By defining beginning as a potential for dura- tion rather than as a point that together with an end point delimits a duration, I hope to open the possibility for viewing duration as process rather than solely as product. Of course, when an event is completed, its duration is a product — duration will then be determined and past. By saying that it is past, I mean that nothing can be done to alter this duration, and by determinacy I
mean this fixity or unalterability. But by saying that it is past I shall also mean that this duration is available as past for a present event — that it is or can be involved in the becoming of another event, for example, by being compared with another duration. Durational determinacy is achieved only when the event is past, but if this past event had no effect on a succeeding event or were not involved in the becoming of some larger event that included it, we could have no present awareness of durational determinacy.
If durational determinacy is linked to the ef- fect a duration has or can have on the forma- tion of other events, we may speak of degrees or types of determinacy. And later I will argue that a specific sort of determinacy characterizes the durations we call metrical. But before turn- ing to this topic, I would like to qualify some of the remarks I made concerning the role of beginning and end in determining durational quantity.
I said earlier that beginning and end are defi- nite decisions, and I implied that for there to be duration there must be a definite beginning and end. However, there are many events that do not have a definite beginning or end. For instance, the silence that precedes the sound in example 6.1 could be regarded as an event if we have some awareness of silence as such and thus feel a duration of silence. This silence might have a definite beginning if it ended a preceding sound and if we were to focus our attention on this be- ginning. But even without a definite beginning, we might become aware of silence as an event if we are awaiting an event that will break the si- lence. Since we live in a relentlessly echoic envi- ronment, what I have called silence here is sim- ply a lack of interest in this sonic environment relative to our interest in the sound represented by the line in example 6.1. The silence I wish to represent by the empty space to the left of the line is the relatively amorphous silence that might be described as a relaxation of attentive- ness to sound and a waiting for a sonic event that will catch our attention. If there is no definite decision to begin this waiting or this relaxation of an attentiveness to sonic events, beginning is indefinite. In this case, the now of silence will not be the feeling of a definite duration thus far realized. Instead, the now of silence is a relatively 78 A Theory of Meter as Process
unfocused awareness of the sonic environment and a readiness for the coming of an event that could more sharply focus our attention. Since this readiness has a history, the silence can grow old, and we can feel some duration of silence. If we are aware of waiting and the absence of an event that would break silence, we can feel some length of silence. In other words, we can be aware of having deferred focus and having awaited a return to focus (in expectation that there will be an end to silence) for some time and feel this to be a relatively long or short time.
Nor does the end of an event that has a defi- nite beginning necessarily create a definite dura- tion. If there is not a definite beginning for a new event that would make the present event past, the end of the present event will be inde- terminate and the duration of the event will be indeterminate. Thus, in example 6.2, it will be impossible to say precisely when this piece of music ends. Here, at the conclusion of the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata op. 2/1 in F Minor, the last sound definitely ends with the immediately succeeding silence, but the movement does not end here. If applause begins when the last sound ends (questions of concert etiquette aside), the applause will have interrupted this movement, this coda, and the duration promised with the beginning of the last sound. It will take some indefinite amount of time for this movement to end and for the otherness of the sonic environment to gradu- ally assert itself. The silence that ends this event (or, rather, this multiplicity of events) will grad- ually become a silence of waiting for a new beginning.
I have introduced these examples to show that definite decisions for beginning and ending are not necessary for a feeling of duration, and in
such cases we may say that duration is indeter- minate. Presumably then, any event with a defi- nite beginning and end will have a determinate duration. If beginning and end are simply points that delimit a duration, this distinction would suffice. However, even in events that are clearly delimited there is considerable variation in the definiteness of our feeling of duration. For ex- ample, a single sound lasting two seconds pre- sents a duration that is in a certain sense more determinate than the duration of a sound lasting ten seconds.
In example 6.3a the duration of the first sound when it is completed is still “available” as a feeling of just this definite quantity — we can judge a second sound to be equal to this dura- tion, or we can produce a second sound of equal duration (i.e., “reproduce” the duration of the first sound). However, in the case of example 6.3b we will find it very difficult to produce a second sound of precisely the same duration or to judge that a second sound is precisely equal in duration to the first. The duration of our ten- second sound is also still available as a feeling of a relatively long sound and can be compared to a noticeably longer or shorter sound, but it is available only as a relatively indeterminate dura- tion and not as a precisely felt quantity.
We might say that the beginning has faded from memory and with it a potential for a deter- minate duration. As we are listening to the first sound, after, say, seven seconds, the sound’s be- ginning is still active for the present event be- cause this sound is still going on and still grow- ing in duration — a duration that could now be felt as relatively long. But we can no longer feel the duration thus far realized as now entirely or vividly “present.” After some time a feeling of the determinacy of past, realized duration will
Preliminary Definitions 79
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abate, and the past act of beginning will cease to be available as a potential for a definite feeling of this sound’s duration. Beginning is still active, and what is past of this sound must be relevant to its present becoming if we can now be aware of a single sound that has been going on for some time.What is now irrelevant and excluded is not past sound, but what had been a potential for a determinate feeling of duration. This was a potential of beginning, and this potential has now been denied. And whatever definite feeling of duration there was in the past will have be- come in itself irrelevant for what the sound has now become and for what is now its potential. The potential that remains is the potential for more sound, or the possibility that the sound will continue, and the potential for a new begin- ning. And this latter possibility can manifest itself in an expectation of or expectancy for a new be- ginning and an opportunity to regain a feeling of durational determinacy — eventually, perhaps, in a feeling of impatience or boredom or in an inattentiveness resembling the feeling of silence I described earlier. In the course of its becoming, the duration of the sound will become increas- ingly indeterminate. Certainly, the sound has duration, but the now indeterminate duration of the sound — a duration that is gradually losing its memorability or potential for reproduction — is increasingly being measured by waiting and by a prolonged expectancy for a novel event. After ten seconds, when the sound has ended, the en- tire sound will be past, but the immediate past of the sound will be more vividly felt than its more distant past. And in a succession of very long,
unmodulated sounds, we will not hear from sound to sound, beginning to beginning, but rather from “ending phase” to “beginning phase.” In such cases, I maintain that there is a gradual change of focus whereby our attention gradually shifts from duration realized to future becoming. Since the sounds in examples 6.3a and 6.3b have definite beginnings and ends, their dura- tions are, strictly speaking, determinate, but there is a clear difference in our feeling of durational determinacy. To make a distinction, I will call the durations in example 6.3a “mensurally de- terminate” and those in example 6.3b “mensu- rally indeterminate,” or simply “determinate” and “indeterminate.” I will say that a duration is men- surally determinate if the duration has the po- tential for being accurately or precisely repro- duced. In this case, the duration can provide a definite measure of duration for comparison with another (latter or earlier) event. A feeling of determinacy together with the definiteness of this feeling is a condition for there being a pre- cise reproduction or comparison. “Precise” here does not mean “objectively” precise, measured by the clock. Rather, it refers to a subjective judgment — a feeling of confidence that our re- production is precise or that our comparison is an accurate comparison. Such judgments may depart from the measure of a clock. Thus, the second sound in example 6.3a might have a du- ration of slightly longer or shorter than that of the first sound, and we might, nevertheless, feel that the two sounds are equal in duration. Or our reproduction in example 6.3b might be pro- portionately as accurate as our reproduction in 80 A Theory of Meter as Process
EXAMPLE6.3 Distinctions of mensural determinacy
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example 6.3a, but even if this were the case, I be- lieve that our uncertainty would be greater in 6.3b than in 6.3a. Since this feeling of precision admits of degrees, the distinction between deter- minacy and indeterminacy often cannot be sharply drawn. However, in examples 6.3a and 6.3b this distinction seems clear enough.
Since determinacy has been defined as a po- tential for comparison or reproduction, an actual comparison or reproduction is not necessary for a duration to be regarded as mensurally determi- nate — its “measure” belongs to it alone as a def- inite and past feeling of duration that may or may not be used as a measure for a new event. For a duration to be determinate in this sense, the event must be completed — it must have a definite beginning and end. And yet, while the event is going on, there is, nevertheless, some definiteness in the duration thus far realized, and the active potential for its continued increase in duration is also a potential for the becoming of a mensurably determinate duration or for the continuing “memorability” of its duration. If the event goes on too long, it will have lost this po- tential, though not, of course, the potential for growing in a duration that has become, increas- ingly, mensurally indeterminate. In this case, I will say that the beginning has lost its potential- ity for the becoming of a (mensurally) determi- nate duration.
In example 6.3a the two sounds are separated by a brief pause of relatively indeterminate dura- tion. By saying that this duration is relatively in- determinate I mean that if our attention is fo- cused on the two sounds and on two begin- nings, we may not be especially interested in the silence as an event that begins and ends and that attains a definite duration. If we actually produce a second sound as a reproduction of the first sound’s duration, the silence could be regarded simply as a gap between stimulus and response. If we compare two sounds that are played for us, the silence will be a waiting for a second sound. Here the precise duration of silence will have lit- tle bearing on the act of reproduction or com- parison. Of course, if the silence is too long, the “memorability” or what I have called the rele- vancy of the first sound’s duration will be lost, and we will lose confidence in the accuracy of our judgment. Since this memorability seems to
fade gradually and since our feeling of accuracy admits of degrees, it is difficult to say precisely when the silence might become too long or when the mensural determinacy of the first sound might be lost. But if the silence is not too long — that is, if we can more or less confi- dently judge equality — this gap or nonevent has little effect on the mensural determinacy of the first sound. Certainly, the silence does function to make the sound past and to end the potential of the sound’s beginning. But if we are not at- tending to the silence as an event, our attention can be directed to the possibility of a second for which the now fixed duration of the first sound has become potentially relevant. The determi- nacy of the first sound’s duration is also relevant for a “larger” event that includes both sounds. And this event will be past only when the first sound has become the first of two sounds of equal duration.
In example 6.3c I have indicated three sounds. In this case, it will be possible to judge that the first and third sounds are of equal dura- tion or, if we are given only the first two sounds, to produce a third sound equal in duration to the first. And again, if the silences are not too long, I believe we could be relatively confident in the accuracy of our judgment or reproduc- tion. If this succession of sounds is played for us, the special relevancy of the first duration for the third will emerge only when the third sound is completed. Now we could hear in this sequence the contrast of two durations — long and short — and a “return” to the first duration. Thus, the durational determinacy of the first sound is still available after a comparison with the second sound is made; and although the first sound has now become something more particular — now the longer of two sounds — neither its mensural determinacy nor the determinacy of the second sound’s duration is affected by the act of com- paring. I should add here that such judgment or comparison is not limited to the simple distinc- tions of equal, longer, and shorter. By judgment I mean a feeling of the particular similarity or dif- ference of the two quantities, a feeling of just these durations and their relative lengths.
In light of the preceding discussion, mensural determinacy might be defined as the “presence” of a past and determined duration as a definite
potential that can function as a “measure” for a later, but not necessarily immediately successive, event. I have focused primarily on equal mea- sure because the mensural determinacy of the past duration can be most easily tested by at- tempting to reproduce the past duration (not the past event) as present. If we have decided to re- peat the first duration, the beginning of the sec- ond sound is a definite potential or a potential for a definite duration — the beginning of the second sound is the beginning of a duration equal to the first. On the other hand, if the sounds are played for us, the possibility that the second sound might become equal in duration to the first is not especially privileged.
Assuming now that we are not producing these sounds and attempting to reproduce the duration of the first sound, the beginning of the second sound is not the definite potential for a reproduction of the duration of the first sound. If, in fact, the second duration upon completion is equal to the first duration and we judge the two durations to be equal, we must say that there was a potential for this judgment and that the determinacy of the first duration was a condi- tion for this judgment. But there was, equally, a potential for the second to be longer or shorter than the first and a potential for judging the dif- ference between the two durations. Here there is no “weighting” of potential in favor of equality. The beginning of the second sound, like the beginning of the first sound, is a potential for a definite duration, but I will say that in neither case is this a definite potential or the promise of a particular durational quantity. Like the duration of the first sound, the duration of the second will be determined when it is past. But since the sec- ond sound does not begin as a duration equal (or unequal ) to the first, the durational potential of its beginning is indeterminate and this potential is unaffected by the now determinate duration of the first sound. This is not to say that the second sound and its duration are unaffected by the first. If there is a comparison, then clearly what the second sound becomes is determined in part by what the first sound became. Although upon its completion the first sound will have a fixed dura- tion, the determinacy of this duration is not past if it is a potential that is presently involved in the becoming of the second sound.
Although the two sounds shown in example 6.3a are mensurally determinate and can be judged equal in duration, this succession is not, as I shall say, “metrical.” To be felt as metrical, the two events must be immediately succes- sive — the beginning of the second event must make the first event past. In example 6.4a I have eliminated the pause between the two sounds. Here the beginning of the second sound func- tions to end the first sound and thus to deter- mine its duration. As a result, the second begin-