Categorías, subcategorías y matriz de categorización

A. DEFINITION

B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS C. WHO MAY EXERCISE

D. TESTS FOR VALIDITY OF EXERCISE E. ILLUSTRATION ON THE EXERCISE II. EMINENT DOMAIN

A. DEFINITION

B. WHO MAY EXERCISE C. REQUISITES

III. TAXATION

A. DEFINITION AND SCOPE B. WHO MAY EXERCISE C. LIMITATIONS

D. DOUBLE TAXATION

I.

Police Power

A. Definition

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. Mayor of Manila (1967): It is the inherent and plenary power of the state which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.

B. Scope and Limitations

1. Scope

General Coverage:

Rubi vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-14078 (March 7, 1919)

"The police power of the State," one court has said, "is a power coextensive with self- protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.)

It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.)

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati

Bank and Trust Co. (1979):

…the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. (citations omitted)

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assoc. vs. Mayor of Manila (1967):

...has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, (Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163) extending as it does "to all the great

public needs." (Noble state Bank vs.

Haskell, 219 U.S. 412) Specific Coverage  Public Health  Public Morals  Public Safety  Public Welfare 2. Limitations US vs. Toribio (1910):

The legislative determination “as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.” (Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele [152 U.S., 133, 136]

C. Who May Exercise

1. Legislature

Police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature.

2. Executive

By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the president, administrative bodies, and lawmaking bodies of LGUs (R.A. 7160, sec. 16).

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Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty (1915):

...this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid.

Note: MMDA vs. Garin (2005):

Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. (MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000) BUT it is not precluded—and in fact is duty-bound—to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and

traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. (Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924)

D. Tests for Validity of Exercise of Police Power

1. LAWFUL SUBJECT: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular class required exercise).

2. LAWFUL MEANS: Means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and is not unduly oppressive

E. Illustrations on the Exercise of Police Power

1. National Security

Ichong vs. Hernandez (1957):

SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) which sought to nationalize the retail trade business by prohibiting aliens in general from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Aliens did not question the exercise of police power; they claim, however, that there was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses.

Scope of the police power: Since the Courts

cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.

Police power and national security: “The

disputed law was enacted to remedy a real

actual threat and danger to national

economy posed by alien dominance and control

of the retail business; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.”

2. Public Safety

Agustin vs. Edu, (1979):

Agustin questions President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 229 compelling owners of motor vehicles to install specific early warning devices to reduce road accidents. Agustin already installed warning devices in his car but they were not the same ones specified in the LOI. He argued that the said LOI violated the police power of the state for being oppressive, arbitrary and unconscionable.

Police power, public safety: The Court

identified police power as a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to

obstruct unreasonably the enactment of

such salutary measures calculated to

communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. According to the Court, a heavy burden

lies in the hands of the petitioner who questions the state’s police power if was clearly intended to promote public safety.

3. Public Morals

Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. vs. City Mayor of Manila (1967):

Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Assoc. assails the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760.

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The grounds adduced were: (1) unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose different fees for different classes of hotels/motels and prohibit 18 year-olds from being accepted in such hotels, unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion more than twice every 24 hours, and (2) invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination because it requires clients to fill up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein personal information are mandated to be divulged.

Police power, public morals: The mantle of

protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. Police power is "that inherent and

plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society xxx There is no

question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.

Cf. White Light Corporation, et al vs. City of

Manila (2009):

The case of White Light vs. City of Manila was termed by Justice Tinga as a “middle case”. It was meant to identify its case within a spectrum of cases decided by the Supreme Court which dealt with ordinances which has for its view the regulation of public morals.

It is called a “middle case” because unlike its predecessors where the issue is either a wholesale ban against hotels and motels or a reasonable regulatory device as the one found in Ermita-Malate vs. City of Manila, this is a case where the ordinance in question severely restricts the services of the abovementioned establishments.

The ratio decidendi started with an outline of the test of a valid ordinance i.e. it must be within the corporate powers of the local government to enact and pass and it must conform with substantive requirements.

A reading of the ordinance at bar would yield that it prohibits two practices: the wash rate admission and renting out a room more than twice per day.

These prohibitions are anchored in the power of the LGU to implement ordinances hinged on the general welfare clause—the devolved aspect of police power.

This case churned out three standards for judicial review: the STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

for laws dealing with freedom of the mind and curtailment of political process and the RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF REVIEW for economic legislation. A third standard was created known as the IMMEDIATE SCRUTINY for evaluating standards based on gender and legitimacy.

The Supreme Court justified the application of

the strict scrutiny test to this particular

ordinance despite its lack of political significance by saying that it is not gravitas alone which is sheltered by the Bill of Rights. It is precisely

these reflexive exercises of fundamental acts which best reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed.

Sexual behavior is one of these fundamental acts covered by the penumbra of rights.

While the reality of illicit activity is judicially recognized, it cannot be denied that sexual behavior between consenting adults is constitutionally protected.

Apart from the right to privacy, the ordinance also proscribes other legitimate activities most of which are grounded on the convenience of having a place to stay during the short intervals between travels.

The Ordinance was struck down as an arbitrary intrusion to private rights. It made no distinction between lodgings and placed every establishment as susceptible to illicit patronage.

4. The National Economy

U.S. vs. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060 (January 26, 1910)

Police power, national economy The State

can restrict or limit private use, if such is deemed by the legislature to be detrimental to the public welfare.

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In this case, the general public interest and the country’s material welfare is affected because of the contagious disease that threatened to kill all the carabaos in the country, such carabaos being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes.

The scarcity of these animals, the increase in their sale value, and the prevalence of carabao thefts, justified Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of these work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and. “…it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the

slaughter of carabaos for human

consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community

from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners.

II. Eminent Domain

Art. III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just compensation.

Art. XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.

Art. XIII, Sec. 4 The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.

To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,

taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.

In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Art. XIII, Sec. 9 The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under- privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.

It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. Art XIV, Sec. 13. The National assembly may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

A. Definition

It is the right of the government to take private property with just compensation.

Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, G.R. No. L- 15870 (December 3, 1919):

The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. (citations omitted)

B. Who May Exercise

Inherently:

 Executive  Legislative

Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, G.R. No. L- 15870 (December 3, 1919):

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…the performance of the administrative acts necessary to the exercise of the power of eminent domain in behalf of the state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive.

…where the Legislature has expressly conferred the authority to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the Chief Executive, the right of the latter to proceed therein is clear.

…"Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent." (citations omitted)

By Delegation:

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919)

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.

The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances.

The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the

authority upon a municipal corporation to

exercise the right of eminent domain is

admittedly within the power of the

legislature.

But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

When a stature or charter or by general law has conferred the right of eminent domain upon a private entity. (Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. L-6690, March 29, 1912) AS EXERCISED BY CONGRESS AS EXERCISED BY DELEGATES Extent of Power Pervasive and all- encompassing Can only be as broad as the enabling law and the conferring authorities want it to be Question of Necessity Political question Justiciable question. RTC has to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for its exercise, as well as what the property’s value is Re: private property Delegate cannot expropriate private property already devoted to public use C. Requisites Generally

a. Taking of Private Property b. for Public Use,

c. with Just Compensation, and d. Due Process.

Specifically

(LGUs, Sec. 19, Local Government Code): a. Ordinance by a local legislature council

is enacted authorizing local chief executive to exercise eminent domain, b. For public use, purpose or welfare or for

the benefit of the poor and of the landless,

c. Payment of just compensation,

d. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to owner of the property sought to be expropriated but such offer was not accepted (Municipality of Parañaque vs. VM Realty, 1998)

Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 (October 26, 1983):

The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the

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problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs.

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.

Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

III. Taxation

A. Definition and Scope

It is the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of the government and for all public needs.

It is as broad as the purpose for which it is given.

Purpose:

 To raise revenue  Tool for regulation

 Protection/power to keep alive

B. Who May Exercise

 legislature (primarily)

 local legislative bodies (Sec. 5 Art. 10, 1987 Consti)

 President (o a limited extent, when granted delegated tariff powers under Sec. 28 (2) Art. 6, 1987 Consti)

C. Limitations

General Limitations

 Power to tax exists for the general welfare; should be exercised only for a public

purpose

 might be justified as for public purpose even if the immediate beneficiaries are private

In document FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y HUMANIDADES (página 25-0)