In the second period, the conflict continued to escalate, while changes in state leadership and inconsistent policies contributed to the further embedding of Maoist actors and the use indiscriminate violence against civilians. This period was one of the most eventful and included an intervention by the King on October 4, 2002; the appointment of four successive prime ministers; a royal massacre on June 1, 2002; and the formation and deployment of the Armed Police Force (APF) to combat terrorism in 2002.
On April 2001, Police Inspector Dhruba Kumar Dulal was killed during a Maoist attack, which later resulted in major disagreements between police chiefs and government officials. In response to the attack, temporarily-deployed police actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians in the contested zones. Many civilians reported that state actors’ behaviour had become more violent and erratic during this
period (INSEC, 2002; Sushil Pokharel, 2014).86 The Maoists changed their strategy as
well. In one instance, Maoists rebels, who were wandering between villages as they fled from state actors, came across a Unified Marxist–Leninist (UML) member, named Nim Lai Rokka, from Jhenam-Rolpa. They beat him to death because he refused to provide them with food. Many locals recalled that the Maoist actors appeared frustrated during the increased attacks by state actors (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 561). On June 8, 2001, 12 policemen and seven civilians, including a three- year-old, were killed when Maoists attacked a police post in Panchkatiya village. The police post had been newly installed, and there were repeated demands for its
removal. Many villagers claimed that the “post was used to confuse the Maoists” (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 52) because it was based near civilian area. Embedded Maoist actors also increased the use of indiscriminate violence87 against civilians in
their areas to regain the control they had lost.
On July 26, 2001, after five years away, Sheur Deuba became Prime Minister again and appealed for dialogue and a ceasefire. On August 3, 2001, the first round of peace talks was initiated. After several rounds of talks, Deuba agreed to release arrested Maoists actors.88 Nevertheless, on November 23, 2001, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal
Daha (known as Supremo Prachanda) issued a statement asserting that the
government had rejected the main demands of his party, which marked an end to the ceasefire. The Maoists then simultaneously launched a major attack on police and army posts in 42 districts, killing 186 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and police
86 http://www.insec.org.np/ (accessed on 12/03/2017).
87 The use of violence, disappearances, and killing as a method. 88 (http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/ (accessed 23/06/2014).
personnel.89 In one instance, on November 22, 2001, in the Ghorahi of Dang District,
an army base was attacked killing 14 soldiers, and trucks loaded with hundreds of weapons were stolen (Marsh, 2007, p. 60). Overnight, the army was unleashed against the insurgents, mobilising both tanks and artillery to respond only to the Maoist attacks.
On November 26, 2001, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba declared a nationwide state of emergency and suspended parts of the constitution.90 State actors were
temporarily deployed to engage in battle with the Maoists. In early 2002,91 the RNA
was deployed under operation “Unified Command.” Operation “Unified Command” was launched after attacks on army posts in Doramba village in central Nepal, consisted of 4,000 police actors,92a unit of 15,000 paramilitary combatants, and the
Armed Police Force (APF), who later assisted the RNA actors. The APF was newly formed by an RNA chief and included many former police and RNA officers who had left their positions due to Maoist attacks during the early years of the conflict.93 The
state also established Terrorist and Disruptive Ordinance (TADO) laws, which provided state actors with broader powers to arrest people for suspected terrorist activity (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 35). TADO allowed the RNA to detain suspects without trial for up to a year, fostering an atmosphere of license among state actors.
During operation “Unified Command,” state actors were temporarily deployed to Maoist-held regions and civilian areas. This often included sending state actors on
89 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/nepal and http://www.gurkhabde.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Kukri_2011.pdf (accessed on 05/7/2016).
90 Sub clauses (a), (b) and (d) of Article 12, Clause 1 of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23. 91 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed
24/08/2014).
92 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060704/asp/foreign/story_6434825.asp (accessed 23/07/2014).
93 https://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed
temporary-deployment to infiltrate the Maoists zones; but the actors were unable to distinguish between embedded Maoist actors and civilians, which led to
indiscriminate violence. The RNA also used armed helicopters to fire on suspected Maoist zones. On November 30, 2001, in Meldhara, Rolpha district, RNA actors fired from an army helicopter, reportedly killing five civilians who were observing Baraha Pooja, a religious festival (Thapa, 2003, p. 268). From this period onward, many of the state operations to target Maoist actors became significantly more militarised in nature.94 When RNA actors caught Maoist actors, they also killed innocent civilians
because it was extremely difficult to differentiate between the embedded Maoist actors and civilians. In the districts of Nepalgunj, Pyuthun, Raraodi, Jajrakot,
Lamjung, Gulmi, Surhkhet, and Dunai,95state actors struggled to differentiate between
civilians and embedded actors. This resulted in civilians being “piggies-in-the-
middle” between Maoist embedded actors; this led many of the civilians in these areas to experience indiscriminate violence.
On January 21, 2002, the Maoists declared a central People’s Government with Barburam Bhattarai as its head. However, operation “Unified Command” led to the capture and killing of several embedded Maoists. To increase their numbers and respond to these attacks, the Maoists chose to implement forced recruitment of civilians on a “one-child-per-home” basis. Many of the newly recruited actors were under-aged, according to United Nations Integration and Rehabilitation Programme (UNIPR),96 at the time. Those who refused to join were often killed as a display of
94 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed
18/05/2014).
95 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1801813.stm (accessed 07/07/14).
96 See http://www.unirp.org.np/Home.aspx (accessed on 10/3/2017). See also Interview no: 005 conducted on
strength and to regain control in the zones in which they were based. Prior to this period, Maoist actors were not commonly known to forcefully recruit civilians.
According to INSEC data, in 2000, there was an increase in the number of civilians killed by the Maoist and state actors. In 2001, the total number of civilians killed by the state accounted for approximately three quarters of the overall deaths, almost 4.5 times higher than the number of civilians killed by Maoist actors. INSEC data also shows an increase in the number of killings by the state (over 3,000 recorded deaths) between 2002 and 2003. The number of battle-related deaths between actors and non- civilians progressively rose during this period.
The level of indiscriminate violence experienced during Period 2 reflects the involvement of new state actors97 in the conflict and their “take-no-prisoners”
approach towards the Maoists (Thapa, 2003, p. 306). This weakened the legitimacy of the state, led King Gyanendra to dismiss the Deuba Government and assume
executive power on October 4, 2002.98 Changes in leadership during this period (four
prime ministers in total) contributed to the confusion and frustration of state actors, allowing Maoist actors to expand and increase their use of “hit-and-run” and “hide- and-seek” tactics. Maoist actors also regarded the government as weak and aimed to exploit this position. Counterinsurgency efforts by the APF and RNA, contributed to the increase in indiscriminate violence by state actors. In an interview with a police officer from Dang, he remarked:
97 The inclusion of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the Armed Police Forced (APF). 98 http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/conflict_resolution/KBNepal2005.pdf (accessed 15/08/2014).
Soldiers are taught to engage the enemy differently than the police, the police live amongst the communities and are selective, even when we shoot to kill; while RNA, on the other hand, will shoot first and ask questions later.99
The Maoists’ strategy of embeddedness made it increasingly difficult for APF and RNA actors to distinguish between Maoists and civilians. Once the APF and RNA were activated, state actors were temporarily deployed to Maoist areas. This strategy failed and caused many of the state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. State actors found it especially difficult to distinguish between Maoist actors and civilians, because the Maoists had been allowed to spread throughout the country. Techniques, such as shooting from helicopters and ongoing “search and destroy” operations added to the increase in indiscriminate violence cases (Thapa, 2003, p. 308).
The Maoists intensified their efforts by expanding fixed and deployed missions to increase their control in contested and uncontested zones. This included expanded operations and attacks on RNA, police, and government infrastructure in the eastern and western regions. An increase in “hide-and-seek” attacks frustrated fixed and temporarily-deployed, RNA and APF actors. The Maoists also launched other tactics, such as sending women and cows (considered gods in Hindu culture) ahead before they attacked state actors. Increased state pressure and attacks under “Unified Command” caused the “cat and mouse” situation to continue.