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(SSK). In the context of the current thesis this is integral - as it informs the emergence of discourse analysis and the theoreJcal stance behind its methodology - parJcularly the study conducted by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) which informs the fundamental approach of this thesis. SSK changed the sociological interpretaJon of science and the producJon of scienJfic knowledge. This is important in relaJon to the thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it incorporates areas such as

parapsychology into its analyJcal focus. Secondly, it changed the approach to analysing such areas - viewing science as a socially and culturally negoJated area that was acJvely constructed by those involved.

2.2 Sociology of ScienRfic Knowledge (SSK)

2.2.1 Emergence of SSK

Pre-1970s sociology of science focused on the examinaJon of social insJtuJons of science, analysing its collecJve norms, moJvaJons and structure. Fundamentally, such analysis enforced the idealisJc perspecJve of scienJfic pracJce and adhered to the view that scienJfic knowledge producJon was a purist endeavour. Prime examples of this being Merton’s (1973) dissecJon of insJtuJonal values and legiJmising norms; or the organisaJon of communiJes within science (Crane, 1972). Kuhn’s (1962) ‘The Structure of ScienJfic RevoluJons’ began to seed a change of perspecJve towards this posiJon - suggesJng that natural science could itself be interpreted as a funcJon of cultural forces.

During the 1970s the sociological analysis of science underwent a transformaJon that changed the core percepJon of scienJfic knowledge and its construcJon. Sociological focus iniJated

“opening the black box” (Whitley, 1972) of science, such as construcJonist conflict theory (R.

Collins, 1975). Analysis shiwed away from the insJtuJonal infrastructures and more towards the actual content of science, highlighJng the cultural producJon of knowledge and the role of interpretaJon that yielded different scienJfic conclusions (Dolby, 1971). This new approach challenged the tradiJonal perspecJve of the implementaJon of science at all levels and

introduced how “the role of human factors in science and how scienJfic knowledge is conJngent and constructed by the operaJon of these factors - the social character of scienJfic

insJtuJons” (Labinger and Collins, 2001: 5).

The research iniJaJves stemming from the work of Harry Collins, Michael Mulkay, Barry Barnes and David Bloor can be interpreted as the origin of what became known as the ‘Sociology of ScienJfic Knowledge’ (SSK). These researchers provided the blueprint for the interpretaJve and methodological focus by which to analyse science, parJcularly Bloor’s (1991) ‘Strong Program’, governed by the principles; causality, imparJality, symmetry and reflexivity. In general, two research iniJaJves generated the bulk of SSK research. The ‘Bath School’ of SSK focused on micro-sociological processes, implemenJng observaJonal methods; alternaJvely the ‘Edinburgh School’

concentrated on macro-sociological processes and historical methodology. Researchers under SSK, such as Hess (1997), Gieryn (1982, 1995, 1999) and Mulkay (1976a) outlined the idealism that was synonymous with prior sociological analysis of science, for example Merton’s (1973) depicJon of the four norms of science. This idealism was not representaJve of the social processes that may actually be occurring within scienJfic communiJes and could be labelled as descripJve rather than prescripJve (Zingrone, 2002: 7).

Collins (2002), a key proponent of this new direcJon, refers to this change as “the second wave of science studies” (2002: 239). Central to this was the incorporaJon of a social construcJvist perspecJve towards how science funcJons and how scienJfic knowledge is produced and governed:

“In the social studies of science and technology, the term “social construcJvism” is owen used as a general label for studies that examine how social variables shape the papern of choices about what research gets done, how it is done, how choices among theories are made in controversies, and the extent to which observaJons, laws theories, and other knowledge claims become accepted in wider scienJfic communiJes.”

(Hess 1997: 35)

The sociologist’s fundamental role changed from one of documenJng how the scienJst funcJoned in their environment to now quesJoning how they negoJated knowledge claims (Collins and Evans, 2002). Research focus now centred on how research and knowledge claims are accepted or rejected as much on the social and poliJcal elements surrounding them as on their empirical merit.

The work of BriJsh sociologist Harry Collins was a driving force in developing in-depth

ethnographic studies of scienJfic knowledge, implemenJng a methodological relaJvist approach as part of SSK. As such, reviewing aspects of his work provides an illustraJon of the key apributes of this approach. Collins’ research has predominantly focused on controversies and debates in high presJge areas of physics. HIs early work examined the detecJon of gravitaJonal radiaJon, providing a representaJon of the social and poliJcal machinaJons that underlie knowledge disputes (Collins, 1975). His invesJgaJons revealed that the experimental work into gravity waves became governed by social-poliJcal forces and not by objecJve science or the phenomenon itself.

For example:

“…scienJsts’ conclusions regarding the existence of gravity waves rested on the degree of charity invested in their interpretaJons of events…In science [a] lack of charity implies a defence of the status quo and a licence to expel anomalous findings from the body of scienJfic knowledge. Charitable interpretaJons imply the opposite…The existence of gravity waves is now literally incredible…their demise was a social (and poliJcal process). Where Weber disJnguished between the physics and poliJcs of experiment, I have tried to show that they are not so easily disJnguishable.”

(Collins, 1981b: 53-54)

The above quote is personified via the scienJst Quest and his acJons acJons against Weber’s gravitaJonal wave experiments in Collins’ (1981b) study. Colleagues confided to Collins that Quest had made the scienJfic controversy a personal maper. DescripJves such as “holy crusade”;

“vindicJve”; “obnoxious” and “self-delusion” (Collins, 1981b: 46-47) were used to depict Quest’s apparent vendepa against the phenomenon of gravity waves. One scienJst encapsulated this senJment with the reflecJon that the debate became “no longer about physics” (1981b: 46-47).

Collins’ research successfully demonstrated how a supposedly objecJve scienJfic problem had become a deeply personal issue. EssenJally, Quest iniJated a “holy crusade” to nullify Weber’s original findings in the shortest Jme-frame possible. Instead of construcJng a research

programme that would test the complete enigma of gravitaJonal waves, Collins (1981b) revealed how Quest’s team simply developed an experimental posiJon from which they could destroy Weber’s findings. A finding which highlights the necessity and usefulness of the relaJvist perspecJve when undertaking sociological analysis of scienJfic controversies. Collins’ (1981a, 1981b) methodological stance allowed him to gauge the true extent to which the gravitaJonal

wave debate had gone beyond objecJve science. A perspecJve that allowed the conclusion that, in this case, social and poliJcal pre-disposiJons were governing the outcome of scienJfic research as opposed to the science itself.

Collins’ (1998) later research into the sociology of gravitaJonal wave detecJon showcases further cultural nuances within scienJfic pracJce. The analysis of different laboratories (Italian verses American) displayed that the meaning and interpretaJon of scienJfic data is largely dependent on the “evidenJal culture” of laboratories (1998: 293). Subsequently, contrasJng evidenJal cultures,

‘open’ verses ‘closed’ or ‘individual’ versus ‘collecJve’, influences the interpretaJon of research findings. Collins (1998) highlighted how different laboratories employ different levels of staJsJcal significance and interpretaJve risk when analysing their research, thus leading to different comprehensions of outcomes and decisions concerning the publicaJon of findings. This research depicts the way in which the cultural climate dictates research and its pracJces – mainly due to the pressure of securing funding. UlJmately, this highlights a deep-rooted concern of how data and published papers will be received in the immediate scienJfic community, a consideraJon that appears to influence the analysis of the data itself:

“But keeping report and interpretaJon disJnct are not easy; the meaning of a paper is in the eye of the beholder. It is not always the case that papers are read or interpreted in the same way as the authors intends…it is more than just the science…How to present and analyse their potenJal findings are set within a framework of consideraJons that stretches in many direcJons…The very noJon of ‘data’ [itself]

depends on different scienJfic tradiJons and paperns of insJtuJonal forces…[ScienJsts should therefore]

have to accept the possibility that structural forces might affect their larger judgements in subtle and invisible ways.”

(Collins, 1998: 309-311)

Collins’ (1999) confirmed this proposiJon by revealing that different audiences, at different distances from the core-set, analyse scienJfic papers in different ways (1999: 163). Looking at the recepJon of published papers Collins notes:

“Results of experiments mean different things to scienJsts in marginal groups, as compared to the mainstream; a posiJve finding for researchers in a ‘rejected science’ is merely ill-analyzed noise for the

mainstream.”

(Collins, 1999: 165)

This analysis illustrates how different audiences demonstrate different interpretaJons, seemingly going beyond the objecJve science within the experiment/ paper. Subsequently, research that has the potenJal to be highly significant in its relevant field becomes invisible within the core-group;

Collins (1999) uses Weber’s research (Weber and Radak, 1996) as a specific example. When a subject or scienJst becomes progressively marginalised their research output becomes ignored and deemed irrelevant within the core-group, to the extent that papers aren’t even read and prejudice is overtly expressed – with no pragmaJc reflecJon on the potenJal impact of the research within the field. Subsequently, even the most revoluJonary and ground breaking research could be shunned simply because the values of the core-group exist in juxtaposiJon to the findings – creaJng a “poisonous atmosphere” (1999: 180).

Beyond Collins’ research other SSK research examples during the period include:

• Frankel’s (1976) delineaJon of corpuscular opJcs and how “in each case social factors combined with intellectual ones to influence the scienJst’s percepJons” (1976: 175) - demonstraJng the inherent complexiJes surrounding the producJon of science and emerging scienJfic knowledge.

• Collins and Harrison’s (1975) analysis of communicaJon and transfer of knowledge (tacit knowledge) amongst scienJsts.

• Pinch’s (1979) illustraJon that demarcaJon arguments are culturally dependent.

• Gibbons and King (1972) detail the historical scienJfic controversy which centred around the development of ovonic switches - Ovshinsky’s introducJon of a new kind of of semi-conductor based on randomly ordered amorphous materials. The study highlighted that a main contribuJng factor to the controversy was not the empirical basis of Ovshinksky’s work but his posiJon as a perceived ‘outsider’ to the scienJfic community and the subsequent contextual factors by which his suggesJons were presented.

• Amick (1974) and Mulkay (1976b) analysed the influence of scienJfic eliJsm and gatekeepers of science, suggesJng a substanJal difference between those that can be categorised as elites versus non-elites. Such eliJsm can be seen most clearly during contested knowledge claims through the resistance of new scienJfic ideas within science itself (Duncan, 1974).

CollecJvely this body of research contributes to what Collins and Pinch (1993) defined as the view that science does not exist as an automated mechanisJc process that yields flawless truths. SSK presents science as a human pursuit that is governed by social process and cultural elements that influence and dictate the human producJon of scienJfic knowledge. This remains key to the development of discourse analysis studies of scienJfic pracJce, and by extension this thesis. Work such as Collins’ highlight the social and constructed aspects of these scienJfic cultures and knowledge-claim debates. As such this informs the perspecJve that perhaps the scienJsts’

discourse in these areas is worth exploring - how are their discursive pracJces contribuJng to this construcJve aspect?

The next sub-secJons (2.2.2 and 2.2.3) will focus on the adopJon of the relaJvist perspecJve within SSK. In relaJon to the current thesis this is an important theoreJcal facet as it is

incorporated within the emergence of discourse analysis and informs that approach. Reviewing relaJvism within SSK allows a perspecJve of what informed the discourse analysis approach, including the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), and also by extension subsequent discourse analyJcal work - the foundaJon of the current thesis.