4,086 different Twitter account holders, whom were tweeting in direct response to scenes, as they aired (2018:3). van der Bom et al. note
“evidence of scrounger discourses, negative evaluation of individuals, generalisations about benefits claimants”, alongside individuals keen to question both the “hygiene and morals” of the people they encountered (2018:9).
Issues of consumption also featured negatively within responses to the programme, to highlight this, van der Bom et al. cite one Twitter user’s response, whereby they wrote:
“they are all struggling to pay bills and buy food. But where do they get their cigarettes from?! #benefitsstreet” (2018:9). Similarly, Bauman’s (2007) notion of ‘flawed
consumerism’ was also identifiable during the festive period, with one user exclaiming:
“this lot are deluded they don't work, squander what they get on fags and booze then complain they can't afford Christmas lol! [laughing out loud] #benefitstreet” (van der Bom
et al., 2018:9). Alongside this discourse, a “political commentary” also emerged, with users drawing on wider social implications (van der Bom et al.,2018:12). To illustrate, one user wrote: “new series of #BenefitsStreet on @Channel4 ... Bleak. Expect more poverty on your doorstep in #ToryBritain over the next 5 yrs.? Thanx4That”, with another referring to the Conservative election victory some days earlier, stating: “to celebrate the #Tories win, Iain Duncan Smith proudly brings you a brand-new series of #BenefitsStreet #IDS #DWP Pure Propaganda TV” (van der Bom et al.,2018:12).
Despite scrutiny, the people featured on Benefits Street were nevertheless, depicted “as
‘scroungers’, ‘scum cunts’ and ‘lazy twats’ who are given ‘lucrative’ amounts of money but are too lazy to find employment”, such depictions for van der Bom et al. are “typical of scrounger discourse”, implying that people in receipt of benefits “do not really need the money to survive” (2018:10) .Or, as van der Bom et al. succinctly suggest “that is to say, their flawed consumerism is further evidence of their general low worth as human beings”, pointing further to the prevalence of an ‘underclass discourse’, which is descriptive of “a cluster of human characteristics that are generally undesirable”, inclusive of characteristics such as “laziness, drug-taking, low intelligence and, sometimes, ‘scrounging’” (2018:10).
The research thus emphasised how:
the tweeting audience of Benefits Street II drew heavily on cultural stereotypes in forging indexical links between individuals’ social
characteristics and an underclass identity (van der Bom et al., 2018:17).
Whilst Baker and McEnery also found that Twitter users expressed outrage, hostility and drew on stereotypical assumptions of people in receipt of benefits in their research, they maintain that other posts revealed a “picture of online activism” (Baker and McEnery, 2015:261). Expecting to see words like scrounger and poverty used in negative way, Baker and McEnery highlight how each of these words were actually often used
sympathetically, noting that “two thirds of tweeters used the word scroungers in tweets that were critical of the word”, with one user stating that: “labelling all benefit recipients as scroungers…easy way out. Open your eyes instead of comparing them to those on Benefits Street” and another declaring that: “poverty porn sells better than community outreach” (2015:261). Other tweeters were keen to inform other Twitter users that they were being invited to “hate the wrong people” (Baker and McEnery, 2015:260).
Brooker et al. also highlighted within their study of Twitter responses to the first Benefits Street programme, that the public held both differing and contradictory opinions (2015).
Whilst it was noted that a “large amount” of what they found “could be characterised as being abuse, or perhaps, joking pejorative”, it was noted that “this behaviour was mostly targeted towards people depicted in the programme, as well as towards the broader social class that those individuals supposedly represent” (Brooker et al.,2015:3185). This
included their homes, clothes and again their consumer choices. Furthermore, public reaction to the programme Benefits Street, as they note, was actively encouraged
amongst social media users of Twitter, via an “official hash tag #benefitsstreet” (Brooker et al., 2015:3177). Brooker et al. upon analysing 124,000 tweets from Twitter users, noted how Twitter acted as a “platform for both abuse of the people represented and to support discussion related to the wider political narratives surrounding welfare in the UK”
(2015:3177-8).
Comments from Twitter users, according to Brooker et al. were “predominantly negative”, again, comprising negative “observations relating to the appearance of the residents and the ways in which their homes and James Turner Street itself were presented”
(2015:3180). Alongside the vilification of the residents on the street, tweeters were also concerned with their representation in the documentary, noting how some users felt that the footage was edited “to meet popular stereotypes”, one user for instance stated:
“regardless of what people think of those ‘scroungers’ the truth is their [they are]
vulnerable and channel 4 have set them up” (Brooker et al., 2015:3181). Interestingly, this particular twitter user appears to point to the framing of benefit recipients and indeed vulnerability, yet draws on negative, yet popular discourse to do so.
Suggesting further instances of “online activism” (Baker and McEnery, 2015) Brooker et al.
found a number of users who referred to fraudulent claiming of benefits, taxation and how other tweeters should consider: “REAL benefits cheats”, such as the “bankers and MPs”
(2015:3182). The broadcasters “intentions” were considered, in relation to the number of viewers the show attracted and further questions as to who “had funded and
commissioned the series”, such debates led one twitter user to state: “the govt [government] who owns the broadcaster that showed #benefitsstreet have a vested interest-cuts or abolition to welfare”, and another media user to argue that this programme had an agenda, where they wrote: “AGENDA: demonise those on welfare; introduce
reforms, desensitise injustice, fabricate consensus…ACTION: propaganda” (Brooker et al., 2015:3182).
Paterson et al. (2016) sought to understand differing public reactions to Benefit Street, further, analysing how participants responded to clips of Benefits Street in focus groups.
Reportedly, “judgement” of those featured on the programme were passed by focus group participants, frequently reflecting a perceived “benefits culture in wider society” (Paterson et al., 2016:199-200). They also found that the respondents felt that a “very narrow view of people on benefits” was provided, prompting one individual to think of the television series, Shameless and another to assert that the programme was: “exploiting people …because they just show…a stereotype or ideology in society about maybe a sort of class or certain groups of people” (Paterson et al., 2016:199-200).
Interestingly, Paterson et al. ponder whether these perceptions, and others where
respondents have queried whether the programme could actually have “a positive effect”, with the participants believing that, given “the problems of people on benefits…somebody is actually taking an interest now rather than just sweeping it aside”, are indicative of:
an awareness that the lives of those on Benefits Street are viewed through a particular lens can help to position some participants as resistant readers to the stereotypes that they claimed they saw portrayed (2016:199-200).
Paterson et al. (2016: 212), however, also argue that a “case can be made for the position that poverty porn facilitates the evocation of negative evaluations”, given that particular clips played to respondents, led to a discussion of wider stereotypical assumptions, of which were not portrayed within the particular clips (including teenage pregnancies).
Notably, the research also revealed a lack of “affinity with the people…on screen”,
although benefit recipients were “slightly more sympathetic”, Paterson et al. note however
although benefit recipients were “slightly more sympathetic”, Paterson et al. note however